Clemson University

TigerPrints
All Dissertations

Dissertations

12-2015

RISK ANALYSIS AND DISASTER RECOVERY:
A FLORIDA LIHTC CASE STUDY
Valerie Hammett
Clemson University, vhammet@clemson.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations
Part of the Urban, Community and Regional Planning Commons
Recommended Citation
Hammett, Valerie, "RISK ANALYSIS AND DISASTER RECOVERY: A FLORIDA LIHTC CASE STUDY" (2015). All Dissertations.
1603.
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_dissertations/1603

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Dissertations by
an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.

RISK ANALYSIS AND DISASTER RECOVERY:
A FLORIDA LIHTC CASE STUDY

A Dissertation
Presented to
the Graduate School of
Clemson University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Planning, Design, and the Built Environment

by
Valerie Lynn Hammett
December 2015

Accepted by:
Dr. Mickey Lauria, Committee Chair
Dr. Stephen Verderber
Dr. Christopher Post
Dr. Tim Green
Dr. Jim London

ABSTRACT

In spite of numerous programs and policies that encourage private investment in
affordable housing, particularly after hurricane disaster, insufficient numbers of
affordable units exist to meet demand. Some low-income households are displaced in the
course of disaster recovery, and others face severe housing cost burdens as demand for
affordable housing outstrips supply. Some suggest competitive uses for limited funds
impede production. Others suggest that disaster and recovery policies tend to favor
homeowners and economic recovery. Little attention has been given to the development
decisions of affordable housing developers during disaster recovery. This study
examines LIHTC development risk after the 2004 hurricane season. Stated preferences
are identified from the public housing agency and LIHTC professionals to identify factors
that impede or encourage investment after disaster. Statistical and spatial analysis is
used to compare development patterns to risks identified from stated preferences of
LIHTC developers. The number of LIHTC units found within storm surge boundaries
places communities, households, and owners at significant risk. This study suggests that
policy preferences steer LIHTC development to coastal communities in spite of risk.
Ultimately, policy can also take steps to encourage mitigation of current and future
hurricane risks.

Keywords: affordable housing, coastal hurricane, disaster recovery, GIS, LIHTC, storm
surge
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Chapter 1
THE HAZARDOUS COAST

INTRODUCTION
The latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has sounded a
wake-up call for urban policy makers. Scientists have stated with 95% certainty that
human activity and greenhouse gases are extremely likely to be the cause of global
warming (IPCC, 2014). The effects of global warming include sea level rise, increasing
periods of drought, extreme weather conditions, and more extreme tropical storms and
hurricanes. Experts warn that in the U.S., Florida and Texas are especially vulnerable to
the effects of global warming (IPCC, 2014).
Florida has experienced exponential growth over the last 40 years. The
population increased by more than 195% from 1970 to 2010 (Florida Department of
Health, 2012). It is well understood that the most significant disaster risk for the state is
from hurricanes. The state is also vulnerable to sea-level rise, particularly in MiamiDade County, which is considered one of the most vulnerable locations in the country
(Revi et al., 2014, p. 555; Beatley, 2009). This study takes a closer look at how disaster
recovery and housing policy affected affordable housing development in Florida after the
2004 hurricane season, specifically multifamily housing produced using Low Income
Housing Tax Credits.
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DISASTER IN THE COASTAL URBAN ENVIRONMENT
The threat of disaster poses special challenges for coastal communities,
particularly in the multifamily housing sector. Programs and policies that effect
outcomes for community redevelopment after disaster typically favor homeowners and
economic development projects favored by community leaders and their constituents
(Comerio, 1988; Fischer and Sard, 2006; Peacock, Dash and Zhang, 2007). A constituent
could include business leaders, advocacy groups, or any other group that has access to
power (Rehfeld, 2005). When thinking about local and regional projects promoted by
those who control the purse strings within a community, the constituency generally
includes participants within the business community that favor allocation of funds to a
diverse range of redevelopment options (Comerio, 1988; Fothergill and Peek, 2004).
One subset of redevelopment is affordable housing.
This research focuses on redevelopment of affordable housing during disaster
recovery using the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program. Since 1996, the
LIHTC program has been the predominant mechanism for funding affordable multifamily housing production across the U.S. In spite of developer participation in LIHTC,
affordable multifamily housing shortages continue to be problematic, especially after
disaster. The intent of this study was to understand how LIHTC preferences influenced
affordable housing development after the Florida 2004 hurricane season by examining
perceived risk in the context of disaster recovery.
Growth and Development in Coastal Communities
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Since 1970, an exploding U.S. population has migrated to the coast. Population
on the coast has generally followed national trends. The problem, however, is coastal
population is concentrated within a limited land area (Crossett et al., 2004). A densely
populated coast places a significant burden on local and state governments who need to
assess environmental and economic challenges imposed by potential hurricane damage.
Hurricanes are the most common natural hazard in east coast communities, regardless of
climate change (Pielke et al., 2008). The effects of climate change are expected to
intensify hazardous conditions.
Growth in coastal communities is driven by economic activity related to
recreation, tourism, water-reliant industry and commerce, and employment (The Heinz
Center, 2000; Crosset et al., 2004; U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, 2004). Economic
activity along the coast supports not only the year round coastal population, but also the
more than 180 million seasonal visitors to coastal regions each year. Tax revenue from
tourist activities alone encourages policies that support even more growth. Commercial
activities surrounding natural resources in coastal areas generate billions of dollars each
year (Marlowe, 1999; U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, 2005). Fisheries generate
more than $32 billion in income and over 1 million jobs in the U.S. (National Marine
Fisheries Service, 2014). In 2010, the Bureau of Economic Analysis estimated that
coastal shoreline counties generated 45% of gross domestic product (GDP) for the U.S
(NOAA, 2013b). Shoreline counties generate over 54% of GDP for coastal states. More
than 50 million jobs and $2.7 trillion in wages were generated in coastal shoreline
counties, including the Great Lakes Region (NOAA, 2013b). All of this robust economic
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activity encourages even more development that in turn contributes to a continuing
migration to coastal communities.
Population density in coastal areas has been expanding at a rapid pace for nearly
half a century. In 2010, population density for the U.S. was 87 persons per square mile
(NOAA, 2013a, p. 3). During the forty years between 1970 and 2010, the U.S. added 36
persons per square mile overall (Crowell et al, 2010; NOAA, 2013a, p. 3). In contrast,
coastal shoreline counties added 125 persons per square mile during the same forty year
period resulting in a density of 446 persons per square mile in coastal counties (NOAA,
2013a, 3; Crossett et al., 2004). Population density of this magnitude puts more pressure
on the natural resources and economic stability essential to a sustainable existence. The
current U.S. coastal population is estimated at 123.3 million or 39% of the national
population and growing (Crowell et al, 2010; NOAA, 2013, p. 5). Coastal population
growth is expected to increase another 8%, meaning that by 2020, another 10 million
people will reside on or near the coast (NOAA, 2013, p. 4). Coastal counties encompass
roughly 10% of land area in the United States, excluding Alaska. Population density of
this scale imposes significant risks on those that live, work, and operate businesses on the
coast, particularly when disaster strikes. The effect of disaster places an even greater
burden on coastal states that must allocate limited resources while attempting to project
the potential impact of coastal disaster on housing and essential services.
Climate Change and Disaster in Coastal Communities
Climate change is predicted to affect the intensity of natural coastal hazards in the
coming years. Sea level rise is likely to increase in more than 95% of the ocean causing a
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twenty percent increase in mean sea level in 70% of coastal areas worldwide (IPCC,
2013, p. 1140). The U.S. will not be immune to the effects of climate change. Rising sea
levels will contribute to higher storm surges, causing more extreme flooding and storm
damage from even minor coastal storms. Climate change also contributes to warming
oceans which in turn causes more intense and destructive hurricanes. Over the past 30
years, the duration and wind speed of hurricanes have shown an increase in the
destructive power in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (Emanuel, 2005). There has also
been an increase in the number of Category 4 and 5 hurricanes, correlating with rising
ocean temperatures (Webster et al., 2005). Future storm models suggest that storms are
likely to become even more intense with an average rainfall increase of 18% over the
next eight years (Knutson and Tuleya, 2004; IPCC, 2014). Storm modeling trends are
impeded by limited availability of storm data creating uncertainty in the literature
(Knutson et al., 2010). Regardless, most scholars agree that climate change will cause
tropical storms and hurricanes to intensify in frequency, strength, and damage potential
while the frequency of less intense storms will decline (Knutson and Tuleya, 2004;
Knutson et al., 2010; IPCC, 2014).
Hurricanes can cause significant damages when they strike. Property owners are
susceptible to damages from wind, flooding, and storm surge. Social and economic costs
associated with these damages can be significant and devastating to individuals, business
and communities. Blake et al. (2011) found the greatest number of deaths from
hurricanes occurred in 1900 when 8,000 people were killed after a Category 4 hurricane
struck Galveston, Texas. Since then, deaths from hurricanes have declined in part
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because of more advanced early warning systems allowing coastal inhabitants to evacuate
or take precautions. However these systems have not been perfect. The most significant
U.S. death toll from a hurricane occurred in 2005 after Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf
Coast. As many as 1,833 people died from causes related to Hurricane Katrina.
Disaster can also have a devastating effect on the social and economic fabric of
coastal communities. Increased development along the coast costs millions in taxpayer
dollars after disaster as shown from federal flood insurance claims and disaster assistance
programs (Godschalk et al., 1989). Between 1980 and 1999, economic damages from
hurricanes totaled more than $68 billion in the U.S. (Davidson and Lambert, 2001
quoting NOAA, 2000). Beven et al. (2008) found even higher costs during 2005, the
most active hurricane season on record since 1969. The economic cost of the 2005
hurricane season included over $100 billion in damages (Beven et al., 2008). Pielke and
colleagues (2008) found the 2004 and 2005 hurricane season caused more than $150
billion in damage averaging $75 billion over the two year period. Normalized damage
estimates of hurricanes from 1900-2005 found the decade between 1996 and 2005 as the
second most costly decade after the ten year period of 1926-1935. The Great Miami
Storm of 1926, which struck during the Florida land boom of the 1920’s, was the single
most damaging storm during the period, causing between $140-157 billion in normalized
damages (Pielke et al., 2008). While deaths from hurricanes have declined, economic
costs continue to rise, arguably as a result from coastal development.
Hurricanes since 2000 have exposed the disparity that exists between
homeowners and renters, wealth and poverty, and the upper and lower classes of
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American society. Like with renters, programs and policies that favor homeowners and
commercial interests during recovery do not always extend to multifamily housing
developers. Investors in affordable and low-income multifamily housing often struggle
post-disaster because recovery programs do not meet their financial needs (Wu and
Lindell, 2003). Programs and policies tend to favor economic development geared
toward infrastructure, commercial businesses, and homeowners (Comerio et al., 1994;
Quarentelli, 1999; Mueller et al., 2011). In spite of numerous programs in place to
address housing needs for low-income households after Katrina, sufficient incentives for
investors failed to meet the needs of displaced renter households resulting in housing
disparity and affordable housing shortages. McCarthy and Hanson (2008) found the ratio
of permits for damaged single-family units were issued more often than for multifamily
units. After Katrina, housing units with less severe damage were more likely to be issued
permits quicker than those with extensive damages, contributing to the overall reduction
in available low-income rental housing during recovery (McCarthy and Hanson, 2008;
Unity, 2010). Vuk (2008) suggests this view is misleading stating that vouchers offset
claims of insufficient available housing. Vouchers are used to rent single or multifamily
housing and are recognized by some as a more viable alternative to affordable housing
than government incentivized housing production (Savas, 1987; Savas, 2000). Much like
affordable rental housing, which often has long waiting lists and barriers to access,
vouchers are also limited and taken alone cannot rectify affordable housing shortages.
This research examined LIHTC multifamily rental housing development during the
recovery period after disaster. The 2004 hurricane season in Florida provided the
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backdrop to analyze development patterns for LIHTC. This study focused on role of
LIHTC after disaster by asking how perceived risk influences development during
recovery. The results of this study identified risk through the stated preferences of
LIHTC professionals in the context of disaster recovery and compared development
patterns of LIHTC multifamily housing between 2004 and 2010.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
The motivation behind this study came from the realization that affordable
housing programs have had little success in providing enough affordable housing for the
households that need assistance. This is especially true after disaster even though billions
of dollars are spent on redevelopment. The goal of this study is to understand the
influences that motivate multifamily development during disaster recovery. The aim is to
understand how LIHTC developers’ perceptions of risk influenced development
decisions.
Numerous studies have analyzed the impact of disaster on low-income
households. Struggling low-income populations in disaster areas are more likely to fall
behind during recovery and often fail to reap the benefits of new investment (Cutter and
Emrich, 2006; Fischer and Sard, 2006; Fothergill and Peek, 2004; Popkin et al., 2006;
Finch et al., 2010). Communities struggle continuously with poverty, particularly the
lack of affordable housing. After a disaster occurs, recovery provides an opportunity to
address affordable housing issues, which are often magnified as a result of disaster
(Fothergill and Peek, 2004). Unfortunately, the recovery process often increases
disparity and decreases accessibility to affordable housing (Cutter and Emrich, 2006).
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Several federal housing programs exist that communities depend on to support
housing and are also used to address post-disaster housing needs (Table 1-1). Among
these are Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), HOME Investment
Partnerships Program, Housing Choice Vouchers Program (HCVP), and the Low Income
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program. These programs can be combined or used in
conjunction with disaster programs to jumpstart economic recovery and redevelopment,
including housing production and restoration. In spite of the availability of these and
other local initiatives, funding for affordable housing can fall short of the amount
necessary to shelter those in need. The loss of more than 51,000 rental units in New
Orleans after Katrina very likely contributed to a doubling of the homeless population
once recovery was well underway (Unity, 2010). Prior to Katrina, 51 percent of renters
paid more than 30% of their income in rent and utilities. The Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) defines housing affordability as rent and utilities at 30% or
less of gross household income. As of 2012, the number of renters exceeding this
amount had increased to sixty-three percent (Plyler, 2013).

9

Table 1-1: Funding Resources for Disaster Recovery
Program

Purpose

HOME Investments Partnerships Program

Provides grants to States and localities that are often used in partnership
with local nonprofits. Eligible activities include constructing, buying, and
rehabilitating affordable housing. Funds can be targeted for rentals or
homeownership. Low income households may qualify for direct rental
assistance. HOME is the largest block grant program.

Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)

Provides resources to communities for a wide range of community
development needs. Annual grants are allocated to larger cities and urban
counties for housing and expansion of economic opportunities. The
primary beneficiaries are principally low- and moderate-income. CDBG has
mutiple programs for a wide array of activities. Diaster Recovery Assistance
are flexible grants under the program and are subject to availability.

Supplemental LIHTC

Supplemental LIHTC were granted by Congress after Hurricane Katrina. In
some cases, credits were advanced from LITHC that was to be awarded in
future years.

Federal Disaster Loans

Individual assistance in the form of housing, grants for personal use, low
interest loans, counseling and other assistance. Public assistance is
available for communities. Low interest loans for renters and homeowners
may be available. Issued through the Small Business Administration (SBA).

Hazard Mitigation Grants (HMP)
Disaster Bonds
New Market Tax Credits

Physical Disaster Loans

SBA Loans

Applicants come from the State, local government, Indian tribes , and
private non-profit organizations. According to FEMA, homeowners and
businesses must apply through one of these applicants.
Tax exempt debt instruments issued by Congress and administered by
States to direct private investment dollars to disaster recovery.
Target tax credits to low income markets. Credits are used to encourage
investment in economic development and jobs creation in low income
communities.
Administered under the SBA. Physical disaster loans can be used to repair
or replace real and personal property. Businesses of any size are eligible.
Interest rates are capped at 4% if no other financing is available or 8% if
credit can be obtained elsewhere.
Other types of disaster loans include Home and Personal Property Loans,
Economic Injury Disaster Loans, and Military Reservists Economic Injury
Loans.

Sources: FEMA, U.S. Small Business Administration

Studies indicate that multifamily housing falls behind other redevelopment efforts
during recovery. Hurricane Ike damaged 88% of Galveston’s low-income housing units
in 2008. During recovery, multifamily reconstruction lagged behind other redevelopment
efforts (Reece et al., 2011). Very few studies concentrate on multifamily development
after hurricane disaster. Those that do exist focus on programs that favor homeowners
and economic development and expose the disparity experienced by multifamily
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developers. Researchers studied CDBG allocations after Katrina. Galster et al. (2004)
found that low-income neighborhoods did generally improve. However, about 62% of
CDBG funds were allocated to homeowners and only 18% were directed to rental units
during recovery (GAO, 2010). This resulted in fewer low-income units overall.
Affordable housing also takes a back seat to economic development. Louisiana and
Mississippi were criticized because tax dollars funded the rebuilding of fewer lowincome units than were in place prior to the disaster. Gotham and Greenburg (2008)
found that fewer units were produced because of waivers of CDBG low-income housing
requirements in favor of other economic interests.
Congress and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) have often approved increases
or advances in the amount of allocated tax credits to facilitate redevelopment of
affordable housing. The LIHTC program, Supplemental Tax Credits, and New Market
Tax Credits were earmarked for affordable and low-income housing after Katrina
encouraging the development of owner-occupied and rental housing. As a result, the
Gulf Opportunity Act of 2005 instituted the Gulf Opportunity Zone (GO Zone) tax
program (GAO, 2010). The Government Accountability Office study stated that
homeowner allocations were quicker and easier to distribute. Owners of rental properties
were expected to access other programs, such as Small Business Administration (SBA)
loans and tax credits (p. 19). Small Rental Assistance programs created more barriers
than access for investors and developers because of regulatory requirements.
Environmental review assessments were required and were costly for investors and
owners who had limited ability to increase rents, often the case with affordable and low-
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income housing (p. 19). Multifamily owners and developers are also subject to capital
markets and credit availability, and even when those markets are in balance, the
feasibility of taking on additional debt can curtail development plans (p. 39). Debt
affects operating and development costs which have to be weighed against allowable
rents. Developers in general, including LIHTC developers, are unlikely to invest in
projects that may pose greater financial risks, whether those risks are a result of location,
funding, or operational costs. Risks imposed by potential hurricanes in coastal counties
would seem to impede affordable multifamily housing development. However this study
found no evidence that location imposes fewer LIHTC developed in coastal areas in spite
of the greater risks associated with coastal hazards.
The research that is the subject of this work is a revelatory case study that seeks to
understand the preferences of LIHTC developers during the recovery process. This study
examines the influence of risk perceptions that affect LIHTC developers’ decisions
during disaster recovery by analyzing the outcomes of LIHTC multi-family housing
production during disaster recovery. For this study, developers include professionals
involved in the production of LIHTC multifamily housing, including syndicators,
bankers, builders, managers, and investors.
PURPOSE STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This purpose of this research was to reveal how developer preference influences
LIHTC multifamily housing production after disaster, and specifically, how risk
perception influences development decisions during recovery. This research examined
how developers of LIHTC multi-family housing make investment decisions and
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specifically, how risk perception influences those decisions. This research was guided by
the following questions:


How do LIHTC developers perceive disaster risk? What risk variables have the
greatest influence on development decisions?



What are the differences in risk perception between for-profit and non-profit
LIHTC providers? How do these differences affect the location of low-income
multi-family housing within the LIHTC program?



Where are LIHTC developments located over the disaster recovery period? Do
LIHTC developers avoid areas that experience the greatest impact from the
disaster event?

KEY CONCEPTS AND OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS
There are a number of terms and constructs used in the context of this study that
warrant further discussion in order to clarify meaning as they relate to this study.
Defining Disaster
Car (1932) was the first to sequence disaster in relation to cultural protections by
defining disaster in the context of consequences within an urban environment.
Dombrowsky (1981) viewed disaster as a natural or man-made event that causes
substantial negative effects. These are the simplified understandings of the concept that
others have expanded upon.
The study of disaster began in earnest shortly after the end of World War II.
Along with physical damage studies, scientists also sought to understand the affect of
bombing on the human population in Europe and Japan. During what Perry (2007) has
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coined the Classical Period of disaster research, disaster was defined as a “catalyst for
what would now be described as a failure of the social system to deliver reasonable
conditions of life” (p. 8).
More than 50 years ago, Charles Fritz (1961), a major pioneer in disaster research,
defined disaster as:
“Actual or threatened accidental or uncontrollable events that are
concentrated in time and space, in which society, or a relatively selfsufficient subdivision of society undergoes severe damage, and incurs such
losses to its members and physical appurtenances that the social structure
is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some of the essential functions of
the society, or its subdivision, is prevented” (p. 655).
Fischer (2003), acknowledging Fritz’s earlier definition, pointed to sociologists that
studied social change under disaster conditions, which is noted in the work of those who
search for meaning and clarification in the social condition of disaster survivors (Cutter,
1995; Enarson, 1998; Enarson, Fothergill, and Peek, 2006). In the field of anthropology,
disaster is defined as an event “involving a combination of potentially destructive
agent(s) from the natural and/or technological environment and a population in a
socially and technologically produced condition of environment vulnerability” (OliverSmith, 1996, p. 305).
According to Comerio (1998) disaster in the urban environment is an unintended
consequence of development in hazard-prone areas. Hurricanes, floods, tsunamis and
earthquakes that occur in non-populated areas are merely natural hazards (See Table 1-2).
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Disasters occur when natural hazards take place in densely populated areas (Comerio,
1998). Fischer (1998) sought to differentiate between disaster and emergency and the
associated degree of impact and response at federal, state and local levels. For instance,
the 1991 tornado that destroyed the homes of 1,000 households in Andover, one-fifth of
the community, was declared a federal disaster area. A year later, Hurricane Andrew
devastated Homestead, Florida, a community of roughly 100 square miles. Differences
in the size and scope of disaster and disaster response have a direct bearing on the needs
and resources allocated to a community. These differences are consistent with Fritz’s
earlier definition that identified the scope of disaster within the subdivision of a
community as opposed to large scale disaster areas.
Fritz’s definition remains the most comprehensive definition among researchers
and has mostly been adopted unchanged (Perry, 2007). Nuances have been added to
clarify specific studies while embracing the basic tenets of the original. Buckle (2005, p.
179) includes the “need for long term recovery” among the significant and irreversible
losses characteristic of disaster. Smith (2005, p. 301) added that disaster events cause
“considerable social, political and economic disruptions” in the wake of death and
destruction. Stallings (1998, 2005) defined disaster as a disruption of nature that
interrupts social routines.
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Table 1-2: Natural Hazards
Natural Hazards and Geologic Process that Impact Urban Environments
Earthquakes
Volcanic Eruptions
Tsunami
Landslides
Subsidence

Floods
Droughts
Hurricanes
Tornadoes
Asteroid Impacts

Disasters have also been defined from a geological perspective, which Perry coins
the Hazards-Disaster Tradition. Within this system, a disaster is an extreme event that
arises when the source, or agent, of disaster collides with a human social system (Perry,
2007). Shadowing the view of Comerio, without human systems in the way disaster
would not occur. Mileti (1999) pointed to an overlap between physical, built, and social
environments as an encroachment on the natural landscape and subject to the inevitable
impact of a disaster event. Cutter (2005) emphasizes human vulnerability and resiliency
more so than the disaster event itself.
In lieu of definitions found in the literature, emergency managers are guided by
the technical definition contained in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, which reads:
“Any natural catastrophe including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high
water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic
eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought, or, regardless of
cause, any fire, flood, or explosion in any part of the United States which
in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity
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and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance to supplement the
efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster
relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering
caused thereby.”

Communities faced with the consequences of disaster seek federal aid during the
recovery and redevelopment process. The federal definition is significant to this study
because this definition establishes the qualifications a community must meet in order to
qualify for federal disaster resources.
The disaster declaration process for federal assistance is initiated with a
determination of damages by the state (See Figure 1.1). Additional preliminary damage
assessments are requested that involve a joint preliminary damage assessment (PDA)
process between federal and state agencies. When the PDA is complete, the state
determines which counties require assistance and the type of assistance needed. A
request from the governor for a Presidential Declaration of Disaster (PDD) is submitted
to the regional Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) who reviews and adds
additional recommendations before forwarding the request to the national office. The
PDD request package is then sent to the President for approval and a signature.
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Figure 1-1: Presidential Disaster Declaration Process
Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

What is Disaster Recovery?
Disaster life cycles are ongoing cyclical progressions that emergency managers
distinguish in four to six phases. Disaster recovery is but one phase of the cycle. FEMA
has identified four phases of the disaster cycle for emergency management purposes.
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These phases are mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Recovery is a unique
experience for each community and is influenced by the economic base, extent of losses,
and the types of disaster assistance available. The multidisciplinary nature of disaster in
academia and in practice poses challenges to the meaning of words and phrases. This
section explores the disaster life cycle in order to clarify the meaning of disaster recovery
in the context of this study.
The concept of disaster recovery has evolved from the linear process of the mid1970s to a dynamic phenomenon that responds to the characteristics of the impacted
community. The linear process described by Haas and colleagues (1977) posed a static
four-stage model that identified the major activities in each stage of the post-disaster
period. Disaster is now recognized as a fluid process that is circular in nature. Each stage
is also a dynamic course of action with decision-making processes that are related and
interactive across stages (Mileti, 1999; Berke and Beatley, 1997; Berke et al, 1993;
Rubin, 1985).
Fischer (2008) describes a five phase life cycle of disaster: the pre-impact period,
the impact period, the immediate post-impact period, the recovery period, and the longterm reconstruction period. The recovery period is defined as the period in which debris
has been cleared, essential services are restored, insurance claims are filed and
preliminary reconstruction plans are made. The long-term reconstruction period can
extend for years depending on the severity of the disaster event. Long-term
reconstruction includes the rebuilding period for housing needs. Hurricane Hugo hit
South Carolina in 1989 causing destruction or damage to 108,658 housing units (Rubin
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and Popkin, 1990). Nearly 17% of all housing units destroyed or damaged by Hugo were
multifamily housing units. After ten months, recovery and reconstruction was barely
underway (Fischer, 1998). The recovery process was noted as politically charged with
competing interests and demands. Recovery after Hugo was consistent with earlier
reflections of Dynes and Quarantelli (1989) who suggested that recovery is often
characterized by “conflicting priorities, by issues of equity and inattention” (p. 3).
Another example of long-term reconstruction took place after Hurricane Andrew
devastated Florida. According to Fischer (1998), estimates for the timeframe to complete
reconstruction after Hurricane Andrew ranged from ten to fifteen years.
Keim (2011) studied disaster within the field of public health. His research
recognized the five phases of disaster within a pre-impact and post-impact cycle. The
pre-impact phase includes prevention, mitigation, and preparedness. Post-impact actions
include response and recovery. Response and recovery were defined by Keim as
“actions undertaken to minimize loss of life and damage to return to a pre-event status”
(p. 143). Others define recovery as a period of restoration and repair of the built
environment within the short and long term phases of disaster (Rubin and Barbee, 1985;
Schwab et al, 1998). Nigg (1995) characterized recovery as a social process influenced
by pre-disaster conditions and post-disaster response.
Smith and Wenger (2007) adopted a narrative that merged recovery and
restoration as conceived by Fischer defining disaster recovery as “the differential process
of restoring, rebuilding, and reshaping the physical, social, economic, and natural
environment through pre-event planning and post-event actions” (p. 238). This
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conceptual definition accounts for the technical and social factors that shape disaster
recovery (Nakagawa and Shaw, 2004; Nigg, 1995). Recognizing the fluid nature of
disaster recovery and reconstruction, the concept of recovery assumes that insurance and
recovery funds are applied for and reconstruction is underway. This, combined with
Smith and Wenger, form the conceptual definition of disaster recovery that will be used
in the context of this research.

Affordable Housing
The most accepted definition of affordable housing comes from the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and is a reflection of the ability of a
household to afford the cost of shelter, including rent or mortgage and utilities.
According to HUD, housing is considered affordable if a household pays no more than
thirty percent of its annual income toward housing costs (Nguyen, 2005). The idea of
rent affordability is straight forward and includes rent and utilities. Affordability for
homeowners is more difficult to ascertain because of mortgage interest deductions, real
estate tax deductions, and capital gains (Schwartz, 2014). This study focused on rental
housing rather than home ownership except to point out programs that favor owners
during recovery rather than supporting multifamily housing restoration and production
Other terms, such as below-market or low-income have been suggested as better
alternatives to affordable housing, but these terms also have their limitations. For
example, Section 8 voucher recipients do not necessarily rent below-market housing
units. Their units tend to be rented at market and vouchers are used to subsidize rent
based on the tenants’ income, usually capped at thirty percent. Tenants pay the
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difference between the voucher and the landlord’s market rent. The term low-income is
also problematic because it requires some sort of threshold or cutoff. Some have argued
for more sophisticated measurements of housing affordability, such as a sliding scale that
accounts for the number of people in the household as well as their income (Stone 1993;
Stone, 2006).
Working definitions of affordable housing have been attempted by others
(Freeman et al., 1997; Chaplin and Freeman, 1999) but there is no generally applicable
definition since the term “affordable housing” might mean different things to different
interests (Miles et al., 2000). Affordability is typically defined by the relationship
between a household’s expenditure for housing costs, including utilities, and income. A
large number of communities are experiencing a shortage of affordable housing, often as
a result of the disinvestment in public housing or low income growth in the macro
economy. Lack of affordability becomes a larger problem for many communities even
after disaster recovery and housing reinvestment. The problems of affordability often
escalate after disaster, becoming even more widespread during recovery as housing
shortages develop (Comerio, 1998; Levine et al, 2007).
Affordable housing can also be thought of as physically adequate housing that is
made available to those who could not afford the rent for such housing without some
special intervention by government or special arrangement by housing suppliers (Field,
1997). Special interventions include rent subsidies through Section 8 vouchers, sliding
scale rents based on income, income and rent caps, such as with rental housing
constructed using Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), or other arrangements that

22

subsidize or reduce conventional rents found in the marketplace. In addition to subsidies
provided to renters, developers can also apply for incentives to reduce construction costs.
These incentives include creative financing, waivers of land use requirements, or special
exceptions to building regulations. Homeowners are also given special interventions
such as favorable lending terms or financial assistance for reconstruction.
The Center for Housing Policy found that 24.5% of renters and 18.6% of
homeowners were severely cost burdened, meaning more than half of household income
is spent on housing costs (Viveiros and Sturtevant, 2014). A severe cost burden means
that more than half of household income is committed to the cost of housing. Cost
burdened renters also have an affordability crisis. Thirty-two percent of moderate
income households are cost burdened, paying more than thirty percent of household
income on housing (Hickey et al., 2012). For the purposes of this study, affordable
housing was defined using the standards most often cited in the literature and accepted by
most government agencies. Housing is considered affordable when rent and utilities are
no greater than 30% of area median income (Salama and Alshuwaikhat, 2006; Somerville
and Mayer, 2003).
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit
This study was specifically interested in how participants of LIHTC respond to
risk during disaster recovery. Participants include developers, financiers, managers, or
others involved with the production of affordable housing under the program.
Established by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the LIHTC program has become the “single
largest subsidy for the production of low-income rental housing” in the country
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(Schwartz, 2014, p.135). The program provides tax credits as an incentive for private
investor participation in the production of low-income rental housing. LIHTC is included
in the tax code of the Internal Revenue Service and, as of 2011, has been directly
responsible for more than 2.5 million housing units.
Other programs exist that are also used for affordable housing production. Funds
allocated under the HOME Investments Partnership Program (HOME) and Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) are sometimes combined with LIHTC to make the
developments economically feasible. HOME and CDBG funding is provided to the state
based on a Consolidated Plan (CP) required by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD). The CP is a statewide five-year plan that guides general long term
strategy to meet expected housing needs using a market centered, data driven framework.
The goal of the CP is to identify housing priorities and is required by HUD when state
housing authorities allocate CDBG and HOME funding.
LIHTC relies on a Qualified Action Plan (QAP) to set out housing preferences of
the state, usually through the state housing authority. The QAP often uses a scoring
system or sets thresholds based on the priorities of the state specifically for LIHTC
developments. CDBG and HOME funds are not tied to LIHTC or the QAP, however the
housing authority as the issuing agency may include provisions that allow for or
encourage the use of CDBG and HOME funds. During disaster recovery, additional
funding sources may be offered at federal, state, and local levels to facilitate the recovery
effort. Some of these sources include disaster mitigation grants, SBA loans, and federal
disaster loans.
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Tax credits are allocated to housing authorities by the IRS on a per capita basis.
Housing needs are generally reflected in the QAP which informs housing producers of
state priorities for LIHTC developments. Points are used to score applications received
developers who compete with others for tax credits during the annual application period.
There are a limited number of tax credits available and the application process and
paperwork requirements are expensive and time consuming. In spite of the complexity of
the annual application process, it is not uncommon for there to be more developers
interested in the program than the available number of tax credits can accommodate. For
this reason, housing authorities are likely to award credits to developers that provide the
greatest number of housing units meeting the priorities expressed in the QAP. Some
states incorporate flexibility in their decision-making while others make decisions based
on score totals.
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Investor Participation in LIHTC
Tax credits are distributed annually by the IRS on a per capital basis (See Figure
1-3). State housing authorities award credits to LIHTC developers in a competitive
environment. Winning LIHTC developers offer the tax credits to investors either directly
or through a syndicator who acts as a middle man to bring developer and investors
together. Most investors are corporations or entities that benefit from the tax advantages
offered by tax credits. A syndicator bundles tax credits into investment packages that
provide equity to the developer. Developers finance the remainder of the project from
other housing programs and through traditional financing. Investors can use tax credits to
lower taxable income dollar for dollar however these benefits cannot proceed until the
development is completed. Tax benefits are applied over a 10 year period. The
developer and any subsequent must owner agree to monitor compliance for 15 years and
since 1990, units must remain affordable for 30 years. Investors of properties that are not
in compliance during the 15 year reporting period face severe penalties, so the incentive
to maintain affordability is strong.
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KEY STEPS AND ENTITIES
IN THE LIHTC PROCESS

Equity $
SYNDICATOR
(General Partner of
Investment Partnerships)

Corporate Investors

❺Tax Benefits
(Credits & Deductions)
Individual Investors

LENDER
❻
LOAN
PAYMENT

Equity $

EQUITY $

State Housing
Agency

$
LOAN

❼RENT

Tax Benefits
(Credits)

DEVELOPER OF
PROJECT
(General Partner of
Project)

❸Tax Benefits
(Credits Awarded)

❶Internal Revenue
Service

Figure 1-2: LIHTC Funding Process
Source: Modified from a diagram prepared for Congressional testimony (see GAO/TGGD/RCED-97-149); also see Danter Company, Follow the Money: How the LIHTC Program
Works
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Risk in Context
The scholarly work in the field of risk is extensive and encompasses many fields.
Early studies in the 1950s were developed from the concerns associated with early
industrial technologies in engineering, chemicals, and nuclear power (Lofstedt and
Boholm, 2009). Initial risk research identified public perception of risk and has since
evolved to the study of underlying issues that address equity, trust and power (Slovic,
2000). Risk literature comes from a wide range of fields including toxicology and health,
public policy, and technology among others (Slovic, 2000). The literature for this study
focuses on risk in the context of natural hazards in the field of social science. In the
social sciences, Gilbert White initiated risk studies in the context of natural hazards with
his 1945 study, Human Adjustment to Floods. White argued that modifying human
behavior is a more effective means of mitigating risk from disaster than engineering
solutions (p.188).
Risk is often studied in the context of hazards, and by default, disaster (Smith,
2013). Smith defines risk as “the actual exposure of something of human value to a
hazard and is often measured as the product of probability and loss” (p. 11). When a
hazard, which Smith defines as “a potential threat to humans and their welfare arising
from a dangerous phenomenon or substance that may cause loss of life, injury, property
damage, and other community loss or damage,” is combined with risk, the definition
becomes more precise. A hazardous risk is defined as the “combination of the
probability of a hazardous event and its negative consequences” ( p. 11).
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The intent of this study was to understand how a segment of real estate
developers, those participating in the LIHTC program, perceive risk associated with
disaster recovery in coastal communities and how risk perception influences development
decisions. Variables of risk were identified in the literature and from a survey of
multifamily housing professionals who participated in the LIHTC program in Florida
between 2000 and 2010. Perceived risks have been categorized and ranked according to
stated preferences from the LIHTC developer community and are discussed more fully in
Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
CONNECTING HOUSING, DISASTER, AND POLICY

WHY AFFORDABLE HOUSING?
Current U.S. housing policy has failed to alleviate the housing cost burden faced
by middle and low income households. Failure on the part of the U.S. housing safety net
often has severe consequences. Within any given 24 hour period, over 610,000 people
experience homelessness (Henry et al., 2013). Households who struggle with rent
experience more stress resulting in high blood pressure, depression, and anxiety. Lowincome households often occupy low-quality housing exposing children and adults to
potential allergens, lead paint, and unsafe conditions (Cohen, 2011).
In 2013, the U.S. Census reported that 14.5% of the population lives at or below
poverty (DeNavas-Walt and Proctor, 2014). The federal government measures poverty
using poverty thresholds and poverty guidelines. Poverty thresholds are updated annually
by the Census Bureau and are the original measure of poverty used mainly for statistical
purposes. Poverty guidelines are issued by the Department of Health and Human
Services and are published annually in the Federal Register. Poverty guidelines are a
simplified analysis of poverty thresholds and are used to determine financial eligibility
for federal programs, including housing subsidies. Guidelines are calculated using the
published weighted average poverty thresholds and the Consumer Price Index for All
Urban Consumers (CPI-U). Three sets of poverty guidelines are issued. One set includes
guidelines for each of the 48 contiguous states and Washington D.C., one set is issued for
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Hawaii, and one set is issued for Alaska. In the contiguous states and Washington D.C.,
2013 poverty guidelines indicate that a single adult earning $11,490 or less is considered
to live in poverty. An annual income of $23,550 is considered poverty for a family of
four (HHS, 2013). These figures are higher in Alaska and Hawaii. In 2013, more than
45 million people, or 14.5% of the population, lived below the poverty level. Poverty has
a direct effect on housing affordability and is linked to housing cost burdens causing
distress for 13% of the population.
Cost Burden and Housing Affordability
Housing affordability is discussed in terms of housing cost burden. A housing
cost burden is defined by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) as
paying more than 30% of household income on costs for shelter including utilities. A
severe cost burden occurs when households pay more than fifty percent of gross income
on housing costs. According to Schwartz (2015), housing affordability is a bigger
problem than inadequate or overcrowded housing. In the past, overcrowding and
inadequate housing were a major concern. Today, fewer than 2% of households reside in
inadequate housing (Schwartz, 2015, p. 32). Overcrowding accounts for less than four
percent of households. In contrast, more than 18% of households spend at least half of
their income on the cost of housing (p. 32). Thirty-five percent are renters and 27% of
these spend more than half their income on rent (JCHS, 2013).
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Multifamily Housing in the US
Multi-family housing accounts for 26% of all housing units. According to the
National Multifamily Housing Council, a primary resource for multifamily insight, in
2013 apartments encompassed 42% of all housing units providing shelter to over 16
million households. There were 3,375,747 apartments constructed between 1990 and
2011. Forty-two percent of the households in these newer properties have an annual
income below $20,000 per year.
The National Multifamily Housing Council estimates over 16 million apartments
exist nationwide. According to HUD, nearly two and a half million units have been built
with LIHTC since 1987. This accounts for between 12% and 15% of new and
rehabilitated apartment units throughout the country1. More than 12% of the U.S.
population lives in multifamily housing. The greatest percentage of apartment dwellers
lives in the District of Columbia followed by New York. In Florida, more than 12.4% of
the population, or 2,380,131 residents, live in an apartment (NMHC, 2013). Florida has
the 13th highest number of residents living in multifamily housing.
Understanding LIHTC
The LIHTC program was created under the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and has
become the nation’s primary program for financing affordable rental housing (Wallace,
1995). The goal of the program is to provide an incentive for private investment in

1

Calculated from NMHC estimate of U.S. multifamily units and the number of LIHTC units placed in
service between 1987 and 2011 stated by HUD. Joint Center for Housing Studies tabulations are based on
the LIHTC database which reports fewer units than the number estimated by the NMHC
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affordable housing intended for households earning less than 50% or 60% of area median
income (AMI). The program supplements existing appropriations for public housing and
rental assistance programs that are administered by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD). LIHTC is the only production program for affordable and
low-income housing in the country. Since its inception, the program has supported
private funding for the construction of more than 2.4 million multifamily housing units
(HUD, 2015). Tax credits are purchased by investors at a reduced rate as an incentive to
fund LIHTC development. Tax credits can then be used to reduce annual income dollarfor-dollar in an amount equal to the initial investment divided equally over a ten-year
period.
To qualify for the tax credit, LIHTC owners commit to setting aside at least 20%
of all units for households that earn 50% of area median income (AMI) or 40% of units
are set aside for households earning 60% of AMI. This is referred to as the 20/50 and
40/60 rule. Rents are targeted to not be more than 30% of household income however
rent is based on AMI rather than household income. Tenants often find that because rent
is not income based, housing costs exceed the targeted percentage for affordability. Units
must continue to remain affordable for a 15 year compliance period, and since 1990, for
an additional 15 years2 or investors will forfeit earned tax credits retroactively by
recapture. The penalty is intended to be severe in order to enforce compliance.

2

Properties must report compliance annually for the first 15 years. After 15 years, owners are no longer
subject to compliance reporting and under certain conditions, may opt out of the program. If an owner
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The LITHC program has been criticized by the private sector for its complexity
and high transaction costs. In the few years after the program was initiated, Clancy
(1990) wrote the bureaucracy within the program was complicated with extensive
reporting requirements and procedures for documenting compliance was cumbersome.
Stegman (1992) initially complained that underwriting was unnecessarily complicated
and burdensome but later pointed to the efficiency of the program because of the portion
of credit dollars going to the bricks and mortar of development rather than the
administrative costs of syndication and managing investor returns (Stegman, 1991).
Postyn (1994) noted that few incentives existed for developers to participate in mixedincome developments because of cumbersome regulatory requirements implying fewer
affordable units available for low-income households.
Recent studies have concentrated on cost burdens and the affordability of rent.
Williamson (2011) examined 38,000 LIHTC households and found that 76.2% of LIHTC
households were cost burdened and 15% were severely cost burdened. Households using
vouchers in conjunction with LIHTC were also cost burdened although to a lesser degree.
More than 35% of LIHTC households using vouchers were found to experience housing
cost burdens, paying more 30% of household income for rent. These statistics
demonstrate that LIHTC is not a guarantee of affordability and often fails to reach
extremely low income households who often have the greatest need for affordable

wishes to opt out, the state housing agency must be notified and given a year to find a qualified buyer. If a
qualified buyer is not found, the owner may be released from future restrictions and obligations under
LIHTC.
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housing. The program does not specifically target households with extremely low
incomes nor are rents assessed on a sliding scale according to income.
Regan and Horn (2013) found most LIHTC households have higher incomes
relative to other affordable housing programs, but 45% of tenants had extremely low
incomes, meaning income is at or below the federal poverty guidelines or is 30% below
AMI3, whichever is greater. This number corroborated an earlier study by New York
University that found 43% of LIHTC households had incomes below 30% AMI.
According to Hollar (2014), over half of all LIHTC tenants pay less than 30% of their
income on rent and three-fourths of tenants spent less than 40% of their income on rent.
Severe cost burdens are experienced by 10% of LIHTC tenants who pay more than 50%
of their income for rent. Developers often apply for additional subsidy programs to
reduce development costs in order to serve lower income households. These efforts are
credited for relieving cost burdens for 31% of extremely low income renters in the
program (JCHS, 2013).
Housing cost burdens for states are uneven. Some states, such as Rhode Island
and Washington, have more than 80% of LIHTC households who are not cost burdened
at all. On the other hand, 31.7% of LIHTC households in Oregon and 32.7% in Arizona
pay more than 40% of income in rent. Severe cost burdens for these two states are 18%
and 20.4% respectively (Hollar, 2014). In Florida, the subject of this study, 40.1% of

3

2013 AMI were found at the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary
for Planning and Evaluation website. The poverty guidelines are updated periodically in the Federal
Register by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under the authority of 42 U.S.C. 9902(2).
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LIHTC households pay less than 30% of household income on rent and are not
experiencing cost burdens. There are 25.7% of households paying greater than 40% of
income on rent. More than ten percent of these are severely cost burdened paying greater
than 50% of household income on housing costs (p. 27).
As mentioned earlier, rents in LIHTC units are capped at thirty percent of either
50% or 60% of AMI depending on the developer agreement. Rents often fluctuate with
market conditions. Because rents do not fluctuate with tenant income, tenants who
experience job loss or a reduction in income are obligated to pay the contract rent. Even
though LIHTC households earning 50% to 60% of AMI are better able to avoid cost
burdens (Williamson, 2011), evidence suggests that LIHTC does not alleviate the cost
burden associated with rental housing.
While the LIHTC program does produce additional affordable units, affordable
housing shortages persist in many communities. According to the Institute for Children,
Poverty, and Homelessness, the number of households living in poverty has increased
while at the same time the number of affordable rental housing has declined. Higher
income households occupied nearly 42% of all affordable housing units, pushing over
half of low and extremely low-income families into unaffordable rental units4. The Joint
Center for Housing Studies (2012) found that over the past decade, the gap between the
supply and demand for low income rentals has widened over the past decade. Since the

4

U. S. Census Bureau (2009), American Community Survey.
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Great Recession of 2008, declining household income has increased demand for
affordable rental housing for higher income tenants pushing the lowest income tenants
into less desirable housing.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING, LIHTC AND DISASTER RECOVERY
The supply of low-income housing incurs additional production challenges in the
face of disaster. The effectiveness of housing programs as a solution for problems caused
by disaster has been examined by others. Gotham and Greenburg (2008) applied a
comparative analysis of Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) and local bonds
after 9/11 and Katrina. Their analysis revealed the overwhelming influence of business
interests that dominated the political discourse, and ultimately influencing rule changes
that eliminated the ‘public benefit’ language previously contained in the provisions.
Green and Olshansky (2012) studied the Road Home Program (RHP), one of the largest
disaster programs implemented during Katrina, highlighting program volatility and
implementation challenges. RHP was created in the wake of Katrina to provide aid to
small rental properties and to offer homeowners a choice to sell out or rebuild.
During the recovery period, redevelopment shadows economic development
policies that currently encourage development of mixed use neighborhoods to dilute
pockets of poverty associated with public housing. Other policies attempting to alleviate
poverty have also prescribed location or development priorities. In the early 1990’s, the
Moving to Opportunity program and the HOPE VI program were introduced in an effort
to disperse public housing residents into other neighborhoods so that impoverished
families could integrate into more middle-class communities (Goetz, 2004). Efforts to
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de-concentrate poverty was also attempted by combining LIHTC with other federal
assistance such as HOPE VI5, HOME, vouchers, and other low-income housing programs
(Graham, 2012; Schwartz, 2010). According to Goetz (2004), HOPE VI was criticized
for focusing on development for middle class families rather than housing low-income
households. The failure of HOPE VI became evident when the negative impact of deconcentrated policy and construction of mixed use developments was criticized widely
during recovery after Hurricane Katrina. The City of New Orleans demolished over
4,500 public housing units and replaced only a fraction of them using HOPE VI for
mixed-use development. More than 142,000 housing units were damaged or destroyed
because of Hurricane Katrina, 79% of them considered to be affordable; by 2008, just 3
years after the storm, only 8,900 affordable housing units had been funded (Dianis and
Sinhha, 2008), well under the number needed to house displaced low-income households.
Much of the literature related to disaster recovery and housing examines the
impact on those who either receive housing services or are displaced due to shortages of
available housing (Mueller et al., 2011; Tierney, 2006). Spangle (1991) primarily studied
technical strategies for recovery, but recognized the disproportionate displacement of
low-income households as a result of damaged housing and the subsequent increase in
rents as a result of higher costs for code compliance during recovery.

5

HOPE VI was implemented in 1992 to encourage redevelopment of severely distressed housing
developments.

38

The evidence of an overall reduction in the number of low-income rental housing
units during disaster recovery has been well documented (McCarthy and Hanson, 2008;
Unity, 2010), however Vuk (2008) suggests that this view is misleading. His case study
explored commentary from advocates of public housing preservation in the aftermath of
Katrina. Vuk (2008) found that low-income households in New Orleans were misled
about available housing. One of the reasons for his claim is the availability of vouchers.
Housing choice vouchers are a demand subsidy provided to qualified households
allowing them access to affordable housing from the private sector. Privatization
proponents have long called for vouchers as a more viable alternative to housing lowincome populations as opposed to government incentivized housing (Savas, 1987; Savas,
2000).
The experience of LIHTC housing providers participating in disaster recovery
have not been given much attention. Most studies and essays bemoan the failure of
LIHTC, and other housing programs, to reach those most in need (Hooks and Miller,
2006). Still others have used geographic information systems (GIS) to analyze damages
and losses of housing, including LIHTC, after Hurricane Katrina (Richardson and
Renner; 2007). This study specifically examines the preferences of LIHTC professionals
and the Florida State Finance Corporation (FHFC), the state housing authority
administering housing programs in the state. Research on LIHTC multifamily housing
development post-disaster fills a gap between the disaster experience of households and
housing providers, particularly LIHTC developers and investors.
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PREFERENCE THEORY, DECISION-MAKING, AND RISK
As stated in Chapter 2, risk as a social science was first explored by Gilbert White
(Lofstedt and Frewer, 1998). White proposed a social construct that suggested modifying
human behavior was a better solution to potential harm from natural disasters (White,
1945). Avoidance is one such measure. Risk avoidance is most often shown in areas
with proximity to hurricane hazards, such as Florida, when communities mandate
evacuations or have a no-development policy on barrier islands.
Bradbury (1989) identified two concepts of risk that propose solutions to different
problems. Technological risk uses a quantitative approach in risk analysis and presents
facts from which decisions can be made. Most attention to property development risk
focuses on measurable processes, largely feasibility analysis and cash flow analysis
(Byrne, 1996; Cadman and Topping, 1995). Additional risk exposure for LIHTC projects
(management risk, tax risk, and capital risk), are quantitative and fall within the
technological risk category. A second concept of risk forms a theoretical basis for policy
design from a social constructivist perspective (Bradbury, 1989, p. 380). It is from this
perspective that societal decisions can be considered and cooperative decisions can be
made.
Plough and Krimsky recognized the significance of the political dimension of
policy formation when ‘what the experts deem most important and what the public
demands from government’ are in disaccord (1987, p. 7). Often this is the case when
disaster recovery is underway, yet social needs fail to be met. Disaccord is highly visible
in the affordable housing realm, not only because of a chronic undersupply in general, but
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especially when disaster recovery fails to address the needs of the most vulnerable
segments of the population—the elderly, disabled, and impoverished. Bradbury (1989)
includes an ethical dimension to consider ‘questions of values that inherently are
embedded in judgments of the analyst’ (p. 382). Risk judgments between laypersons and
experts will naturally have differing viewpoints because each class has varying
experiences and expectations that contribute to understanding. Disagreements between
experts and laypersons are not factually wrong per se but are from a different perspective
(Fischcoff et al, 1983). The literature on disaster recovery reflects this discord with the
majority of research focusing on the effects disaster places on the displaced and the
disenfranchised. The conversation ultimately leads the charge for more assistance and
more housing that is affordable for the poor and working classes, often to no avail.
Research devoted to those who provide affordable housing fails to examine the problem
from the producer’s perspective. Developing an understanding from the perspective of
one or another group provides the foundation for a two-way conversation that supports
knowledge and mutual respect (Bradbury, 1989). This study bridges the gap between the
perspective of the developer and the multiple studies that advocate for increased access to
affordable housing by vulnerable households.
Slovic et al (1979) found in an earlier study on hazards related risks that people
who had faulty perceptions were likely to err in their understanding. That challenge is
still prevalent today. Understanding barriers to the development of affordable housing as
heard from those that produce housing with LIHTC will hopefully contribute to the
discourse in the literature and in public policy.
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LOCATION PREFERENCE AND DEVELOPER RISK
While some developers may consider the social benefits of their developments,
for the most part, real estate developers are concerned with exposure to financial risk
when making investment decisions. Empirical evidence identifies real estate risks as
illiquidity (the inability to turn real estate into cash quickly), optimal holding period,
price risk (Cheng, Lin & Liu, 2008); interest rate risk (Archer, Elmer, Harrison & Ling,
1998); credit and debt burden risks (Igan & Pinheiro, 2010); and risk associated with
business cycles (Igan & Pinheiro, 2010). Traditional aspects of development risk, such as
financing and interest rates, have been studied by Markham (2001) and Cameron (1990).
Additional risks identified by Liu, Liu & Sun (2011) include policy risk, funding risk,
operational risk, urban planning risk, technology risk, natural hazards risk, market supply
and demand risk, and capital risk.
Newell and Steglick (2006) identified property development risks in a survey of
leading property developers in Australia. The major categories of risk factors in this
study were categorized by stages of construction and included risk factors such as costs,
land, financial, infrastructure, management, time, changes, and environmental factors
among others. Their survey of property developers indicated that the pre-construction
phase of development has the highest overall risk in the development process. Risk
factors for this stage include many of the same risk factors that would take place during
post-disaster redevelopment: political risk, experience, funding, market risk, land
acquisition, and government approvals. Some of these same risk factors were verified by
this Florida LIHTC case.
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Risk factors were categorized in the course of this study. Dullisear (2001)
classified property development in four broad risk categories: commercial, construction,
land, and social. Hargitay and Yu (1993) identified two categorical types of risk as
systematic and unsystematic. Systematic risk was defined as an external risk that cannot
be controlled such as general economic changes, changes in government policies, market
risk, and cyclical risks. Unsystematic risks are specific risks that can be anticipated, for
instance business risk, liquidity, location, construction, and financial risks. Pidgeon et al
(1992) studied risk perceptions through the dichotomy of objective and subjective, or
perceived risk. Objective risk is specific and measurable while subjective risk is what an
individual perceives based on personal experience and expectations of an occurrence.
Building on Morrison’s (2007) use of Social, Technological, Economical,
Environmental, and Political (STEEP) analysis in real estate development, Khumpaisal
and Ross (2007) used STEEP analysis for categorizing real estate development risks that
are both quantitative and subjective. STEEP analysis is a strategic decision-making tool
that allows an organization to assess potential changes to the current macro environment.
The method is also known as ETPS, STEP, PEST, PESTLE, and STEEPLE. Various
iterations of this business model consider other factors that influence decision-making,
such as Legal (L), Political (P), Economic (E), Environmental (E), Technological (T), or
Sociological (S). This study used a modified STEEP analysis to isolate those factors
specific to real estate development in the aftermath of disaster. The categories chosen for
this study were Social, Technical, Environmental, Economic, and Government (Table 21).
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Table 2-1: STEEG Analysis Categories for Real Estate Development During
Disaster Recovery Modified from Khumpaisal and Ross (2007)
STEEG Analysis Categories for Real Estate Development
During Disaster Recovery

Social

Social factors include community feedback for real estate
development projects. This feedback could be in the form of
pushback based on existing bias towards a particular type of
development or demand for a specific type of construction.
Social factors are identified as external threats or external allies
to a project.

Technical

Technical factors include factors that indicate financial
feasibility for a project. This includes measurements of
feasibility such as cap rates, internal rates of return, operations,
and financial strength.

Economic

Economic factors involve the profit and loss of a given
development and include available funding, incentives,
subsidies, and application costs that have a positive or negative
influence on profitability.

Environmental

Environmental factors include those elements that influence
where a project will be developed in conjunction with known or
perceived natural or human made hazards.

Government

Political factors are those governmental influences that are
outside a single developer's influence. These include the
likelihood of existing policies to continue, funding based on a
political agenda that could expire depending upon which group
is in power, or priorities based on needs at the federal, state and
local level.

44

Identifying LIHTC Development Risk
In addition to traditional real estate development risks, LIHTC in particular
carries management and recapture risk due to complicated management and reporting
requirements (Roberts, 2009). Recapture risk occurs when the required number of lowincome units is not maintained, resulting in tax credit recapture from the investor back to
the state.
Reznick examined operating data for 16,356 tax credit properties and found that
foreclosure risk among LIHTC is less than 1% even though cash flow margins were tight
(2011). Nearly 35% of properties surveyed were operating below the break-even point
demonstrating the significant contribution of subsidies to project feasibility. Only one
study was found that analyzed the effects of disaster specifically on LIHTC properties.
After Hurricane Sandy, the Furman Center at New York University conducted a count of
housing damages by type, including LIHTC. Of 178,000 affordable housing units
damaged by storm surge, 248 buildings with 24,800 units were identified as LIHTC
(2013). Considering the low margins achieved by LIHTC, damages to units after disaster
could increase the incidence of foreclosure if damaged units cannot be brought back
online in a reasonable amount of time. Cost risks can cause a negative impact on
performance if rehabilitation falls below the break-even point for operations. After
disaster, the risk of recapture due to a brief noncompliance period from the down units is
somewhat mitigated because the IRS typically waives compliance requirements, at least
temporarily, during the response and restoration period. When foreclosure occurs, IRS
rules state that the extended compliance period is waived and recapture is mitigated under
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the assumption that a subsequent owner will continue affordability status. One of the
limitations the earlier study is that LIHTC foreclosure rates could be understated because
deeds in lieu and syndicate support of underperforming properties was not analyzed
(Reznick, 2013).
Melendez, Schwartz, and Montrichard (2008) found that LIHTC capital risk
increases as LIHTC properties age and need rehabilitation. Often, older developments
that have completed the initial compliance period and the extended compliance period
use LIHTC funds to upgrade properties and maintain affordability. After disaster,
rehabilitation creates risk because of the additional financing needed to restore and repair
units after disaster.
Strategies for managing private sector risk as a tool for mitigation have received
some attention in the literature. Harrington (2006) uses economic theory to propose
catastrophic risk insurance while Kunreuther (2006) uses risk decision theory to argue for
a comprehensive natural disaster insurance program. Both of these ideas are likely to
increase developer costs, becoming a barrier for participation because of the tight
margins of profitability associated with LIHTC.
A list of objective and subjective risk variables was compiled from the real estate
development literature and the reflections of this study’s survey respondents. Risk
variables were categorized using the modified STEEP analysis described previously (see
Table 2-2). Some elements of risk that directly affect hurricane prone areas, such as
storm surge, coastal proximity, impact zone, or specific programs associated with
housing and disaster recovery were included. Phase II of this study asked developers
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about elements of risk in order to identify those risk factors that affect decision-making.
Developers contributed two additional funding sources to mitigate financial risk, Project
Based Section 8 Rental Assistance and State Housing Trust Funds. Respondents also
ranked a series of risk variables that reflected perceived risks associated with hurricane
disaster.
After disaster, risk perception could influence recovery decision-making,
particularly if decision makers experienced significant losses. Location and land
availability are key factors for development decisions and both factors are significant
barriers to development in high cost/high hazard coastal counties. Land acquisition
cannot be financed with LIHTC investment funds, so the developer either acquires land
for a specific project, or has land readily available from previous investments (Nelson,
2014). The price of available land is basic to any investment decision. Oftentimes the
least expensive land is located in the most vulnerable of places (Khadduri, 2013). Land
in coastal communities often comes at a premium. Higher rent and higher stabilized
occupancy rates offset high land costs in these areas (Bin and Kruse, 2006). Site
decisions are also influenced by access and the available market, which increases value
and cost. After disaster, particularly those disasters that have devastating outcomes on
resources, developers are especially cognizant of market rebound and future risk due to
hazards. Available land in a high impact disaster area could present barriers to a
subsequent purchase
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Table 2-2: Modified STEEP Analysis

Florida 2004 Case Study Criteria: A SEEP Method for Categorizing
LIHTC Risk During Disaster Recovery

Social

Environmental

Economic

Political

NIMBY

Location

Recapture

Government
Priorities

Advocacy
Groups

Storm Surge

Financing

Policy Consistency

Public Sentiment

Coastal

Incentives

Regulation

Impact Zone

Grants

Funding

CDBG

Grants

HOME

Disaster Funds

Insurance
Capital Costs
Land Acquisition
Terms

State Housing Trust Funds

Project Based Section 8
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households who need shelter temporarily as a response to disaster. In this study, some
developers expressed a preference for risk avoidance in the areas likely to be hardest hit
based on perceived location hazards. While no direct evidence exists, in the course of
this study developers communicated the perceived risk of a slow rebound in some
communities, if the area rebounds at all. Lack of redevelopment after Katrina,
particularly in some of the lower-income communities suggests that perceived risks
associated with a slow rebound are well-founded.
Developers of low-income housing often face NIMBYism (Not in My Back Yard)
from communities resistant to the perceived risk of the decline of property values because
of the proximity to low-income housing. While this study found that advocacy was not
exceedingly significant in development decision-making, developers suggested that local
communities be better informed about the typical tenant occupying LIHTC in a
rebranding attempt to reduce the stigma associated with affordable housing. Excessive
costs for insurance, code compliance, or proximity to hazards shape investment decisions
from an opportunity cost or development cost basis.
Location Preferences and the Public Agency
Statute requires that state housing authorities (HFA) develop annual Qualified
Action Plans (QAP) to encourage a wide variety of stated preferences for LIHTC
development. The QAP is a federally required planning tool that HFA uses to explain
how the LIHTC program will be administered, and to establish preferences and set-asides
for tax credit awards (Hollar, 2014). Allocation criteria is determined by the state,
however the statute specifically requires certain criteria to be considered, including
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location, which is the primary interest for this study. Other required features and
conditions are shown in Table 2-3. Public policy preferences are communicated in QAPs
in several ways. Preferences in the form of extra points encourage developers to submit
projects that favor specific populations, such as the elderly, disabled, or families; extra
points may also be awarded to encourage projects in certain locations. Others use
thresholds and set asides. Others, like Florida, use specific language, such as ‘targeted’.
This study specifically examined location preferences for areas affected by the
2004 hurricane season. That year, four hurricanes hit Florida causing some degree of
damages in every county. Hurricane Charley was the first to strike on Florida’s east coast
beginning a 44 day onslaught of damaging winds, rain and storm surge. Charley was
followed by Hurricanes Frances, Ivan, and then Jeanne. Some areas were hit by multiple
hurricanes. Other areas had damage associated with storm surge. In the two years after
the hurricanes, Florida QAPs responded with location preferences which will be
discussed in further detail in Chapter 5.
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Table 2-3: Allocation Criteria for Qualified Action Plans
LIHTC Qualified Action Plan Criteria
Project characteristics

Lowest income populations

Housing needs

Tenants with children

Project location

Qualified Census Tract

Revitalization plan

Participation non-profit organizations

Sponsor characteristics

Energy efficiency preferences

Special needs tenants

Historic properties

Public housing waiting lists

Projects intended for eventual tenant ownership

Set-asides are one means of communicating LIHTC preferences. These can be
established within the QAP reserving a dollar amount or a percentage of tax credit
allocations for projects meeting specific guidelines, for populations served or location
preferences for example. Thresholds can also be established that require projects to meet
minimum guidelines just to submit a proposal for LIHTC awards. Gustafsen and Walker
(2002) performed a content analysis of QAPs from 1990 to 2000 to determine how
preferences and set-asides were used to guide development characteristics. They found
that set-asides and preferences were declared in eight categories: geographic location,
housing needs, financing, residential characteristics, project type and activities, building
characteristics, sponsorship and costs, and affordability. Others have found that location
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requirements result in LIHTC developments often being supplied in low-income areas
with housing already relatively easy to obtain using vouchers (Eriksen and Rosenthal,
2010). Some studies suggest LIHTC developments often act as a substitute for market
housing that would have been constructed without tax credits or other subsidy (Eriksen
and Rosenthal, 2010; Malpezzi and Vandell, 2002). Given that developers are less likely
to build LIHTC in areas with less demand, like extremely low-income communities,
QAPs that award additional points or set-asides for these areas can result in LIHTC being
developed in areas that already support low-income households considering that rents are
relatively cheaper and landlords are likely more willing to accept vouchers (Baum-Snow
and Marion, 2009).
According to Khadduri (2013) developers actively communicate during the
comment period for QAPs being commenced the following year to influence which
projects will be fundable. Preferred locations established in the QAP do not necessarily
insure developers will bring properties into the LIHTC competition (Khadduri, 2013).
For instance, threshold requirements may negate additional points awarded for location
obstructing competitiveness of certain properties. High land costs also impede developer
activity in more desirable areas that are often experiencing a decline in affordable
housing, again moving affordable housing to areas already being served by the voucher
program.
Khadduri (2013) suggests that LIHTC is superior to vouchers when it lends itself
to neighborhood revitalization. During the disaster recovery period, LIHTC can improve
the quality of housing stock in areas affected by the storm. In addition, new LIHTC
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constructed as a result of disaster can mitigate future damages because of improved
construction standards (p.2). Khadduri found little research comparing how LIHTC
construction performs in high hazard areas, nor were studies found that analyze how
often existing LIHTC in coastal communities withstood multiple hurricane hazards. This
research opens the door to that analysis by studying the location preferences delineated in
QAPs after a major hurricane disaster and location preferences of developers based on
stated and revealed preferences.
Revealed Preference Theory
The disaster cycle provides a unique opportunity for effected communities to
engage in redevelopment with the intent of creating a modern community along with
services and a landscape that enhances the lives and property of its inhabitants. Yet
disaster recovery is a difficult process with limited funds available to bring an affected
community or region back to normalcy. Housing is but a small segment of the recovery
process, albeit one of the most essential, particularly when a large portion of existing
housing is damaged. The reality of having limited resources available to assist
communities in recovery efforts lends itself well to the theory of preference.
Pioneered by Paul Samuelson, revealed preference theory is a means of analyzing
choice by observing behavior. Revealed preference theory arose from theories of choice
and utility rooted from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries pioneered by Georg
Cantor and Ragnar Frisch. Revealed preference was proposed by Samuelson as an
alternative to ordinal utility theory (Samuelson, 1950) and promoted the idea that any
good or service is preferred over an alternative choice. Samuelson (1948) initially
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studied individual preferences using an indifference map based on observations. This
study analyses the stated and revealed preferences of stakeholders of LIHTC in the
context of disaster recovery.
Bockstael and McConnell (2007) studied behavior for valuing environmental
amenities using revealed preference techniques. The authors recognized the economic
impact inherent in disaster, particularly how impact analysis measured by economic
activity does not equate to social welfare.

“A major hurricane will increase local expenditures dramatically
both in terms of expenditures made to protect property a priori and
expenditures made ex post for replacements and repairs. These
show up as increase[s] in revenues to construction and materials
supply firms. Yet no one would agree that social welfare is enhanced
by a hurricane.” (p. 3)

Stated preference identifies preferences with interviews or surveys. This study
used a survey to illicit stated preferences from LIHTC developers to understand how
disaster recovery policies influence decision-making. Stated preferences of the Florida
Housing Finance Corporation (FHFC), representing the public agency, were identified
with a content analysis of Qualified Action Plans. The value of stated preferences was
demonstrated in a study of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Carson et al (2003) conducted
interviews for a large scale contingent valuation study that identified stated willingness-
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to-pay by households to assess the harm associated with the disaster. Stated preferences
were also used when attempting to value the damages associated with the Exxon Valdez
oil spill. The researchers used direct interviews as opposed to observations of behavior
because revealed preferences were difficult to obtain and indecisive (Bockstael and
McConnell, 2007).
Others studies have combined stated and revealed preference methods as a
means of comparison. Valuing environmental amenities was the subject of a
study that compared revealed and stated preference models (Adamowicz et al.,
1994). The stated preference model is a direct method for valuing environmental
amenities. In this model, a stated choice was acquired from respondents using
hypothetical choice sets. Revealed preference, an indirect method of value used
to observe choices, was used to compare results. This study used a survey to
illicit stated choices from LIHTC professionals and content analysis to determine
the states choices of the public agency. Revealed preferences were garnered
using geographic information systems (GIS) to isolate demonstrated development
patterns for comparison of location preferences in the aftermath of hurricane
disaster.
During disaster recovery, choices are made to allocate a limited amount of
funding to critical projects, such as infrastructure, housing and economic development.
Policies formed before disaster strikes can guide leaders in their funding allocation
preferences. Disaster management plans are unable to predict every nuance of housing
redevelopment needs or developer risks that inhibit affordable housing development

55

when expedient housing recovery is needed. This study compares the stated preferences
of LIHTC community and FHFC by observing revealed preferences using Geographic
Information Services (GIS). The study also ranks risk variables in a modified STEEP
model based on responses by survey participants to identify the level of perceived risk
and willingness to develop during disaster recovery.
DISASTER THEORY
According to Smith and Wenger (2007), the recovery phase of disaster is little
understood among researchers and practitioners. Communities are challenged to rebuild
basic services, infrastructure, and the local economy. Individuals are faced with
rebuilding homes and lives. Business owners are faced with determining the feasibility
of whether to restore or not. Housing providers, within the context of a business model,
have to factor in risk and financial constraints to determine if, where, and when
rebuilding and restoration will occur. Policy makers focus on reconstructing a
sustainable community using limited resources. Decisions are made about who will be
winners and losers when available funding is weighed against social, economic, and
environmental needs; needs which far outweigh available resources. In addition to basic
economic realities, stakeholders and decision-makers are faced with contradictory
policies, complex interconnections between participants, and limited understanding of
how all of these complexities impact the effectiveness of public and private systems for
supplying a sufficient number of affordable housing units.
The community leans toward the restoration of a familiar place while at the same
time striving to reconstruct a safer and more equitable society (Kates et al., 2006, p.
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14656). New sustainable development potentially replaces old and run-down buildings,
depending on political will and the struggle between available resources and competing
interests of who benefits from recovery and restoration (p. 14656). This paradox was
seen in action after Hurricane Katrina nearly devastated the Lower Ninth Ward in
Orleans Parish, Bernard Parish and Jefferson Parish. Over 51% of white-occupied homes
and 67% of black occupied homes were damaged or destroyed in these areas. Yet
redevelopment was criticized for being inefficient and for straining public services
(Simunovich, 2008). Urban redevelopment programs were heavily criticized for failing
to house low-income households while building a new community that highlighted the
economic revitalization of the area, leaving many lifelong residents behind. Ultimately,
disaster planning requires that stakeholders participate in a dialogue that guides
redevelopment during recovery. LIHTC developers, as the primary provider of
affordable multifamily housing, can contribute expertise to housing recovery policy by
identifying the programs most effective for affordable housing production during disaster
recovery.
Researchers from many disciplines have studied disaster in the context of their
fields, but ultimately there are five bodies of theory in the literature on the disaster
recovery process. These are the social, institutional, environmental, economic, and
physical theories of study. These areas contribute to disaster theory through the construct
of competing choices. What these bodies of knowledge reveal about disaster recovery is
that the process is circuitous and complex. Multiple sectors of society have a role in the
recovery effort but lack understanding of how each sector affects outcomes (Alesch,
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2005). Quick decision-making is undertaken under political and social pressures which
inhibits the process of integrating and learning from past experiences. These are the
realities that converge in the emerging theory of disaster recovery (Alesch, 2005). It is a
goal of this research to contribute to that emerging theory.
THE THEORETICAL DOMAIN OF DISASTER RECOVERY
Much of the literature emphasizes the social outcomes of disaster recovery,
particularly for low income and disadvantaged populations. Homeowners and economic
redevelopment receive the bulk of disaster aid in the form of grants and low-interest
loans. Renters and low-income families face being permanently displaced from the
community. During disaster recovery, LIHTC multi-family housing developers are at a
disadvantage. LIHTC developers face additional risks that influence decisions to produce
affordable housing during recovery. This study was interested in the perceived risks that
influence LIHTC development during recovery. The goal of this research is to compare
stated preferences and revealed preferences to isolate risks for LIHTC production in
Florida. Understanding LIHTC risk informs policy makers of the expert assessment of
the programs most likely to facilitate a robust affordable housing recovery.
There are several theories that emerge in the literature that encompass various
disciplines in the study of housing and disaster recovery. Much of the research
surrounding disaster recovery and low-income housing is grounded in the theories of
environmental justice and social justice from the legal and sociological disciplines
respectively. The plight of disadvantaged populations fits well within these areas of
focus because of the concern for human rights and the social functions of society.
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Privatization evolves from economic theory and seeks to implement market mechanisms
to improve efficiency in government programs through public/private partnerships, tax
credits, and vouchers (Savas, 2000). The public housing model has coalesced into a
modified public-private partnership model where private developers are incentivized
through tax breaks or subsidies to provide low-income housing to those in need. During
disaster, incentives and government aid is expected to expedite recovery so a sense of
normalcy and economic activity can return, ideally to a better than pre-disaster condition,
even if the poor are excluded. The provision of low-income housing during recovery also
has roots in public choice theory attributable to public discourse and political response.
Public choice theory was developed by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) in an effort to
explain how decisions are made in the political arena. Supply side programs, such as
LIHTC, are among existing housing programs driven by government policies. Policies
are often modified during disaster recovery to facilitate redevelopment of affordable
housing by the private sector (Figure 2-1). An understanding of associated risk variables
contributes to an ongoing discourse of housing deficiencies post-disaster.
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Figure 2-1: Public Choice Theory and Post Disaster Housing Recovery

The perception of risk in hazardous areas may influence the development
decision-making process. In economic literature, risk is typically conceptualized as
uncertainty over future outcomes (Bodie, Kane and Markus, 1993). Knight (1921)
defined risk as measurable as opposed to uncertainty which is “not susceptible to
measurement.” This study identifies risk and uncertainty, merging the two into what is
conceptualized as perceived risk. For the purpose of this study, perceived risk is defined
as the stated actions and motivations that stem from social, economic, environmental, and
political experiences. Expectations of risk, whether perceived or quantified, should
influence decisions about where LIHTC projects will ultimately be developed.
For this study, temporal changes in demonstrated location preferences were
expected as the disaster event became a distant memory. Temporal changes were
examined in the course of this study to compare revealed preferences with stated
preferences. This analysis sought to extract variables of risk from a comparison of stated
and revealed preferences. The study also sought to make note of variations in site
choices over time.

60

An embedded revelatory case study approach was used to determine the
reasonableness of the variables developed from the literature. A survey of LIHTC
professionals ranked each of the variables by order of preferences. In the analysis,
variables presented were interpreted in terms of risk. The case study method was chosen
as an empirical study of LIHTC production in Florida after hurricanes Charley, Jeanne,
Frances and Ivan hit the state over a six-week period in 2004. The study begins with the
proposition that affordable housing production is driven by housing need based on
population, but in the case of disaster, housing damages often drive public policy.
The Hurricane Housing Working Group (HWG), convened by the Governor Jeb
Bush, stated recommendations for housing recovery. Location preferences of the public
agency were communicated in the Qualified Action Plans (QAP), published annually by
the Florida Housing Finance Corporation (FHFC). Evidence of HWG recommendations
were also communicated in the 2005 and 2006 QAPs. Geographic information systems
(GIS) technology was embedded in the case study to analyze demonstrated LIHTC
development patterns during the analysis period. Using GIS as a method of analysis
provided a geographic study of development patterns in conjunction with Sea, Lake, and
Overland Surges (SLOSH) models to analyze LIHTC developments located in the
boundary of storm surge. There is no evidence in the literature to suggest that a
comprehensive storm surge analysis has ever been completed for Florida LIHTC. Figure
2-2 demonstrates the case study framework for this study.
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Figure 2-2: Embedded Revelatory Case Study Design
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Chapter 3
FLORIDA AND THE LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT

INTRODUCTION
A revelatory case study design was used to complete a location and risk analysis
of LIHTC in the aftermath of the 2004 hurricane season in Florida. The case study also
developed risk variables that were ranked by participants, which was discussed in the
previous chapter. This chapter spotlights a brief history of housing assistance and the
LIHTC program in general. LIHTC in Florida is further described in relation to the 2004
hurricane season to analyze the suitability of Florida LIHTC and Disaster Recovery as a
case study.
HOUSING ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES
The U.S. Congress has played a role in housing since it funded research to study
slums in American cities in 1892. Federal aid was first proposed by President Theodore
Roosevelt in 1908 when he established a Housing Commission to study housing for low
income households. It was not until 1918 that Congress authorized $100 million to
finance projects for the United States Ship Building Corporation for housing workers
during World War I. In 1922, then Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, promoted
home ownership with the Own Your Home campaign. Hoover continued to tout the
virtues of homeownership through the decade until the Great Depression.
The Great Depression saw a wave of foreclosures as mortgages became
unaffordable and families were forced from their homes. Unemployment climbed to
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twenty-five percent. Incomes fell by forty percent. In 1932, the Federal Home Loan
Bank System was established by Congress in response to the work of the White House
Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership, convened by President Herbert
Hoover in 1931 to gain a better understanding of the barriers that were holding back
homeownership (Hoover, 1931). Hoover signed the Emergency Relief and Construction
Act into law on July 21, 1932, which authorized the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
to make loans for public service projects, including slum clearance and low-income
housing construction. According to the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
actions taken in 1932 were the first significant housing activities undertaken by the
federal government.
When Roosevelt took office in 1933, he immediately took steps to provide relief
for homeowners by establishing the Home Owners Loan Corporation. He continued to
fund grants and slum clearance through the Public Works Administration and the Public
Works Emergency Housing Corporation. By 1934, nearly half of all residential loans
were delinquent and homelessness continued to increase. At the height of the Great
Depression, millions were homeless, living with relatives, finding shelter in vacant
buildings, or existing in organic shanty towns. The National Housing Act of 1934 was a
pivotal piece of housing legislation that set in motion policies that established public
housing in the U.S. Initially, the Act created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
to insure single-family homes as a means to spur home construction for ownership. It
was not until 1937 that the United States Public Housing Authority was created under the
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National Housing Act to authorize loans and subsidies for public housing (Quigley,
2000).
The Evolution of Housing Policy for the Poor
Housing policies have rarely been about just housing in isolation (Schwartz, 2015;
Edson, 2011). When the United States Public Housing Authority was enacted, the
declaration stated the purpose of the act was to help States ease unemployment first, and
then to improve housing for low income families. In 1940, the Lanham Act allowed
federal funds to be used to produce public housing as a part of the war effort to house
defense industry workers. This was followed by legislation to exercise rent control under
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 to curtail rent inflation after the war. Katz et al
(2003) analyzed seventy years of housing policies at the state and local level and found
only two that directly addressed affordable and decent housing.
It was not until 1949, under President Harry Truman, that the Housing Act
authorized the construction of a large number of public housing units. While 810,000
units were authorized to be built by 1955, only 125,000 were actually constructed. Urban
renewal and slum clearance projects undertaken under the act actually destroyed more
housing than was replaced (Thomas, 1997; Rusk, 1999; Teaford, 2000), a charge that
would be repeated during the recovery phase of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (Campanella,
2006).
The 1950s and 1960s ushered in programs to assist the elderly and disabled in
obtaining housing. The Housing Act of 1956 authorized housing agencies to increase
spending for elderly housing and expanded eligibility for single elderly households to
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obtain public housing. The Housing Act of 1959 authorized Section 202, a program that
allowed non-profit organizations to develop housing projects for the elderly. The
reauthorization of the Housing Act in 1961 continued support of the elderly by
authorizing rental subsidies to this segment of the population in addition to providing
government insured loans for low-income housing construction.
President Lyndon Johnson took office in 1963 and ushered in his ideas for the
Great Society with the goal of eliminating poverty and racial injustice. During the
Johnson administration, Congress established the Department of Housing and Urban
Development as a cabinet-level agency and created the Model Cities Program as one
component of Johnson’s war on poverty. The Model Cities Program was replaced by the
Community Development Block Grant (CBDG) program in 1974; CDBG is still a key
element of housing policy today. Various mortgage subsidies were also launched from
the Kennedy administration in 1961 through the early 1980s when Ronald Reagan took
office to encourage the private sector to produce low-income rental housing for the poor,
elderly and disabled. Other than Section 515, which subsidizes rural housing
development, the grants and programs from this period did not produce additional public
housing but relied on existing stock or the private sector. According to the Section 8
contract database that is maintained and publicly available through hud.gov, as of 2012,
the Section 8 program provided rent subsidies for 1,034,445 households. These units
were constructed over a 20 year period between the early 1960s and the early 1980s and
are for profit entities owned by private parties or non-profit organizations (Schwartz,
2015).
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By 1969, housing subsidies for tenants became tied to income. Initially set at
twenty-five percent of household income, the threshold is currently capped at 30% even
though many households are paying considerably more of their income for housing. In
1970, the Experimental Housing Allowance Program demonstrated the feasibility of rent
subsidies in privately owned buildings, becoming the precursor to Section 8 multifamily
housing.
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 consolidated many
housing grant programs under the CDBG program and created the Section 8 voucher
program to subsidize rent for low income households living in privately owned housing.
Vouchers were proposed as early as 1937 but did not become a matter of policy until
1970 with the Experimental Housing Allowance Program. The Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974 created the first permanent voucher program and was managed
by local housing authorities nationwide (Schwartz, 2015). In 1983, Reagan introduced
the Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act to provide more flexibility for tenants using
vouchers. Like other programs and statutes, the voucher program has been modified and
renamed through the years, but it is still the largest demand-side housing subsidy program
for low-income households.
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit was established in 1986 and provides
roughly $5 billion in annual tax credits to developers in exchange for capping rents at
either 50 percent or 60 percent of area median income (AMI). Housing must remain
affordable for a minimum of 15 years or investors risk significant financial penalties.
Some argue that developers collect rents at the same rate as would be collected if there
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were no subsidy at all (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2008). The LITHC program is described in
greater detail in a separate section of this chapter. Housing for the homeless was
addressed in 1987 with the advent of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act.
The HOME Investment Partnership (HOME) was created through the 1990
National Affordable Housing Act. HOME is a block grant program that focuses
specifically on low- and moderate-income households. The difference between CDBG
and HOME is that the latter is limited to housing while the former provides flexibility for
a wide range of community development projects. State and local governments can
choose how HOME funds are spent as long as projects are spent on housing programs for
low-income households (Schwartz, 2015). Funding is divided between state and local
government at 40 percent and 60 percent respectively. Congress requires that at least 15
percent of HOME funds be allocated to community based nonprofit organizations known
as Community Housing Development Organizations. HOME funds must also be
matched with other funding sources, and can be used in conjunction with LIHTC. As of
November 2012, the HOME program was instrumental in assisting 1.3 million renters
and homeowners with housing (Schwartz, 2015). Roughly half of all HOME funds have
been allocated for rental housing. HOME-funded projects often serve a different
population from LIHTC because assistance must be targeted to households with incomes
at 80 percent or less of AMI for owners or no more than 50 to 65 percent of AMI for
renters. Like LIHTC, HOME-funded rental housing must maintain affordability for a
minimum of 15 years.
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Several programs were initiated in 1993 that contributed to a new round of urban
redevelopment, including the creation of empowerment zones by Congress which was
intended to encourage development in distressed areas. The Urban Revitalization
Demonstration Program, or HOPE VI, was also authorized the same year. The goal of
HOPE VI was to demolish and redevelop distressed public housing following
recommendations of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing.
The program funded the demolition of distressed public housing units but has been
criticized for replacing them with less than 55 percent of equivalent public housing units
necessary to support households with very low incomes (Schwartz, 2015; Kingsley,
2009; Popkin et al, 2004). Kingsley (2009) asserts that the percentage of replacement
public housing is closer to 81% because as much as a third of public housing units
scheduled for demolition through HOPE VI were vacant units. This view is discounts the
“prolonged” pre-demolition period in which neglected maintenance and upkeep forced
households to move out while management allowed units to remain vacant (Goetz, 2013,
p. 91).
As this brief history points out, housing assistance in the United States falls into
three categories:


Tenant-Based: subsidies given to individual households including Section
8 vouchers.



Public Housing: Housing typically owned and managed by local
government, usually a state or local housing authority.



Project Based: subsidies given to the owner of housing units which must
then be rented to lower income households at affordable rates. Privately
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owned Section 8 Multifamily Housing and the Low-Income Housing Tax
Credit Program both fall into this category.

This study centered on the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program in the
context of disaster recovery. The next section begins with a brief overview of LIHTC,
how the program works, and how it is used in Florida to produce affordable housing. The
chapter closes with a description of the 2004 hurricane season in the State of Florida with
an overview of housing damages around the state.
THE LOW INCOME TAX CREDIT PROGRAM
The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program was established under
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in an effort to incentivize private development of lowincome rental housing. The program is a supply side housing program administered by
the Internal Revenue Service and is the single largest subsidy for low-income rental
housing production (Schwartz, 2015, p. 135). The incentive for investors to participate in
the program is the tax credit that reduces federal income taxes dollar for dollar. The
program has funded more than 2.5 million affordable housing units since its inception
and accounted for as much as half of the multi-family rental housing constructed through
2010 (Khadduri, Climarco, and Burnett, 2012).
According to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), state
and local housing authorities are awarded tax credits totaling nearly $8 billion annually.
Housing authorities are authorized to issue credits for the acquisition, rehabilitation, or
new construction of rental housing for low-income households. HUD maintains a
national database on the size, unit mix, location, and contact information for individual
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projects. Each year, states are required to adopt a Qualified Action Plan (QAP) that
establishes the priorities and scoring methods that will be used to allocate tax credits.
Developers compete for tax credits based on the criteria established in the QAP.
Financing for LIHTC developments go through the same stages as a typical development:
pre-construction loan, construction loans, and permanent financing. The acquisition of
financing begins at conception and can be complicated because multiple layers of grants,
bonds, tax credits and local programs are often used to reduce the developer’s equity
requirement and maintain project feasibility. Tax credits are used to reduce an investor’s
tax liability dollar for dollar over a 10-year period beginning at occupancy. The LIHTC
property must remain affordable for an initial 15-year compliance period and an extended
15 year non reporting period with an agreed upon proportion of units to be occupied by
low-income tenants under the 20/50 or 40/60 rule. Proper management is critical to
maintaining compliance throughout the 15 year period because severe penalties are
applied to investors should the property fail to meet affordability requirements. Good
management is also essential to maintain profitability amid tight profit margins. LIHTC
has been noted for being complicated because of the layered financing structures needed
for feasibility and compliance (O’Regan and Quigley, 2013; Schwartz, 2010). The
following sections discuss each aspect of the LIHTC program in more detail.
Understanding the Qualified Action Plan
The Qualified Action Plan (QAP) is mandated by the federal government and is
created by state and local housing authorities on an annual basis to explain how tax
credits will be allocated. The QAP sets the criteria for competition for 9% tax credits,
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which are fixed annual quotas received by state and local housing authorities. Nine
percent tax credits are allocated for new construction. Four percent tax credits are used
for rehabilitation and new construction completed with tax exempt bonds. This study
does not differentiate between 9% or 4% credits, but analyzes disaster recovery
preferences of the LIHTC program overall.
Federal criteria and standards that are required to be included in the QAP are
project location, characteristics of housing needs, sponsor characteristics, and tenant
populations (i.e. the elderly, disabled, and families with children). Additional allocation
requirements can be established at the state and local level depending on need and often
include additional requirements for housing the lowest income households, projects that
commit to longer term affordability, location in qualified census tracts (QCT) or difficult
to develop areas (DDA), and participation of local non-profit organizations. After
disaster recovery, state and local housing authorities may set preferences for impacted
areas. Developers and stakeholders have the opportunity to comment on proposed
requirements during the QAP development phase for the following year’s allocation.
Each state has a unique approach to the QAP. Provisions are often rated using
point systems, thresholds, and set-asides, although some states use alternative language to
communicate preferences. QAPs in Florida do not reference a point system, but instead
uses language such as “targeted” to express preferences within the QAP. Florida
universal applications use points in a limited basis as a tie-breaker in general areas of
development design or for certain physical features not specified or required within the
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QAP. Analysis of universal applications was not a part of this study but could contribute
additional context to public preferences established by the state housing authority.
Basis boosts and policy statements can be just as influential in project selection
(Shelburne 2008; Gustafson and Walker 2002). Some states award tax credits based
strictly on point scores while others maintain some flexibility and award credits by more
subjective means. Thresholds establish minimum standards and result in some projects
being excluded entirely from the process. Set-asides are pools of tax credits that are
designated for specific targets or categories, such as a particular area, or with specific
features, that are competed for among all properties that qualify for the set-aside. The
development community that wishes to compete for tax credits must be willing to invest
in a property within the bracketed characteristics established in the QAP. Rather than a
strict point system, Florida’s use of targeted language and limited use of points in the
universal application indicates some flexibility for choosing which projects are awarded
credits.
The Ownership Structure of LIHTC
Ownership in LIHTC includes multiple parties that have a stake in the success of
the project (See Figure 3-2). Developers, local government, investors, partnerships,
stakeholders, and property management play important roles in developing and
maintaining compliance and feasibility of the project through the compliance period,
which is at minimum 15 years, plus an extended 15 years based on the criteria established
by the state and local housing authorities.
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Developers generally specialize in affordable housing, but often participate in
other types of development. In either case, the development of a LITHC property follows
the same rules as any other real estate project, minimization of risks and maximization of
profits. The developer is compensated with entrepreneurial profits at each stage of the
development process and is shielded from liability through a limited partnership
corporate structure according to state laws.
The owner operates as a separate entity from the developer for tax purposes.
Ownership often consists of corporate owners and partnerships that are brought together
under a limited partnership. A general partner interest holds 0.01 percent while the
limited partner holds the remaining 99.99 percent interest. Limited partners do not
participate in direct management.
Tax credit investors are often corporate entities or investment groups that
participate in LIHTC to offset other income. Investments are priced as a function of
demand which is fueled by the need to offset taxes. This became a problem between
2007 and 2009 because of fallout from the Great Recession of 2008 (Schwarts, p. 157,
2014). Corporations no longer needed to purchase tax credits because income was
virtually non-existent as the country reeled from the financial collapse (Edson, 2011). To
mitigate the effects felt by LIHTC, Congress adopted the Tax Credit Assistance Program
(TCAP) through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. The LIHTC
database reports funding categories that are used in conjunction with LIHTC for each
development. At the time of this study, TCAP was not included. At the same time that
TCAP was adopted, Congress created a credit exchange program which allowed
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administering agencies in the state to exchange tax credits for cash grants to developers.
Properties developed with tax credits issued through TCAP were required to be placed in
service by 2012. TCAP was in place between October 1, 2006 and September 30, 2009
and was used to fund LIHTC in conjunction with programs developed for disaster areas,
including the Gulf Opportunity Zone and Midwestern Disaster Area Housing Credits.
These programs are not reported in the LIHTC database.
Tax credits cannot be used for land acquisition, and as is generally recognized,
location is instrumental to a successful real estate development. Often the developer will
either purchase land for development or will develop land from their portfolio. In either
case local government must agree to, and sign off in writing on, any LIHTC development
before tax credits can be awarded. State and local governments may have funds for land
acquisition in the form of block grants, loans, or trust funds that developers can apply for.
Local government has jurisdiction over land use and the regulatory requirements for
development, such as zoning restrictions. Additional support can be given for the project
with variances for land use, property tax deferrals or abatements, or waivers of permitting
fees. In return the local government may require that additional conditions be met in the
form of amenities, population served, or any other conditions that are needed to solve
problems in the community.
An allocating agency exists in each state and for certain larger municipalities
within the state. The allocating agency is usually the state housing authority and local
housing authorities who receive tax credits annually per capita from the U.S. Treasury.
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The housing authorities in turn issue the tax credits to developers on a competitive basis
under the conditions outlined in the annual QAP.
Community partners and stakeholders can make or break a project. The most
obvious community partner is the housing authority itself, which has set priorities for
housing needs in the state. Neighborhood associations and landowners around a
proposed site can express support or deny support based on any number of factors
including impact to surrounding properties, or more notably, the Not in My Back Yard
(NIMBY) phenomena. This study does not expressly examine NIMBY and LIHTC
directly, but the survey of LIHTC professionals suggested that those who oppose LIHTC
based on the principle of NIMBYism are unaware of the favorable tenant mix of low and
median income households and the physical appeal of newly constructed LIHTC
properties. Community Development Corporations (CDC) are local nonprofit
community-based organizations that typically focus on revitalization of low-income
neighborhoods. CDCs play a critical role as a LIHTC stakeholder because their support
can lend credibility to a proposed project among other stakeholders and local agencies.
Project lenders are involved in the LIHTC development from pre-construction
through the permanent loan. Each phase may involve the same lender or not. Land
acquisition requires predevelopment funding and often involves a bridge loan. A
construction loan provides the funding when the project construction begins and is
dispersed at agreed upon phases during construction. The construction loan will take out
the land acquisition loan. Finally, when the project is complete, a permanent loan is put
into place, which will be used to take out the construction loan.
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The Syndicator
A syndicator brings the LIHTC finance package together and pools funds from
multiple investors. The syndicator usually arranges the limited partnership where
multiple investors pool resources and share in a proportional share of the net income from
LIHTC operations. Management is left to the general partner. In effect, the syndicator is
the intermediary between the developer and the investors. Some syndicators provide a
turnkey package that includes lender financing from land acquisition to the permanent
loan.
The investment instrument works in much the same way as an investment fund
where the investors have little knowledge or interest in the details of day-to-day
operations, but as in the case of LIHTC, are more interested in the tax benefits. The
syndicator works closely with the development team and management company to insure
the project remains compliant for the 15 year minimum period so investors are not
penalized. The penalty for noncompliance is severe. If a LIHTC does not maintain the
number of agreed upon affordable units, the investor faces potential recapture of all the
tax credits awarded retroactively.
Maintaining Affordability
As stated previously, LIHTC allows investors to reduce their federal incomes
taxes each year for ten years, dollar for dollar, as long as the development stays in
compliance. Two types of LIHTC are available for investors, the 4% credit and the 9%
credit. A 4% credit is typically taken for rehabilitation or new construction supplemented
with tax-exempt bonds. The credit is taken in annual installments over a ten-year period
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(Table 3-1). A 4% credit is intended to deliver 30% of the qualified basis for a LIHTC
project. The 9% credit works the same way only it is intended to deliver 70% of the
qualified basis for the project. Projects that do not use any other federal subsidies are
supported with the 9% tax credit. Both the 4% and 9% credits fluctuate because they are
tied to market interest rates. According to the US Department of Revenue, the 9% rate
has historically ranged from as low as 7.35% to 9.27%. The 4% rate has fluctuated from
3.15% to 3.97%.
Table 3-1: Calculating the Annual LIHTC Credit for Investors
Anatomy of the 4% and 9% Tax Credit
ABC Apartments
100 units - all intended for low-income families
Eligible for 60% of area median rents
Rents are set at 30% of the median

CBA Apartments
100 units - all intended for low-income families
Eligible for 60% of area median rents
Rents are set at 30% of the median

Project Cost:
Land
Subsidies

$ 15,000,000 Project Cost:
$ 3,000,000 Land
$
Subsidies (Tax-exempt financing)

$ 15,000,000
$ 3,000,000
$ 900,000

Eligible Basis
Qualfied Basis

$12,000,000 Eligible Basis
100%
Qualfied Basis

$ 11,100,000
100%

Total Basis

$ 12,000,000 Total Basis

$ 11,100,000

Tax Credit
Annual Credit
Credit to Investors over 10 Years

9%
Tax Credit
$1,080,000 Annual Credit
$10,800,000 Credit to Investors over 10 Years

4%
$444,000
$4,440,000

Source: Modified from Schwartz, 2015

A development remains in compliance as long as a specific number of units
remain affordable for low-income households for a period of 15 years plus an additional
15 year period. Compliance is closely monitored during the initial period. Tax credits
are assigned to specific housing developments and are attached to the units instead of
tenant household income. Developments are eligible for tax credits if at least 20% of
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units are affordable to households earning up to 50% of area median income (AMI) or if
40% of units are affordable to households earning up to 60% of AMI. For instance, if a
development is 100% occupied, and a low-income household vacates a unit, then that
unit must be rented to another low-income household. Most developers opt to designate
most of their units for low-income occupancy to maximize the amount of credit they
receive, having the effect of reducing their equity investment and making the project
more feasible. According to Schwartz (2015), more than 70% of all developments
constructed with LIHTC designate 100% of units for low-income households. In
addition, evidence suggests that most developments target families with lower incomes.
A study of 12,228 LIHTC developments around the country found that over half of the
total units had tenants with incomes at or below 40% of AMI. This seems to correlate
with earlier studies that found average annual incomes of LIHTC tenants to be between
45% and 50% of AMI (Schwartz referencing E&Y Kenneth Leventhal Real Estate
Group, 1997:7; GAO, 1997, p. 38; and Cummings and DiPasquale, 1999).
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Figure 3-1: Investment Structure of LIHTC Development
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Administration of LIHTC in Florida
Florida has 67 counties that accept and administer funds for housing needs
throughout the state. Several agencies, including 115 public housing agencies and 17
regional housing finance authorities manage smaller housing programs throughout the
state. However the bulk of housing resources are managed by the Florida Housing
Finance Corporation (FHFC), including the LIHTC program. FHFC works with local
governments, non-profits, elected officials and others to complete its mission of
providing affordable housing throughout the state. Programs that support multifamily
housing in the state include Multifamily Mortgage Revenue Bonds, Florida Affordable
Guarantee Program, HOME Investment Partnerships, Elderly Housing Community Loan,
and the Low Income Housing Program (LIHTC). Florida also has special programs that
support the predevelopment phase of affordable housing development. The
Predevelopment Loan Program (PLP) is limited to eligible non-profits or community
based organizations, public housing authorities, and local governments and can be used to
support a wide range of predevelopment expenses from title searches to feasibility
studies.
Florida LIHTC can be used in conjunction with the HOME Investment
Partnerships program, PLP, the State Apartment Incentive Loan program, or the
Multifamily Mortgage Revenue Bonds program. A percentage of units must be set aside
for low-income or very low income households for a minimum of 30 years with an option
to revert to market rates in the 14th year. Otherwise, Florida requirements are consistent
with 20/50 and 40/60 LIHTC. As required by law, housing needs are assessed annually.
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FHFC conducts market studies and solicits input from the public to determine housing
needs throughout the state. Funds are targeted by county according to need and can be
reserved based on geographic area or demographics. The demographic needs identified
from QAPs in this study include commercial fishing workers, farmers, and the elderly.
Geographic locations included the Florida Keys, urban infill, Front Porch Communities,
rural areas, and counties impacted by the 2004 hurricane season. According to FHFC,
the tax credit program has allocated over $201 million in credits for more than 53,000
units since its inception.
THE FLORIDA 2004 HURRICANE SEASON
The majority of tropical storms occur in the mid-Atlantic, Caribbean, and Gulf of
Mexico from mid-August through October (Landsea et al., 1999). Between 2003 and
2005, the peak of the hurricane season for Florida arrived in September (Virmani and
Weisberg, 2006). In 2004, Florida experienced an onslaught of hurricane activity in a
short six week period. The first hurricane hit Port Charlotte on August 13 as a Category
4. Hurricane Charley had sustained winds of 150 miles per hour. In spite of wind
speeds, Charley was a small hurricane with storm surges limited to within 6 to 7 miles
from the center (Pasch, Brown, and Blake, 2011). Storm surges were relatively small,
not exceeding 7 feet. Charley caused damages estimated at $15 billion, making it the
second costliest hurricane in U.S. history.
Hurricane Frances was the next hurricane to hit the Florida coast that year. On
September 4th, Frances hit both Palm Beach and Martin counties as a Category 2 storm
with winds of 105 miles per hour. Rains were so heavy that a portion of Interstate 95
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collapsed. The state citrus crop was destroyed and major flooding occurred in counties
directly hit by the storm. Storm surge was 6 feet along the east coast where Frances hit.
Space facilities at Cape Canaveral reported damages in excess of $100 billion. The
American Insurances Service Group estimated that $4.11 billion in damages occurred
statewide. Total damages for Hurricane Frances were estimated at $9.507 billion, 90% of
which occurred in Florida. As of 2011, Frances was the eighth costliest hurricane in the
U.S. (Beven, 2014, p. 4).
The next hurricane to strike the Florida coast hit the panhandle on September 16
as a Category 3 hurricane. Winds reach 120 miles per hour and the storm surge ranged
from 10 to 15 feet, inundating towns along the coast. Grand Cayman Island was
completely washed over by storm surge, damaging or destroying 95 percent of all
buildings on the island. As with Frances just twelve days earlier, Hurricane Ivan caused
part of Interstate 10 to collapse under the weight of storm surge and wave action.
Thousands of homes were destroyed in Baldwin, Escambia, and Santa Rosa counties.
Ivan was the most destructive hurricane to hit Florida in over 100 years. Damages were
estimated at $18.82 billion and earned Hurricane Ivan 3rd place on the list of costliest
U.S. hurricanes (Stewart, 2011, p. 6).
Hurricane Jeanne made landfall just ten days after Ivan, following nearly the
identical path as Hurricane Frances just twenty-two days earlier. On September 26,
Frances crossed Palm Beach and Martin counties, which were still reeling from the
damages caused by Ivan. Frances was a stronger Category 3 storm with maximum winds
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of 120 miles per hour. Storm surges were measured from 3.5 feet to 6 feet along the east
coast. As of 2011, damages were estimated at $7.66 billion (Lawrence and Cobb, 2014).
According to the Hurricane Housing Work Group (HWG) convened by Governor
Jeb Bush, all 67 Florida counties were affected by the four hurricanes in some way, some
of them more than once. More than 700,000 homes were damaged or destroyed with
losses expected to exceed $213 billion (HWG, 2005). This estimate does not include
those who were working exclusively with insurance companies or did not apply for
assistance for other reasons. In the aftermath of the storm, 1.2 million households
registered with Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). More than 148,800
households applied for rental assistance and 116,000 households received structural
housing assistance for repairs. Disaster loans were made available through the Small
Business Administration (SBA) for rebuilding homes and businesses. Special assistance
was made available to the five counties hardest hit by Charley and Ivan: Charlotte, De
Soto, Hardee, Escambia, and Santa Rosa.
The HWG was unable to assess accurate rental damages. Owners of rental
properties were referred to the SBA for assistance making it likely that rental damages
were underestimated (HWG, 2005). Over 28% of households were renters in the hardest
hit areas, but only 15% registered with FEMA for housing assistance (p. 9). What is
known is that 100,000 renter households were approved for FEMA assistance in the
months after the storms, but according to HWG, this number does not correlate with the
rental stock that sustained substantial damage. Multifamily damages were categorized
into three groups (see Table 3-2). The most severely damaged properties had structural
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Table 3-2: Categories for FEMA Housing Assistance
Category
1

2

3

Type
Structural

Non-Structural

Ineligible

FEMA Housing Assistance by Group
Percentage
Multi-family
Description
Affected
Units
Most Severe; this group had inadequate
16.5
insurance and did not qualify for SBA
3,247
disaster recovery loans.

20.7

The households did not receive
structural housing assistance but did
receive rental assistance. The marjority
of this group (68.8%) were renters.

38,882

62.8

This group was found to have adequate
insurance to repair their homes;
however, FEMA did not determine
ability to pay or finance deductibles.

10,787

Source: Hurricane Housing Working Group, 2005

damage and encompassed 16.5% of households seeking assistance. Households that had
structural damages but did not get assistance received short-term rental assistance. Other
households had adequate insurance and received no assistance from FEMA. Households
occupying 52,916 multi-family housing units registered with FEMA for housing
assistance representing 2.6% of damaged housing in Florida.
Effects from the hurricanes were felt around the state, but the greatest damages
occurred in the impact areas. Table 3-3 shows the multifamily housing stock damaged in
each county. Damaged units are compared to existing supply. For instance, De Soto
County had 350 multifamily units damaged in 2004, representing nearly 30% of its
multifamily housing. Considering the average household size is 2.61 in the State, De
Soto had over 900 in need of some form of rental assistance. Palm Beach County had
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11,715 multifamily units damaged representing just 5.9% of the total population
representing over 30,500 potentially entering the rental market simultaneously. The
known total damages of multifamily units provided a basis for comparing developer
location preferences revealed in the GIS analysis completed in Phase III of this study.
Housing damages in counties that were preference for location in the QAPs following the
2004 hurricane season are shown in Figure 3-2. In some instances, a number was not
provided. If fewer than ten households experienced damage, then a number was not
disclosed.
After the hurricanes, pledges for recovery and assistance came from federal, state
and local organizations, including providers of utilities, power companies, in-state and
out of state law enforcement. However, housing assistance during the recovery and
response effort primarily benefited homeowners (HWG, 2005). Rent vouchers were
distributed as needed for emergency housing, and a Disaster Housing Resources website
was launched by the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) to help victims find
temporary rental housing. As many as 15,000 travel trailers and manufactured homes
were set up; FEMA provided rental assistance to 148,803 households; and Structural
Housing Assistance was provided to 116,000 households. These numbers indicate that
more than 250,000 households flooded the rental market. This equates to potentially
1,000,000 Floridians seeking shelter in the rental market.
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Table 3-3: Comparison of Total Units to Estimated Damages by Housing Type from
2004 Hurricane Season
Total
Single Family
% of Total
% of
County
# of Units
# of Units
Units
Total
Damaged
Damaged
County
Units
Monroe
25
0.1%
19
0.1%
Collier
334
0.3%
254
0.4%
Glades
505
11.6%
204
10.8%
Hendry
1,317
11.3%
632
11.1%
Hardee
5,570
64.1%
3,741
61.7%
Broward
6,932
1.0%
5,251
1.4%
De Soto
7,506
64.3%
4,314
65.1%
Okeechobee
7,668
53.4%
3,946
57.2%
Miami-Dade
9,481
1.1%
6,289
1.4%
Martin
19,343
32.1%
14,018
37.3%
Lee
20,761
9.4%
16,577
12.5%
Santo Rosa
23,196
46.9%
18,518
50.5%
Indian River
29,460
53.5%
22,804
62.5%
Charlotte
34,077
48.0%
27,918
53.0%
Polk
49,809
23.4%
34,346
26.9%
St. Lucie
51,627
60.4%
39,930
64.8%
Escambia
51,876
2.7%
41,922
48.2%
Brevard
56,698
26.0%
43,127
28.6%
Palm Beach
84,001
16.3%
60,351
20.1%

Multi-Family
% of
# of Units
Total
Damaged
Units
*
0.0%
20
0.0%
*
1.6%
34
3.6%
193
36.5%
985
0.3%
350
29.1%
136
17.5%
2,458
0.7%
1,510
9.4%
1,179
1.9%
879
19.9%
2,749
21.5%
2,384
23.6%
2,850
9.1%
4,666
30.6%
4,024
17.2%
3,921
8.4%
11,715
5.9%

Source: Hurricane Housing Work Group, 2005
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Manufactured Housing
% of Total
# of Units
Units
Damaged
County
*
0.0%
59
0.7%
297
13.1%
650
13.0%
1,626
77.4%
408
1.9%
2,829
72.8%
3,570
53.5%
488
3.6%
3,519
56.6%
2,951
10.8%
3,409
40.6%
3,660
63.1%
3,673
44.8%
12,465
23.4%
6,647
76.9%
5,077
45.5%
8,492
40.9%
7,794
45.3%

Figure 3-2: HWG Report for Estimated Housing Damages (HWG, 2005)
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SBA provides disaster loans to businesses for rebuilding, or for replacing
multifamily homes. LIHTC rents are capped to area median income. Additional loan
obligations cannot be supported over the long term when income is capped. Even so,
HWG noted that additional rental stock would be needed to replace destroyed rental and
homeowner housing. The most cost effective way to meet the expected demand was with
development of multifamily housing (HWG, 2005). The group recommended that a
Hurricane Housing Recovery Program be implemented. HWG also recommended that
subordinate financing be provided by the state to induce private developers to build rental
housing units in areas of greatest need. It was recommended that rental housing target
extremely low income groups in addition to “low income households more commonly
served by existing programs” (p. 17).
Resources are rarely, if ever, enough to meet disaster recovery needs. HWG
developed a formula for allocating available funds. The formula ranked counties based
on four factors: 1) total percentage of damaged non-seasonal housing units in a county,
2) total destroyed units in a county, 3) percentage of households sustaining damage
earning less than $30,000 per year, 4) and number of households displaced and requiring
FEMA temporary housing. Each county was categorized and ranked into one of four tier
categories (see Table 3-4). Future research might include comparisons between the
recommendations of HWG and the LIHTC placed in service to glean further insight. This
study compares stated and revealed preferences between the Florida Housing Finance
Corporation and the LIHTC developer in terms of risk.
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Table 3-4: Tiers for Allocation Preferences Established by the HWG (2005)
Tiers
I

Counties with the most sever housing damages in number and percentages. Counties in this tier were
most likely in the impact area or were hit by multiple storms. 16% of counties are in this group.

II

These counties had heavy damages with either a large number of damaged units and/or a high percentage
of damaged units, 9% of counties are in this group.

III

Counties in this category had moderate damages either a high number of units damaged or a high
percentage of damaged units, 16% of counties are in this group.

IV

Minor damages occurred in these counties and are expected to address housing recovery through existing
programs; the majority of counties, 58%, fall in this group.

Source: HWG, 2005

The counties targeted for location in the 2005 and 2006 QAPs were scattered among each
of the tiers with 58% of them were in the Tier IV category. Counties in Tiers II and III
were less preferred by the public agency. These counties represented 25% of counties in
these tiers that were given preference in the 2006 QAP. Tiers II, III and IV were given
no preference in 2005 QAPs. Tier I counties were 16% of the total counties preferred
(See Table 3-5).
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Table 3-5: Household Damages Tiers I-IV
# of
Tiers
% of Total
Counties

# Damaged
Units

I

11

16%

336,830

II

6

9%

249,694

III

11

16%

58,090

IV

39

58%

63,747

Total

67

100%

708,361

Source: HWG, 2005

CONCLUSION
From the health benefits of slum clearance to the economic benefits of urban
renewal, housing policy is often a solution for a related underlying problem. Housing
was once undertaken to support manufacturing, evidenced by small mill towns that that
housed workers for the benefit of the mill owner. Real estate has been a driver of the
American economy, and home ownership has been engrained in the American dream.
For owners and renters alike, the greatest concern for housing today is affordability.
During disaster recovery, affordability is amplified, particularly when housing damages
are significant. This study provides a stepping stone to understand how LIHTC
91

preferences are established and how developers answer the market demand for affordable
housing under the LIHTC program during disaster. Those who produce and fund
affordable housing weigh the public demand for affordable housing against risk and
uncertainty associated with disaster. This research starts a dialogue comparing stated
preferences of each leg of the public and private partnership that is LIHTC to ask how
programs and incentives encourage LIHTC construction in hazardous places. The study
also compares revealed preferences to understand how LIHTC development patterns
compare with the stated preferences of public and private stakeholders. Several tools
were applied within an embedded revelatory case study design to compare stated
preferences with revealed preferences to determine how risk influences LIHTC
production. The next chapter explains the methodology and research design and explains
how research tools were used.
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Chapter 4
LIHTC RISK AND DISASTER RECOVERY:
A CASE STUDY APPOACH

INTRODUCTION
This study used an embedded revelatory single case study design. According to
Yin (2009), an embedded single case study design is often initiated with theory
development and a proposition, which was demonstrated in previous chapters. This case
study design is bounded by LIHTC developers operating within Florida after it was hit
with four hurricanes in 2004. Each hurricane elicited a Presidentially-declared disaster
area response. Florida is a coastal state surrounded on three sides by the Gulf and
Atlantic coast. The state experienced significant losses of affordable housing as a result
of the 2004 hurricane disasters. The goal of this case study was to identify risk variables
that influence LIHTC developers’ decision-making within the constraints of public policy
preferences stated in Qualified Action Plans filed between 2004 and 2010. Location
analysis revealed preferences for sites of LIHTC multi-family developments postdisaster.
WHY LIHTC AND DISASTER RECOVERY?
Risk drives investment and disinvestment in real estate development decision
making. The LIHTC development literature identifies additional risks associated with the
program, and much of the LITHC and disaster literature addresses how disaster policies
can provide temporary relief for rental demand. This study opens a dialogue toward
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better policy that recognizes the limitations of LIHTC production during disaster
recovery. This research will serve three purposes:
1) To develop an understanding of risk in development patterns demonstrated by
preferences of LIHTC developers in disaster recovery decisions;
2) To inform public and private stakeholders of barriers to LIHTC production so that
effective policies and programs can be developed to distribute limited resources
while encouraging development of affordable housing.
3) To contribute to the emerging development of Disaster Recovery Theory by
informing the disaster community of the risks that influence LIHTC development
decisions during the recovery period.
METHODOLOGY
This study was formulated within the paradigm of social constructivism which
seeks “understanding of the world in which (we) live and work” (Creswell, 2007, p. 21).
One of the goals of this study was to share the views of LIHTC housing developers that
operate in an area that is susceptible to hurricane disasters. Florida was chosen for this
research because of its geographic location and susceptibility to the effects of hurricanes.
Future studies will compare other states with similar hazards for common variables based
on disaster type, severity, types of programs and policy preferences influencing recovery.
Disaster recovery policies that reshape the community are often driven by
economic development. The literature is replete with evidence that demonstrate how
renters suffer displacement to a higher degree than homeowners. Developers of
multifamily housing experience a similar degree of disparity during recovery.
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Multifamily developers are less likely to have access to disaster recovery assistance as
compared to homeowners and other community business interests (Comerio et al., 1994;
Quarentelli, 1999; Wu and Lindell, 2003; Mueller et al., 2011). Small business loans and
additional leveraging tools are often not feasible considering the income generated from
an existing project, making recovery efforts more difficult for the developer (Wu and
Lindell, 2003; Galster et al., 2004; GAO, 2010). The degree of perceived risk is related
to the tools and leverage options available to LIHTC developers. Development
challenges exist as a result of disaster recovery policies that inhibit the ability of LIHTC
developers to add unexpected disaster recovery costs to already tight budgets. A LIHTC
developer’s ability to produce sufficient new affordable rental housing stock to the
community during recovery is also difficult due to a lack of funding options that support
capped rents and recoverable expenses. Other areas of risk that affect LIHTC decisionmaking are found in the dynamic forces of community in the form of advocacy and
NIMBYism. These are anecdotal experiences from which risk variables were
established. Additional risk variables were derived from the development literature
discussed in Chapter 2.
The study was organized in three phases intended to identify how post-disaster
location policy preferences influence development during recovery. This case study uses
content analysis, geographic information systems (GIS), and a survey of LIHTC
developers within the bounded case study area of Florida after the 2004 hurricane season.
Phase I examined Qualified Action Plans (QAP) using content analysis to
determine location preferences of the Housing Authority of the State of Florida as
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established within the QAP. This phase uncovers the stated preferences of the public
agency. For this study, the public agency was represented by the Florida Housing
Finance Corporation (FHFC).
In Phase II, a survey was launched to ask LIHTC professionals to identify the
significance of a set of variables associated with perceived risk during the recovery
process. The survey was composed of closed-ended questions using a combination of a
10-point sliding scale or a 7-point Likert scale. An open-ended question provided LIHTC
professionals an opportunity to share opinions about the state of affordable housing
production and actions that could improve existing programs to reduce risk.
Phase III analyzed location preferences using GIS technology with a data layer
created from the LIHTC database maintained and publicly available through the U.S
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Additional data layers were
created using a storm surge model created by the Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from
Hurricanes (SLOSH) model software. The SLOSH model was created by the National
Weather Service (NWS) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) to estimated storm surge heights. A composite approach was taken using the
Maximum Envelopes of Water (MEOWs) because this approach is recommended by the
National Hurricane Center as the best way to account for vulnerability and uncertainty for
an area. MEOWs and Maximum of MEOWs (MOMs) form the basis for evacuation
planning and are integral to the field of emergency management. The SLOSH model is
subdivided into 32 regions that are applied to coastlines along the U.S. Atlantic, Gulf of
Mexico, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Bahamas.
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This case study focused on LIHTC development in Florida. Eleven Florida water
basins were applied to SLOSH models for potential storm surges experienced during a
Category 3 storm at mean tide (C3M) and a Category 5 storm at high tide (C5H).
Shapefiles were created from SLOSH model runs for each category. The LIHTC
database was added as a .dbf file. A Florida base map was obtained from TIGER/Files.
Data layers of hurricane paths for Charley, Ivan, Jeanne, and Frances were created and
LIHTC location was analyzed for developments placed in service from 2004 to 2010.
Risk was indicated by proximity to the coast and proximity to storm surge boundaries.
Phase III analyzed the number of housing units susceptible to storm surge during C3M
and C5H hurricane scenarios. Development patterns were analyzed over the seven year
period between 2004 and 2010 to determine if stated risk influenced development
outcomes.
Results from the three phases of the study were compared to gain insight to
perceived risk of LIHTC developers and revealed development patterns. The research
exposed strengths and weaknesses in the interrelationships between location preferences
of public policy, developer risk perceptions, and demonstrated development patterns of
LIHTC.
A CASE STUDY APPROACH
The depth of inquiry in a case study can capture the essence of a phenomena and
its associated context (Yin, 2009). Comparing relationships between policy, perceived
risks, and actual patterns of development in the state of Florida after a hurricane disaster
is an initial step toward understanding the effectiveness of disaster policy and recovery
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programs. According to Creswell (2007), case studies are “an exploration of a ‘bounded
system’ of a case or multiple cases over time through detailed, in depth data collection
involving multiple sources of information rich in context.” In this study, a single case
was chosen to establish a baseline of comparison for future research of LIHTC
susceptible to hurricane disaster in other coastal states. Secondary data sources used in
the study were acquired from HUD’s LIHTC database and SLOSH models. Original data
was also collected from a survey of LIHTC developers. Previous chapters described the
historical context of the effect of the four storms on housing and the policy response.
Stake (2000) defined a case study as an “interest in individual cases, not by the methods
of inquiry used.” The methods used in this case study are specific to the state of Florida.
Future case studies that emulate this research using the same tools will be reliant on the
distinct policies and preferences of the state that interact with existing federal programs
and the uniqueness of the disaster event. This is the first study in a series that could lead
to an opportunity for comparative analysis of responses to programs initiated for disaster
recovery and housing redevelopment in multiple states.
Case Study Proposition
The case study proposition “directs attention to something that should be
examined within the scope of the study” (Yin, 2009, p. 28). A search of the literature
failed to reveal existing studies of risk specifically associated with LIHTC developers and
disaster.
The proposition of this study recognized that affordable housing developers
prioritize investment returns as a component of their investment decision making,
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however LIHTC developers consider additional risk factors that are not being fully
addressed by available housing and disaster programs intended to facilitate recovery.
LIHTC housing developers that fail to fully participate in the post-disaster housing
market, particularly in the impact zone, theoretically are responding to an array of
perceived risks.
Variables of risk were identified in the literature and validated in an earlier pilot
study. Each variable was categorized into a modified STEEP analysis for LIHTC
development in the context of disaster recovery. The five categories comprising the
STEEP analysis are social, technical, economic, environmental, and political. Technical
and economic risks are measurable in a business analysis. Technical risks are the
measurable factors that define project feasibility and success, such as the internal rate of
return (IRR), profit or loss. Economic risks are associated with external funding
opportunities that potentially improve feasibility. However, perceived risks are
subjective and are not readily measured in the context of project feasibility. For this
study, those subjective risks are categorized under social, environmental and technical
categories. It is well understood that financial incentives drive development behavior.
When the funding and costs are in balance, the community benefits from additional
affordable housing, in spite of potential disaster risk. The financial community benefits
from LIHTC because the typical working class tenant can participate in the established
economy. The developer benefits because the affordable housing project gets funded.
In this study, elements of risk perception derived from the development literature
provided the basis for the proposition. Risk was measured by comparing stated
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preferences of the public agency and LIHTC professionals stated and revealed
preferences identified in a survey and by post-disaster development patterns. GIS was
used to analyze development patterns of post-disaster LIHTC development. These
development patterns were compared with the stated preferences of LIHTC developers to
identify variables of risk that influence LIHTC development during disaster recovery.
Case Study Design
The case study was designed using a single case study of a state impacted by
hurricane disasters. Significant damage to affordable housing was also a factor required
for case selection. Figure 4.1 provides a summary of the criteria that was used to guide
the case study selection. Florida was chosen because of its vulnerability to hurricane
hazards. More than 500 storms have hit the state since hurricanes were first recorded.
Over 10% of these storms have been recorded in this century. The strongest hurricane to
hit Florida since 2000 was Hurricane Charley which struck the Florida coast as a category
4 storm in August of 2004. Hurricanes Jeanne and Ivan followed, both as category 3
hurricanes. Hurricane Frances as a category 2 storm ended the forty-four day onslaught
of hurricanes. President George W. Bush declared all of Florida a disaster area.
Flooding, hurricane force winds, and storm surge damaged housing and infrastructure in
multiple counties. Housing damages were well documented in a report filed by the
Hurricane Housing Working Group, which was convened by Governor Jeb Bush to
provide recommendations for housing recovery (HWG, 2005). The work completed by
HWG was discussed in Chapter 3.
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A Sampling Frame for Case Selection
A purposive sampling technique was employed in the case selection process. The
goal of case study selection using this technique was to focus on specific characteristics
of interest that will best help answer the question of how risk perception influences
LIHTC development during disaster recovery. According to Maxwell (2005), purposive
sampling is when, ‘‘particular settings, persons, or events are deliberately selected for
for the important information they can provide that cannot be gotten as well from other
choices’’ (p. 87). Teddlie and Yu (2007) further categorize purposive sampling into four
goal areas: a) representativeness or comparability; b) special or unique cases; c)
sequential sampling; and d) multiple purposive techniques. For this research, purposive
sampling was used to pick a revelatory case that would yield the most information about
a phenomenon of interest. The population of potential case study areas included states
bordering the Gulf and/or Atlantic coasts that have experienced multiple hurricanes
resulting in the declaration of a Presidentially-declared disaster area for impacted
counties or parishes. Housing losses, particularly affordable housing, was also a
significant case study criteria. Developers of LIHTC multi-family housing, both nonprofit and for-profit, were included in the boundary of the case study (Table 4-1).
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Table 4-1: Case Study Selection Criteria
Case Study Criteria
1. Study area must be on the Atlantic and/or Gulf coast with coastal
counties that are vulnerable to hurricanes.
2. Study area must have been a Presidentially Declared Disaster area
as a result of a past hurricane event.
3. Study area must have been subject to floods, hurricane force winds,
and storm surge.
4. The hurricane event must have occurred between 2004 and 2008.
5. The hurricane event must have been classified as a Category 2, 3, 4,
or 5 on the Saffir-Simpson Wind Scale.
Multiple coastal counties within the state must have had a loss of
6. low-income and affordable housing as a result of the disaster.
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Table 4-2 lists the Atlantic and Gulf coast states that experienced hurricanes
between 2004 and 2008 resulting in presidentially declared disasters that met the criteria
for the case study protocol. Each of the states affected were potential case study areas.
Florida was chosen because of the sheer impact of Hurricanes Charley, Frances,
Ivan and Jeanne across the state. In 2004, four hurricanes struck Florida within a period
of six weeks. Based on the extent of housing damages experienced in the aftermath, and
the evidence of multi-family housing damage found in reports and in the literature,
Florida was considered a good fit for this case study. Future research of other states
impacted by Hurricanes Katrina or Sandy could reveal a relationship in development
patterns identifying the paradox of risks identified in the survey and revealed preferences
from location analysis in GIS. Future cross comparisons may also reveal patterns of
growth that show how LIHTC development decisions evolve from an increasing
knowledge of potential hazards. This revelatory case study is prepared as a baseline of
LIHTC development patterns in Florida which can be adapted to analyze LIHTC in other
coastal states.
Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis in a case study is not always simple to define. The questions
and proposition helped narrow the scope of this case study from the overall context of the
impact of Hurricanes Charley, Ivan, Frances and Jeanne on the state. This study also
analyzed risk from the perspective of LIHTC professionals during disaster recovery.
Development patterns of LIHTC sites were analyzed using GIS, but development patterns
alone were insufficient to determine risk. A LIHTC development can contain over 200
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household units, or a small development can have as few as 20 household units. Risk
was measured by the number of units developed in hazardous locations. The LIHTC
household unit was an appropriate unit of analysis to identify exposed risk and was the
primary unit of analysis for this study. A secondary unit of analysis is the development
itself. The development consists of multiple units and is analyzed in the context of
location within a storm surge along with the total number of units. Stated preferences for
hypothetical barriers or incentives to development were analyzed to reveal other risk
variables that provide additional context for the study.
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Table 4-2: Potential Case Study Areas
Potential Case Study Areas
Year

States
Hurricane Category
Impacted

Damages

2004 Frances

2

FL

$9.5 billion(1); 90% of
damages occurred in
Florida

2004 Jeanne

3

FL

$7.6 billion

Storm Surge

Flooding

< 6 feet

Yes

6 feet

Yes

2004 Charley

4

FL

$15 billion

< 7 feet

Yes

2004 Ivan

3

FL

$18.8 billion

10-15 feet

Yes

2005 Dennis

3

AL; *FL $2.5 billion in the U.S.

2005 Wilma

3

2005 Katrina

3

2005 Rita

3

LA; TX

2008 Ike

2

TX; LA

FL

5 feet

Yes

7 feet

Yes

25-28 feet

Yes

$12 billion

10-15 feet

Yes

$29.5 billion

10-20 feet

Yes

$21 billion

FL, LA, MS $108 billion

Housing Losses
700,000 damaged units with
400,000 households having
incomes under $30k
(combined with Hurricane
Jeanne) (Beven, 2014)
Smith and McCarty (2011)
found that Hurricane
Charley caused the most
damage to housing units
during the 2004 hurricane
season
In 2004, the Insurance
Information Institute
estimated that 1/5th of
homes in Florida were
destroyed or significantly
damaged by the Florida
2004 hurricane season. (2)
Most housing damage
occurred in the Carribean
More than 1,000,000
housing units along the Gulf
Coast were damaged
Over 33,000 homes were
damaged in Louisiana and
Texas
$3.4 billion in estimated
housing damages

2008 Gustav
2
LA
$4.6 billion
(1) Beven, J. L. (2014) Tropical Cycle Report, Hurricane Frances, National Hurricane Center
(2) Dumm, R.E., Sirmans, G. S., and Smersh, G. (2009) The Capitalization of Stricter Building Codes in Miami, Florida House
Prices, Florida State University.
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Analytic Strategy
The volume of data collected in a case study requires a general analytic strategy
that can be formed around theoretical propositions, developing case descriptions, using
both qualitative and quantitative data, and examining rival explanations (Yin, 2009). For
this study, data was collected and organized around the proposition and specific research
questions. The goal of the study was to explore revealed preferences which were used to
identify variables of risk that influence LIHTC investment and location decision-making
during disaster recovery. Yin (2009) outlines a series of iterations that lead to
explanations as follows:


An initial proposition is made about the behavior.



Compare findings against the proposition



Revise the proposition



Compare other details of the case against the proposition



Repeat as often as needed

Case Study Protocol
The case study includes three methods of analysis organized in three phases.
Phase I consists of the content analysis of Qualified Action Plans from 2004 to 2010.
Phase II was a survey of LIHTC professionals identified as being active in a LIHTC
development in Florida from 2000 to 2010. Phase III compared the findings of Phases I
and II using GIS to perform location analysis. Each research method is explained in
detail in this chapter. Datasets and research method are identified in Table 4-3.
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Table 4-3: Case Study Protocol
Type of Evidence
Data Collection Instruments
Collected

Method

Baseline location data for
LIHTC housing prior to a
disaster event

HUD LIHTC database.

GIS
Analysis/Descriptive
Statistics

Baseline storm surge data
for project proximity to
hazard areas

Historical storm surge maps
using SLOSH model.

GIS
Analysis/Descriptive
Statistics

Qualified Action Plans

Analyzed to determine annual
Location priorities of the
public agency

Content Analysis

Temporal analysis of
LIHTC locations from
2004 to 2010

HUD LIHTC database

GIS
Analysis/Descriptive
Statistics

Variables for Perception of
Risk

Web-based Questionnaire

Descriptive and
Inferential Statistics
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Comparison of Phases
The data from Phase I identified the stated preferences of the QAPs published
from 2004 to 2010 by the Florida Housing and Finance Corporation. In Phase II,
developers identified stated variables that were analyzed to determine risk perception.
Location risks identified in the survey were compared to the locations stated in the Phase
I content analysis. In Phase III, revealed preferences were identified using geographic
information systems (GIS) to calculate the number of LIHTC units constructed during the
study period. The GIS analysis also identified LIHTC units in areas subject to storm
surge from both Category 3 and Category 5 hurricanes. Comparisons were made against
the variables identified in the survey with the location of LIHTC developments in relation
to storm surge and hurricane impact areas. Location priorities in annual QAPs were
analyzed to identify public policy preferences. Findings from the GIS location analyses
were analyzed against policy preferences and stated developer preferences.
Threats to Validity and Reliability
Internal Validity
Establishing causal relationships is a test of internal validity (Yin, 2009). This
study expected to identify certain risks associated with investment or disinvestment
decisions by producers of affordable housing. However, inferences to relationships
identified within the statistical analysis may be associated or related, but not causal. The
sampling frame was the LIHTC database. The survey population was limited to
professionals in the Florida LIHTC community chosen from the contact data in the HUD
LIHTC database. The LIHTC program was legislated into existence in 1986. The pilot
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study identified participants of LIHTC in South Carolina using counties impacted by
Hurricane Hugo as the case study area. During the pilot, it was determined that early
developers in the program were often no longer active in the profession due to retirement,
a change in profession, and in at least one occasion, was deceased. For this study, the
sample population was chosen from those professionals who were active in the profession
from 2000 to 2011. The LIHTC database is the most comprehensive collection of
LIHTC projects available. Data collection for the database has evolved but data is
incomplete, usually because states leave fields blank or some data unknown. Updates
are completed annually by HUD who provides statistics for general reliability of the
database. Between 2004 and 2010, approximately 8.7% to 15.1% of projects placed in
service had missing addresses. This was overcome by manually inputting an address
found by an independent Internet search to verify location. Only one Florida property in
Palm Beach County was discovered to have an erroneous address in the course of this
study. Owner contact records were missing in 7.5% to 12.1% of the time, however many
participants are included multiple times in the database. Typically LIHTC participants
are involved with multiple properties therefore missing contact information was easily
identified from other entries in the database. The “number of units” fields were missing
data 6.4% to 14.1% of the time.
The LIHTC database includes projects that may no longer be bound by LIHTC
restrictions. The first wave of LIHTC eligible to leave the program was constructed
between 1987 and 1994. This study made no attempt to determine which LIHTC were no
longer in compliance. Khadduri, Climaco, and Burnett (2012) studied LIHTC properties
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that were eligible to leave the program and found that most continue to be affordable
after the compliance period ends. The majority of owners recapitalize with new tax
credits for rehabilitation. Others reposition themselves with market rate leases.
Repositioning was found to occur most often when housing markets are strong. Since
1990, federal law requires a 15-year compliance period and an additional 15 year
affordability period. While rental housing markets have improved since 2008, the
number of LIHTC eligible to leave the program is unlikely to threaten the validity of this
study.
The GIS analysis could overstate or understate the number of total developments
units because of properties that have dropped out of the program or because of missing
data. This study provides general data derived from the database in order to allow the
reader to understand the scope of the problem. The primary focus of GIS analysis was to
reveal location preferences for LIHTC development after the 2004 hurricane season.
Non-compliant properties should not affect these results since developments coming out
of compliance in 2004 were placed in service at the beginning of the program, and
regulatory changes in 1990 insured the majority of LIHTC will remain compliant until
2020.
General data regarding the number of LIHTC located in the boundaries of
potential storm surge could vary depending on a number of variables including wind
direction, wind speed, and intensity. This study used preset MEOWs developed in the
SLOSH model for Florida basins.
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External Validity
The greatest threat to external validity is in establishing a way for findings to be
generalized. Generalization for case studies is analytical in nature and developed in
theory with which to compare empirical results (Rowley, 2002). Replication can be
claimed when theory is supported by two or more cases. In a single case study such as
this, generalization is less certain because of the unique characteristics of the case. In the
course of this research, state programs and the impact of disaster vary with each incident
and with each state. This study aims to create a baseline of perceived risk and
development patterns post-disaster with the expectation that comparisons could be made
from future case studies.
Reliability
According to Yin (2009), case study reliability requires that data collection
procedures and a chain of evidence be documented and maintained. Record-keeping has
been organized and is maintained in a case-study database. Hard copies of field notes are
maintained and all documentation is being catalogued for easy access within the case
study database. Reliability was also considered in the conduct of the survey. During the
pilot study, it was discovered that earlier participants in LIHTC had left the business. It
was also realized that many participants are involved with multiple developments each
year. The selection process for identifying the sample of survey participants was changed
to reflect these circumstances. The population was chosen from active participants in
LIHTC from 2000 to 2010. Duplicate entries were removed. Potential respondents were
then verified through web research to insure that they were still active in the LIHTC
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industry. Phone calls were made to potential respondents to request participation and
validate an email address so a link to the survey could be sent. Multiple emails were sent
to respondents to further boost participation. When a GIS analysis was conducted of
C5H storm surge, it was discovered that some properties were duplicated based on the
varying degree of storm surge affecting a single development. Storm surge was classified
in equally divided segments based on the total range of feet. One development could be
impacted by storm surge in two ranges. In each case, multiple entries were randomly
assigned one representative for that development. This eliminated duplicate counts of
units for that development and avoided overstating damage estimates.
Construct Validity
This study identified risks associated with LIHTC development during disaster
recovery. Risk was measured by ranking variables chosen by survey respondents when
given a set of options from the STEEP categories. High preference variables represented
high risk if that preferred variable was taken away. Variables with low preference scores
indicated the variable represented less risk. Risk variables were identified and ranked in
order of preference using a mean score. Risk was also measured and ranked using the
total number of LIHTC units placed in high hazard areas placed in service annually
between 2004 and 2010 within Category 3 and Category 5 storm surges. Location was
analyzed using measurements of storm surge risk in feet and location based on the
number of LIHTC units located within potential storm surge using the SLOSH model.
Estimated damages were applied in U.S. dollars. Development patterns in non-coastal
counties and along the paths of the 2004 hurricanes were also analyzed.
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METHODS OF ANALYSIS
The case study was divided into three distinct methods of analysis conducted in
three phases. Each phase uses one of three methods to identify preference. Content
analysis and a survey were used to obtain stated risks from the public agency and from
the socially constructed influences of the developer. Revealed preferences were analyzed
using geographic information systems.
PHASE I: CONTENT ANALYSIS
Documentation relating to a specific disaster can be prolific because government
agencies and others organize and monitor the phases of disaster from response to
recovery. This research focused on documents that influence LIHTC developer decisionmaking. The document most relevant to the research questions, and targeted to the
LIHTC industry, is the Qualified Action Plan (QAP). This document sets the protocol for
State housing needs and dictates how federal tax credits will be prioritized. QAPs
examined during the South Carolina pilot study had points and thresholds that identified
preferences. This language communicated location preferences by establishing
quantitative measures to gauge priority. During disaster recovery, supplemental QAPs
may also be issued to encourage housing recovery efforts.

During Hurricane Katrina,

Louisiana issued multiple QAP supplements as policy changes and additional housing
recovery strategies were implemented. However this was not the case in Florida which
issued a single QAP each year through the study period. Florida QAPs differed from
those issued during Katrina and those analyzed during the pilot study. Preferences were
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communicated using the words targeted, threshold or set-aside rather than a quantifiable
scoring method. Florida QAPs were collected and analyzed from 2004 to 2010.
Phase one of this study examined Qualified Action Plans (QAP) from 2003 to
2010 using content analysis to determine location preferences of the Housing Authority
in the State of Florida as established within the QAP. The QAP for 2003 was examined
as a baseline to understand the language of the Florida QAP layout prior to the 2004
hurricane season. States generally create QAPs using a template that is revised each year.
Any deviation in language for location preferences from the 2003 QAP was easily
identified.
The initial review of QAPs included a search for points, set-asides, or thresholds
that gave preferences for location. Some states use a point system to establish
preferences within the QAP. Such was the case of South Carolina during the pilot study.
Florida does not use this system. In Florida, points were applied in the Universal
Application (UA) for LIHTC, and while this study did not examine UAs, a preliminary
review of several UAs was completed and findings indicated that points were most often
applied to design features of units or property amenities as opposed to geographical
preferences. Geographic set-asides were also distributed between large, medium, and
small counties based on the state’s most recent market study. Market studies are
completed in conjunction with a Consolidated Plan required by HUD for the allocation of
HOME funds or CDBG. While not required for LIHTC allocations per se, the
Consolidated Plan is often instrumental in the creation of Qualified Action Plans so that
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available sources of funding can be directed to the most pressing housing needs within
the state.
Set-asides are “pools of tax-credit funds within which applicants compete only
against other properties qualifying for the set-aside” (Khadduri, 2013). Geographic setasides were established for Florida Keys communities, Rural Development, and Front
Porch Florida Communities. Set-asides in the QAPs examined for this study were not
applied to locations specifically impacted by the 2004 hurricanes.
Thresholds are another means of stating public preferences in the QAP.
Thresholds establish a minimum baseline that can have the effect of excluding properties
from the bidding process altogether (Khadduri, 2013). Thresholds were not explicitly
established in the documents examined for this study, but were referred to as minimums
to be met in accordance with the UA. For instance, threshold requirements for Rural
Development, Florida Keys, and Front Porch Communities were geographical threshold
requirements ranked in the UA, however specific points were not applied making it
difficult to determine the priority of a specific location. Thresholds were also noted for
developments that received additional funding through tax-exempt bonds. Future studies
are needed to dissect scoring and threshold priorities of Florida UAs as they relate to
hurricane prone properties. Since points are not applied for every category of the UA,
selection appears to be subjective. Given the subjective nature of the UA, future studies
would also benefit from interviews with a representative of the public housing authority
to understand how scoring and LIHTC selection are accomplished in Florida.
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Location preferences are stated in the QAP and are the most direct
communication of public preferences for LIHTC allocations. All Florida QAPs
examined included a heading for location under Section I of the Selection Criteria. In
every document analyzed for this study, selection criteria was scored and ranked in the
UA according to priorities established under Section II, Priorities of the QAP. Section I,
defined how those priorities would be targeted.
Florida QAPs revealed specific language used to communicate preferences for
preferred characteristics of LIHTC developments. Keywords were identified to further
analyze each document in order to determine if specific counties impacted by the 2004
hurricanes were targeted. Each document was imported to software that enabled a
searchable format. Keywords were entered and a search was completed to determine
location preferences established within the QAP. The keywords used for the content
analysis were targeted, gives preference, set-aside, threshold, and location. Using these
keywords, location priorities for counties impacted by the 2004 hurricanes were found in
QAPs for years 2005 and 2006.
PHASE II: SURVEY ANALYSIS
A web-based survey was conducted using Qualtrics and included both closed- and
open-ended questions. The survey included questions designed to identify and rank
preferences measured as risk for LIHTC during disaster recovery.
Survey Population
The study population is LIHTC developers identified in the HUD LIHTC
database and were limited to those that at minimum operated within Florida, but this
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group may also participate in LIHTC development in multiple states. Project contacts are
included in the database by name, company, and phone number. In the course of the Pilot
study, it was found that the database includes professionals that work in LIHTC as
syndicators, developers, investors, management, or finance. This case study focused on
LIHTC in Florida, therefore a random sample was drawn from the population of Florida
LIHTC. The formula for sample size was based on Dillman et al. (2011) which considers
the total population and a conservative estimate of the proportion of the population that
would provide varying answers to a two response category with a 90 percent confidence
interval and a margin of error of ± 5 percent. One hundred forty three contacts were
randomly chosen to participate in the survey. The survey asked questions along three
general categories: demographic, location, and funding.
Rationale for Selection of Survey Method
The purpose of using a survey was to get a sense of how decision-makers in the
industry view disaster risk. Under the paradigm of social constructivism, LIHTC
professionals were expected to draw from personal and professional experiences to
identify preferences for LIHTC development during disaster recovery. The survey
developed for this study included a series of hypothetical statements to establish a
perceived level of risk under five general categories: social, technical, economic,
environmental, and government. The survey used here was an exploratory tool that
attempted to analyze an initial set of variables of perceived risk associated with disaster
recovery within the sample population. The goal of the survey was to reveal variables of
perceived risk that relate to development decisions in the aftermath of disaster. The
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survey was conducted on a random sample of all LIHTC developers who were associated
with any of the completed projects within the case study area regardless of their
participation in recovery efforts.
Procedures for Administering Survey
The survey was administered online using Qualtrics, an online survey platform.
According to Dillman et al (2011) web based surveys are especially useful in business
settings where most participants have access to Internet services. The participants email
addresses were acquired either by telephone or through an online search of company
contact information. Participants were contacted by phone to confirm email and provide
details about the study. Participants were emailed a link to the survey and were given
thirty days to complete the questionnaire. A weekly reminder was sent to each
respondent with a final reminder sent two days before the final deadline. There is no
evidence that the length of time given for the survey affected the response rate.
Measuring Risk
For this study, preference is measured using either a seven point Likert scale or a
ten point sliding scale. Risk is derived by measuring a mean and standard deviation from
risk statements. Categories of risk include social, technical, economic, environmental,
and government (Table 4-4). These categories reflect macro influences on development
decisions.
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Funding risk was measured using a 7-point Likert scale. Respondents were asked which
funding source was most likely to incentivize LIHTC development in an impact zone. A
program that was likely to encourage development was identified as a low risk whereas a
funding source that was very unlikely to incentivize development was considered high
risk. In addition to the mean, which was calculated throughout the survey, this question
was analyzed further using inferential statistics to test the significance of the mean. This
same inferential analysis could be applied to other questions in the survey to gain a more
comprehensive interpretation of the results.
A second question also focused on funding sources that could be combined with
LIHTC during disaster recovery. Respondents were asked which funding sources were
critical to participation in the LIHTC program (Table 4-5). A program that was not
critical to development represented a high risk. A critical program indicated low risk.

Table 4-4: Measuring Categories of Risk
Low Risk

High Risk

Go

No Go

Social

0

10

Technical

0

10

Environmental

0

10

Economic

0

10

Government

0

10

Variable
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On a ten point sliding scale, non-critical programs had a low score of 0, meaning the
program had no influence on affordable housing production. A high score of 10 was an
indicator that a program that was extremely critical to LIHTC development during
disaster recovery, meaning the program was significant in reducing risk for the developer.

Table 4-5: Measuring Funding Risk

Program
CDBG
HOME Funds
Supplemental LIHTC
Disaster Bonds
Mitigation Grants
Federal Disaster Loans
SBA Loans
Traditional Financing
Physical Disaster Business Loans
Federal Disaster Grants
Private Insurance
Road Home Small Rental Property
New Market Tax Credits
Other

Not
Extremely
critical
Critical
High Risk Low Risk
0
10
0
10
0
10
0
10
0
10
0
10
0
10
0
10
0
10
0
10
0
10
0
10
0
10
0
10

Location risk was measured with a 10-point sliding scale that identified a potential site as
most preferred, or low risk, and least preferred, which was considered a high risk site
(Table 4.6).
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Table 4-6: Measuring Location Risks
Location Risk
Adjacent to a previously flooded site
Upcoming election may change disaster recovery priorities
Site is in a coastal county
Site is not in a coastal county
Site is 1 to 5 miles from the coast
Site is 5 to 10 miles from the coast
Site is > 10 miles from the coast
Site is > 25 miles from the coast
Site is not within a storm surge boundary
Site is within a Storm Surge boundary
Site could flood during a hurricane
Site has some potential for storm surge

Most
Preferred
Low Risk
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

Least
Preferred
High Risk
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

A final set of close-ended questions attempted to measure externality risks under
the broader terms of social, political, and economic interests. An externality is a cost or
benefit that accrues to an owner or producer over which they have no control, such as
insurance costs or regulations. These questions were asked using a 10-point sliding scale
with 0 being an unwillingness to participate, indicating greater risk, and 10 being willing
to participate, or an indication of no risk (Table 4-7).
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Table 4-7: Measuring Externalities
Measuring the Risk of Externalities
Financing the project has unfavorable terms
Insurance costs are higher in a coastal area
Construction costs are rising in the recovery zones
Land costs are higher along the coast
More regulations are imposed in coastal counties
A local neighborhood group is against low-income housing
Public sentiment is against low-income housing
A for-profit organization is willing to partner in developing the project
A non-profit organization is willing to partner in developing the project
More flexible regulations in a non-coastal county
Construction costs are stable in the recovery zones
Additional incentives are available to build in coastal counties
Insurance costs are lower in counties that are not along the coast
An advocacy group supports low-income housing in a specific community
Land costs are lower in areas away from the coast
Disaster relief programs are available for low-income multifamily housing
Financing the project with favorable terms
Supplemental tax credits are available

Low Risk High Risk
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

There are some limitations to the survey. Inferring cause-and-effect relationships is an
interpretive matter in survey research (Singleton and Straits, 2005). The standardized
nature of a survey questionnaire represents only surface details of the developer’s
experiences. The survey questionnaire was used to identify and rank stated preferences
of perceived risk by LIHTC developers operating in the state of Florida during disaster
recovery.
The LIHTC database includes data collected since the program began. Data
collection processes have evolved over that time resulting in some missing and erroneous
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data. When obvious errors were encountered, such as incomplete addresses or phone
number errors, duplicates were compared within the database itself.
Data Collection and Analysis
An attempt to contact the developer by phone was the initially preferred means of
engagement with the LIHTC professional. During the pilot study, it was discovered that
contact phones numbers often were no longer in service or linked to the contact by a
company cell phone that was no longer in use. Many contacts were associated with
multiple companies as a result of job changes, company structure, or company changes.
Online sources such as LinkedIn and company websites were used to update phone
numbers. An attempt was made to contact each participant by phone to explain the
research and get an email address. Others not reached by phone were sent a link by email
with an explanation. Of 143 randomly selected records, a link to the web-based survey
was emailed to a sample population (n=112). Thirty three participants completed the
survey indicating a response rate of 29%.
Response Rate
The survey for this study was administered to business professionals who often
report low response rates (White and Luo, 2005). In an effort to boost response rates,
White and Luo tested the use of monetary incentives and a long versus short form survey.
According to Dillman (2000), monetary incentives are useful in improving mailed
surveys, second only to multiple contacts. White and Luo found that rewards of $10 and
$20 improved response rates for paper-based business surveys. For this survey,
incentives were not provided, however multiple reminders were sent. Short form surveys
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were found to illicit a higher response rate at the expense of a loss of detail in the data
received. These results concur with Greer et al. (2000) who found that questionnaires
with fewer pages resulted in higher return rates. Others have found no significant
difference in return rates between longer or shorter surveys (Hager et al., 2003).
In one of the earlier studies examining online survey response rates, Cobanoglu,
Warde, and Moreo (2001) tested response rates on surveys given to professors
specializing in the hospitality industry and found response rates were highest for online
surveys at above forty-four percent. Faxed surveys elicited a 17% response rate and a
27% was found for mailed surveys.
While financial incentives can improve response rates (White and Luo, 2005;
Nulty, 2008), others have found that network associations are beneficial for boosting
responses (Bartholomew and Smith, 2006). An association with organizations that
specialize and promote LIHTC in the housing industry, such as the National Association
of State and Local Equity Funds or Novogradac & Company, may have boosted response
rates for this study. However, this study was limited in scope focusing specifically on
LIHTC participants with experience in the State of Florida where hurricane hazards are a
predominant disaster risk. Therefore a decision was made to personally contact
professionals who have demonstrated participation with LIHTC on the Florida coast.
Statistical Analysis
Respondents were given a list of funding incentives and were asked “Given the
following incentives, how likely would your company be willing to build a LIHTC
multifamily development in an impact zone that has sustained severe damage from a
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hurricane disaster?” Using a 7-point Likert scale with 1 being very unlikely (meaning
greater risk and 7 being very likely (meaning less risk), descriptive statistics were
analyzed for the mean and standard deviation. Inferential statistics were conducted using
SPSS to test the means and standard deviation followed by multivariate analysis to
determine correlation between variables6.
A similar analysis was conducted on a question that asks “When thinking about
disasters, please rate the location preference for each of the following for a potential
LIHTC development.” A sliding 10 point scale was given to the respondent with 0 being
least preferred, indicating a site with greater risk, to 10 being the most preferred site,
indicating less risk. Like the previous question, inferential statistics were conducted
using SPSS to test the means and standard deviation. Multivariate analysis was
conducted to determine if any correlation exists between variables.
PHASE III: GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Schensul, Schensul, and LeCompte (1999) define archival data and secondary
data as qualitative and quantitative data “collected and stored for research, service, and
other official and unofficial purposes by researchers, service organizations, and others.”
This type of data generally falls into three categories: public data sets, private data sets,
and private records. This study used public data sets that included historical SLOSH

6

Note that cross tabulations were proposed for this study to analyze the differences between For-profit
and Non-profit business models. However, given the small sample size and insufficient responses within
cells, cross tabulations were inappropriate for this study. Implementing this or a similar survey to a larger
LIHTC sample population could result in a greater response rate sufficient to derive meaning from an
analysis of cross tabulations.
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model storm surge data and the HUD LIHTC database. The pilot study needed to
account for only one Universal Trans Mecator (UTM) Zone. Florida is divided in two
UTM Zones: NAD83/UTM 16 and NAD83/UTM 17. Zone 16 consists of 15 counties in
the northwestern quadrant of the state. The remaining counties are located in UTM Zone
17. The majority of data was analyzed using GIS spatial analysis projected to
NAD_1982_UTM_Zone17N (Table 4-8).
Table 4-8: GIS Datasets and Limitations
Datasets

Source

Limitations

Projection

To
Storm surge SLOSH models are
subject to error; access to
GCS_North_American_1927 NAD_1982_UTM_ZONE_17N
storm surge risk maps and raw
data may not be available

SLOSH Model

National Weather Service

LIHTC Database

To analyze locations of LIHTC
projects in relation to
proximity to hazard areas
Subject to input error and
identified by FEMA and
missing data
Storm Surge data before and
after a disaster event.

Florida County Map

2012 TIGER/Line Shapefiles - U.S. Census

From

GCS_North_American_1983 NAD_1982_UTM_ZONE_17N

GCS_North_American_1983 NAD_1982_UTM_ZONE_17N

Using descriptive statistical analysis, the number of LIHTC placed in service
(PIS) was calculated by unit for each year of the study period. A storm surge analysis
was completed for each Florida basin except the Okeechobee basin located inland at the
southeast quadrant of the state west of Palm Beach.
This study used the SLOSH model to identify the number of LIHTC
developments and units located in potential storm surge from a Category 3 storm with a
mean tide (C3M) and a Category 5 storm at high tide (C5H) to identify an average and
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worst case scenario for hurricane damages. Basins were constructed within the SLOSH
model and exported to shapefiles for ArcGIS (ESRI, 2013). Storm runs were created
using the Maximum Envelope of Wind (MEOW) with the highest wind speed available
for each category of storm. During the pilot, a select number of counties were analyzed
and compared for the number of LIHTC located in storm surge and flood zone areas. At
the time of this study, flood zone maps were being recalculated by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency and were incomplete for analysis. Counties across the
country monitor flood zones and often have ordinances and codes that limit or discourage
development in these areas. In Florida, the high cost of flood insurance is well
understood to be a factor in development decisions for all property types (Anderson,
2015). What is less understood is the impact on LIHTC development in storm surge
areas. Estimates of economic impacts were not included in the pilot study. In this study,
GIS identified those LIHTC properties in storm surge areas and estimated the economic
impact of a C3M or C5H storm surge.
Rationale for Use of Archival Records
The HUD LIHTC database is the most comprehensive collection of LIHTC
development. States collect comprehensive annual data for every LIHTC development in
the country. The data is subject to error. Errors were corrected when noted. In spite of
any relatively minor shortfalls, the database is the most reliable public source of LIHTC
available to researchers. The SLOSH model was developed by NWS and NOAA and is
often used by emergency managers to monitor and predict storm surge potential (Glahn et
al, 2009). TIGER/Line files are often relied upon for analysis in GIS. These three data
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sources were used to observe development patterns before and after the 2004 hurricane
season. Proximity of LIHTC projects to historical storm surge boundaries for a C3M
storm surge and a C5H storm surge were also analyzed.
General Limitations
Archival records are typically produced for a specific purpose. LIHTC files are
collected and made accessible for public access and general research purposes. As stated
before, accuracy is not guaranteed and limits the study. The LIHTC database is
maintained by HUD based on submissions from each state. It is very unlikely that
missing data had a significant impact on findings.
O’Looney (2000) identified five categories of data quality for GIS applications:
positional accuracy, attribute accuracy, completeness, logical consistency, and lineage.
Each of these categories are discussed in terms of general limitations for this study.
1. Positional accuracy is defined as “the degree of horizontal and vertical control in
the coordinate system” (p. 45). Florida is divided into two UTM coordinate
systems. This study recognized both systems and analyzed units in storm surge
hazards according to the appropriate UTM.
2. Attribute accuracy is the “degree of error associated with way thematic data is
categorized” (p.45). In this study, longitude and latitude coordinates in the
LIHTC database were relied upon. Field visits and engineering surveys are likely
needed to measure the level of accuracy between the storm surge boundary and
the number of units actually within those boundaries. Category 5 storm surges
estimated for this study resulted in some LIHTC developments being counted
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twice. Further investigation revealed that more than one range of depth for storm
surge was being applied. For this study, duplicate counts were removed to avoid
double counting of units.
3. Completeness is the degree of missing data and missing data is treated. The
LIHTC database does have some missing fields, and others fields that have entries
and blank fields. This was especially apparent during the pilot study when
attempting to identify funding sources and non-profit participants. GIS analysis
for funding sources and non-profit participants is limited to those records that
were available with the understanding that data is incomplete. When recognized,
incomplete data has been pointed out in the findings and considered in the
analysis.
4. Logistical consistency looks for contradictions within a database. The LIHTC
database contains LIHTC locations based on input from states. Logical
consistency infers that one entry may be based on duplicate factors. Logical
consistency is not a limitation for this study.
5. Lineage is the chronology of data and estimates used for processing data. The
LIHTC database has consistent fields with content supplied by each state. Some
states may not report all fields which would create inconsistency in a multi-state
study. This case study focused on a single state and it is expected that data
collection has been consistent except in those areas identified in the findings.
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The next chapter discusses each phase of this case study. The findings and analysis for
each phase are presented and analyzed to determine how risk influences LIHTC
development.
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Chapter 5
AN ANALYSIS OF RISK

The purpose of this revelatory case study was to understand how LIHTC
developers perceive risk and identify variables of risk that influence decisions during
disaster recovery. Phase I of this study identified the stated preferences of the Florida
Housing and Finance Corporation (FHFC) acting as the public agency. Location
preferences for areas with housing damages were found in Qualified Action Plans for
2005 and 2006. Phase II of this study asked LIHTC professionals to state preferences in
a series of competing choices. Respondents were asked to rank variables that were most
likely to incentivize development. Open ended questions provided an opportunity to
contribute ideas for encouraging development of affordable housing during recovery
which contributed to an understanding of risk perception. Phase III applied descriptive
statistics using geographic information systems (GIS) to identify revealed preferences of
developers using location analysis of LIHTC placed in service. There are two dates
associated with LIHTC. The first is the allocation date. The allocation date is the year
the tax credits were assigned to the project. The second date is the year ‘placed in
service’, which is the year the development was completed and occupancy was verified.
A development is typically placed in service (PIS) within one to two years of the
allocation. PIS is the date relied on in Phase III of the study.
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PHASE I: STATED PREFERENCES OF THE PUBLIC AGENCY
Qualified Action Plans (QAP)are created in a collaborative process with input
from stakeholders in the months prior to its publication. Stakeholders include non-profit
organizations, local housing authorities, private developers, and advocates for affordable
housing. The 2004 QAP was introduced to the public months before the hurricane season
and funding was likely underway or complete by the time the storms hit. There would
have been ample time, however, to modify the 2005 QAP to accommodate housing needs
resulting from the storms.
In this analysis, the public agency refers to FHFC, the state housing agency
responsible for allocating tax credits. The QAP is a compilation of preferences
established by federal, state and local governments through policy statements, and
regulations. After the 2004 hurricanes, Governor Jeb Bush convened the Hurricane
Housing Working Group (HWG) to gather data and recommend action to facilitate
affordable housing recovery. The recommendations of the HWG were discussed in
Chapter 3 and were compared to QAPs to analyze policy statement influences. The 2005
and 2006 QAPs incorporated many HWG recommendations for allocating resources. In
2005, the QAP preferred all locations identified by HWG as a Tier I priority likely as a
result of damages more so than policy statements. The 2006 QAP incorporated
additional locations from Tiers II, III and IV and eliminated some Tier I counties.
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The Hurricane Housing Working Group
States often retain some flexibility that will allow LIHTC awards to be given
based on non-numerical priorities. The State of Florida is no exception. Priorities were
established in the months immediately following the 2004 hurricanes by targeting
counties most impacted by the storms. Four priority tiers were established by the
Hurricane Housing Working Group (HWG) based on severity of damages that occurred
by county. HWG also factored in the total number of housing losses when prioritizing
housing needs (HWG, 2005). These statistics formed the basis of policy priorities
recommended to the governor and state legislature.
In 2005, the year immediately following the storms, the HWG analysis was
incomplete. As a result FHFC was unable to incorporate the findings even though the
2005 QAP ultimately concurred with HWG recommendations. Location priorities for
2005 were established for eleven counties impacted by the storm. These counties were
identified as: Brevard, Charlotte, De Soto, Escambia, Hardee, Indian River, Martin,
Okeechobee, Polk, St. Lucie, and Santa Rosa (Figure 5-1). Each was a Presidentially
Declared Disaster Area and received emergency assistance and access to needed disaster
relief. All eleven counties were included in the Tier I group (See Table 5-1). Seven were
coastal counties and four were inland. DeSoto, Hardee, and Okeechobee counties are
considered small, rural inland counties, meaning the population is less than 100,000 and
density is less than 100 individuals per square mile. Charlotte, Escambia, Indian River,
Martin, Santa Rosa, and St. Lucie are considered medium counties with a population of
between 100,000 and 500,000. These counties are located on the coast. Brevard and
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Polk counties are large counties with populations of greater than 500,000. Polk is an
inland county and Brevard is located on the coast. Polk County was hit by three of the
four hurricanes.

Figure 5-1: 2005 QAP Preferences

In 2006, only five counties in Tier I were given priority in the QAP (Figure 5-2).
Four of these were coastal counties. Hardest hit counties were excluded from the 2006
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QAP even though allocations for LIHTC in one or more hardest hit counties continued
through 2009. The 2006 QAP also included preferences for seven additional counties
located in the remaining tiers. Tier III included two non-coastal counties and Tiers II and
IV included only coastal counties. No other location preferences relating to the 2004
storms were established in QAPs between 2004 and 2010.

Figure 5-2: 2006 QAP Preferences
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Table 5-1: Comparison of HWG Report with 2005 and 2006 Qualified Actions
Plans

HWG Report

2005 QAP

Tier I
Hardee
DeSoto
Okeechobee
Martin
Santa Rosa
Indian River
Charlotte
Polk
St. Lucie
Escambia
Brevard

x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

2006 QAP

x
x
x

Coastal
Counties

Non-Coastal
Counties
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x

Tier II
Lee
Palm Beach

x
x

x
x

Tier III
Glades
Hendry

x
x

Tier IV
Collier
Miami-Dade
Monroe

x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x

Total

11

12

13

6

Tier I
Tier II
Tier III
Tier IV

11
0
0
0

5
2
2
3

8
2
0
3

4
0
2
0
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The Hurricane Housing Working Group reported that Tier I counties experienced
over 47% of total housing damages. Housing was categorized by single-family, multifamily, and manufactured housing. Multifamily housing (MFH) was only 3% of total
damages in all Tier I counties combined. However, on a per county basis, most Tier I
counties had significant damage in their multifamily housing stock, especially Hardee
with 36.5% and St. Lucie with 30.6% of total MFH damaged. De Soto County had the
next highest percentage of damages with 29.1% of its MFH stock followed by Charlotte,
Indian River, Santa Rosa, and Okeechobee counties (Table 5-2). Brevard, Polk, and
Martin counties had less than 10% of MFH stock damage or destroyed.
Table 5-2: Housing Damages
Total
County

Hardee
De Soto
Okeechobee
Martin
Santa Rosa
Indian River
Charlotte
Polk
St. Lucie
Escambia
Brevard
Tier I Total
State Total

# of Units
Damaged
5,570
7,506
7,668
19,343
23,196
29,460
34,077
49,809
51,627
51,876
56,698
336,830
708,361

% of
Total
Units
County
64.1%
64.3%
53.4%
32.1%
46.9%
53.5%
48.0%
23.4%
60.4%
2.7%
26.0%
47.6%

Single Family
# of Units
Damaged
3,741
4,314
3,946
14,018
18,518
22,804
27,918
34,346
39,930
41,922
43,127
254,584

Multi-Family
Manufactured Housing
% of
% of Total
% of Total
# of Units
Total
# of Units
Units
Units
Damaged
Units
Damaged
County
County
County
61.7%
193 36.5%
1,626
77.4%
65.1%
350 29.1%
2,829
72.8%
57.2%
136 17.5%
3,570
53.5%
37.3%
1,510
9.4%
3,519
56.6%
50.5%
879 19.9%
3,409
40.6%
62.5%
2,749 21.5%
3,660
63.1%
53.0%
2,384 23.6%
3,673
44.8%
26.9%
2,850
9.1%
12,465
23.4%
64.8%
4,666 30.6%
6,647
76.9%
48.2%
4,024 17.2%
5,077
45.5%
28.6%
3,921
8.4%
8,492
40.9%
35.9%
23,662
3.3%
54,967
7.8%

Source: Hurricane Housing Working Group, 2005; Shimberg Center for
Affordable Housing, 2004
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Tier
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Tier II counties were classified as having either large numbers of housing
damages, or a large percentage of housing damages compared with the total statewide.
Two Tier II counties were included in the 2006 QAP. Lee County reported 20,761
housing units damaged from the storms (Table 5-3). This was 9.4% of total damages
reported in the state. Less than two percent of these were MFH. There were 1,179
damaged or destroyed MFH units in Lee County. Compare this to Palm Beach County
with 16.3% of the state total, or 84,001 total housing units. The greatest numbers of
damaged multifamily units were located in Palm Beach County with just under 6% of the
state, or 11,715 units damaged.
Glades and Hendry counties were Tier III counties and together had slightly more
than five percent of total MFH housing. Hendry counted 34 damaged MFH units, or
slightly above three and a half percent of the total. Glades had less than ten. When ten or
fewer units were damaged, exact numbers were not published in order to protect privacy.
Together, Hendry and Glades accounted for more than 11% of the total housing damaged
or destroyed as a result of the 2004 hurricanes. These two counties represent 18% of the
total number of counties included in Tier III.
Monroe, Collier, Broward, and Miami-Dade had less than two percent of
damaged housing in the state and were included in the Tier IV category. These four
counties represented just 10% of all counties in Tier IV. The greatest number of MFH
damages was in Miami-Dade with 2,458 MFH units reported damaged.
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Table 5-3: 2006 QAP - Tiers I, II, III & IV
Total
County

Monroe
Collier
Glades
Hendry
Broward
Okeechobee
Miami-Dade
Martin
Lee
Indian River
St. Lucie
Brevard
Palm Beach
Total
State Total

# of Units
Damaged
25
334
505
1,317
6,932
7,668
9,481
19,343
20,761
29,460
51,627
56,698
84,001
287,793
708,361

% of
Total
Units
County
0.1%
0.3%
11.6%
11.3%
1.0%
53.4%
1.1%
32.1%
9.4%
53.5%
60.4%
26.0%
16.3%
40.6%

Single Family
# of Units
Damaged
19
254
204
632
5,251
3,946
6,289
14,018
16,577
22,804
39,930
43,127
60,351
213,129

Multi-Family
Manufactured Housing
% of
% of Total
% of Total
# of Units
Total
# of Units
Units
Units
Damaged
Units
Damaged
County
County
County
0.1%
*
0.0%
*
0.0%
0.4%
20
0.0%
59
0.7%
10.8%
*
1.6%
297
13.1%
11.1%
34
3.6%
650
13.0%
1.4%
985
0.3%
408
1.9%
57.2%
136 17.5%
3,570
53.5%
1.4%
2,458
0.7%
488
3.6%
37.3%
1,510
9.4%
3,519
56.6%
12.5%
1,179
1.9%
2,951
10.8%
62.5%
2,749
21.5%
3,660
63.1%
64.8%
4,666
30.6%
6,647
76.9%
28.6%
3,921
8.4%
8,492
40.9%
20.1%
11,715
5.9%
7,794
45.3%
30.1%
29,353
4.1%
38,476
5.4%

Tier
IV
IV
III
III
IV
I
IV
I
II
I
I
I
II

Source: Hurricane Housing Working Group, 2005; Shimberg Center for
Affordable Housing, 2004

PHASE 1: Findings and Analysis
Every county in Florida was affected by the 2004 hurricanes (HWG, 2005).
Comerio (1998) noted that most disaster relief is dispersed to owners of single-family
homes, “even when losses are predominantly in multi-family structures” (p. 21). LIHTC
development is a significant source of multifamily housing production, especially during
recovery. Vacant LIHTC units are often used to shelter others during the transition
between response and recovery. After disaster, policies often relax recapture rules so
vacant units can be rented to those who would not normally qualify under income
restrictions. Damaged LIHTC units are also given an extended period of time to be
repaired without risk of recapture. Policies also begin to develop to address inevitable
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shortages of affordable housing, shortages that were likely exacerbated as a result of the
disaster event.
Qualified Action Plans provide evidence of the preferences guided by public
policy. It was assumed that the public agency sought location preferences in counties
that indicated a serious need for additional affordable housing units and that all the usual
means of determining location needs took place in a collaborative way among
stakeholders. It is also assumed that state preferences recommended by HWG played a
role in the public agency’s decision making.
The analysis of QAPs indicated a preference for counties that experienced the
greatest impact from the four hurricanes. This is especially the case for location
preferences stated in the 2005 Florida QAP. While the HWG was still convened and
analyzing damages, the FHFC was proactive by including the counties directly hit by one
or more hurricanes.

St. Lucie was hit by Hurricanes Jeanne and Frances, resulting in the

most severe housing damage. Indian River and Brevard counties also experienced
extensive housing damage, reportedly from storm surge (HWG, 2005). Indian River,
Brevard, and Polk Counties were affected by three of the four hurricanes. Ivan had the
greatest impact to the south damaging housing in Miami-Dade, Broward, and Collier
counties. Hurricane Ivan traversed northward across the Gulf of Mexico landing near
Santa Rosa and Escambia counties causing even more damage. Santa Rosa County took
a major hit and reported 46.9% of housing damages. Over 19% of those damages were to
multi-family housing units. These counties were ultimately categorized as Tier 1
counties by HWG.
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In 2006, the Florida Housing and Finance Corporation incorporated HWG
recommendations and spread location preferences across a wider range of counties
affected by the storms. While Tier I counties were the largest subset of counties
preferred in the QAP, a few counties in the remaining tiers were given preference as well.
Factors influencing the inclusion of Tiers II, III, and IV counties could be a result of
preferences for small, medium and large counties, Florida Keys (Monroe County), or
number of damaged housing in these counties. As a percentage of housing losses,
Monroe, Collier, Broward and Miami-Dade are Tier IV counties were minimally
impacted by Hurricane Ivan but were included in the 2006 QAP. The initial number of
MFH damages between the four counties was estimated to be at least 3,4637 (HWG,
2005). Lee, Hendry, Glades, and Palm Beach are Tier II and III counties located south of
the path taken by Charley, Frances and Jeanne, and north of the southerly path of
Hurricane Ivan. In other words, none of these counties sustained a direct hit from any of
the four hurricanes. Yet all four counties were given preferences in the 2006 QAP, likely
because of the total number of damaged units in these counties. Lee County had 20,761
total housing units damaged. Of these, 1,179 were multifamily housing. Hendry County
had fewer units damaged, but of the 1,317 units represented 11.3% of total housing
damages. Nearly half were manufactured housing units. Glades also had a small number
of housing units damaged, but a significant 11.6% of total housing stock was affected

7

Monroe County had fewer than 10 apartments damaged, so the exact number was not provided in order to
protect the privacy of the tenants and owners.
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with over 13% in manufactured housing units. Multifamily housing production is a safe
and effective means of replacement housing for these types of units. Palm Beach County
sustained damages to over 84,000 housing units and 11,715 of those were multifamily.
The four of counties had more than 9.4% of housing damages with the greatest being
16.3% in Palm Beach County. This is a testament to the extent of devastation the four
hurricanes caused across the state.
Nineteen of 67 Florida counties were given preferences in QAPs in 2005 and
2006. All QAPs examined gave geographic preferences for the Florida Keys, Front
Porch Communities and Rural Development each year, but other than 2005 and 2006, no
other preferences were stated for specific counties. That means that 48 counties that
experienced some effect of the hurricanes were not given any preference. Comerio
(1998) points out that the scope of housing losses relative to local conditions may
indicate that some areas may not experience losses to the same degree. For instance,
Hurricane Ivan damaged fewer numbers of housing units than the other three storms, but
had a significant impact on agriculture and forestry. Comerio also found that “housing
and property decisions made within two years of a hurricane or earthquake bear a
relationship to the disaster that forced such decisions” (p. 246). After two years,
decisions are governed by market conditions and personal choice (Comerio, 1998). The
State of Florida established housing recovery preferences from recommendations made
by HWG. The 2005 QAP was a reaction to the devastation of the storms from the
previous year and included those counties that experienced the most extensive housing
damages. In 2006, FHFC incorporated many HWG recommendations but greater
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attention was given to coastal counties regardless of tier. The preferred counties stated in
the 2005 and 2006 QAPs were in direct response to the impact that Hurricanes Charley,
Jeanne, Frances, and Ivan had on housing damages. Based on the findings of the QAPS,
it was assumed developers might propose LIHTC development in locations preferred in
the 2005 and 2006 Qualified Action Plans, regardless of risk.
Ultimately, the 2005 QAP showed preferences for eleven counties, seven of
which were coastal counties. Four were located inland. In 2006, twelve counties from
Tiers I, II, III, and IV were given location preferences. Eight of these were coastal
counties. The response in 2005 correlated with large percentages of housing damages
overall with the exception of Escambia County. Escambia had a small percentage of
housing losses, but the large numbers of housing losses were significant. Polk County
had a lower percentage of housing damages.
In 2006, counties in Tiers II, III and IV were added to the QAP along with the
five Tier I counties with a large percentage housing units damaged. Tier II, III, and IV
counties also had large numbers of damaged housing except for Monroe County, which
had fewer than 25 damaged housing units. Monroe County is a coastal county that
encompasses land area on the Florida mainland and includes the Florida Keys. HWG
recommended Tier II, III and IV to receive priority in sequential order after Tier I. Since
the 2005 QAP included all Tier I counties, the 2006 QAP would be expected to include
counties from each of the other tiers because of HWG recommendations to address
housing needs in these tiers. An additional recommendation from HWG was that
preferences for Tier IV counties should be given to those that border Tier I counties. Tier
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IV counties preferred in the 2006 QAP did not adjoin Tier I counties and did not
experience significant housing damages. One county was small and rural (Monroe) and
another was a medium county (Collier). Broward and Miami-Dade are both coastal and
heavily populated. Preference for these counties is likely a response to affordable
housing needs within the Tier IV counties rather than a reaction to the effect of the
hurricanes since both counties had less than 1% of housing units damaged compared to
the state total. Each year, the public agency indicated a preference for coastal counties
above inland counties. Rising coastal population is an indicator of affordable housing
needs and likely influenced preferences. A thorough analysis of population, income and
housing trends would provide a better indication of housing needs for Florida counties
that could further explain the preferences of the public agency established in the 2005 and
2006 QAPs.
PHASE II: STATED PREFERENCES OF LIHTC DEVELOPERS
A random sample was drawn from the LIHTC database and participants were
contacted by telephone or email prior to implementation of the survey. A total of 112
participants were emailed a link to the survey and were given a four week time frame to
complete the questionnaire (Table 5-4). Reminders were emailed after week one and
week three, and again two days before the deadline. Two participants opened the survey
and opted out and 29 participants completed the survey for a response rate of 28%.
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Table 5-4: Survey Responses
Sample
Population
n=112

Respondents
31

Response
Rate
28%

Survey Results
Response to closed-ended survey questions were analyzed using descriptive and
inferential statistics. An open ended question was also included. This section discusses
the results. The survey instrument is found in the appendix.
Business Model and Experience
The first four questions gave an overview of the general demographics and
experience of respondents. LIHTC is a complex program, and professionals with
experience are more likely to fully understand the nature of development under the
program. Experienced LIHTC respondents are also likely to be more aware of the
barriers imposed by the program during disaster recovery. The industry is composed of
for-profit and non-profit participants. For-profit developers dominate the LIHTC
industry by more than sixty percent nationally and eighty-seven percent in Florida. The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has provided informal, nonbinding guidance for nonprofits who wish to participate in the LIHTC program (Mittereder, 2013). The state,
however, often includes preferences in the QAPs for developers who work with nonprofit organizations. Survey respondents averaged 17 years of experience in the LIHTC
industry. Six respondents were employed in the industry for six years or less. Private,
for-profit industries were represented by 66% of respondents and 34% were non-profit
organizations (Figure 5-3). Of the non-profits represented, 28% were 501(c)3
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organizations. Sixty percent of non-profits were Community Development Corporations
(CDC). A CDC is a nonprofit, community-based organization that focuses on a number
of initiatives promoting community development, including affordable housing. CDCs
typically support or participate in projects at the local level.

Figure 5-3: Percentage of For-Profit and Non-Profit Firms
n=29

Geographic Experience
Questions 5 through 9 sought to understand the geographic scope of respondent
experience and whether experience included other development projects in addition to
LIHTC. These questions also asked about respondents experience with coastal
development specifically and experience with disasters in the context of LIHTC
development. Most respondents, 65.5%, participated in LIHTC development in multiple
states. Slightly more than 20% developed LIHTC in a single county, and 13.8% operated
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in multiple counties within the state. Over 82% of participants indicated involvement
with projects other than LIHTC. The same percentage, 82%, owned LIHTC in coastal
counties. More than 39% of respondents had experienced damages to LIHTC units as a
result of a hurricane, and of those, all of them had more than 20 units damaged as a
result. This study was not specifically interested in the numbers of units damaged as a
result of a hurricane but was interested in the preferences associated with development.
It is obvious from the number of respondents selecting the highest category available for
damaged units that in future surveys, twenty units or above should be in the lower range
of categories for understanding the extent of damages.
Ranking Preferences
The next few questions asked respondents to rank a series of preferences. The
first question asked respondents to rank the importance of five general categories of risk
discussed in Chapter 2. Risk categories were identified in the development literature and
included risk variables like credit, debt burdens, interest rates, policy, funding, and
hazards. These variables were categorized based on a modified STEEP analysis for real
estate development built from the work of Khumpaisal and Ross (2007) and Morrison
(2007). The categories were social, technical, economic, environmental, and
government (Figure 5-4). Social factors included public sentiment and advocacy.
Environmental factors included proximity to the coast, impact areas, and events related to
hurricanes. Both of these categories had the least influence on development decisions.
The technical categories most significant to development include financial factors
associated with real estate development, including cap rates, internal rates of return, and
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other project oriented factors. Economics included externalities that included
government funding and land acquisition. Government priorities were a function of
program changes associated with political change and volatility.

Figure 5-4: Risk Categories

Respondents were asked to rank each category from 0 to 10, with 0 indicating low
risk and 10 indicating high risk. Technical, economic, and government categories each
scored above seven. Economic factors presented the greatest risks that were most likely
to derail an affordable housing project. These elements included sources needed to fund
development. Social factors, such as the level of community support for development,
were least likely to influence the decision to develop. All categories scored greater than
neutral significance for influencing a development decision except the Social category.
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Development decisions were most influenced by economic forces, government and
political influences, and the technical requirements needed for project profitability.
Funding Preferences
Government funding was the primary factor in the economic category. Funding
from government sources is often essential for feasibility of affordable housing
production. Developers rely on funding assistance during the recovery and
redevelopment phase of disaster because of the limitations and constraints on rent
increases. The LIHTC database revealed very little about project funding. Most of the
fields for HOME and CDBG funds were blank. Only five percent of projects in the
database received HOME funding and even fewer, no more than one percent, included
CDBG funds (Table 5-5). The data means little considering that nearly 80% of LIHTC
fields for two programs were blank. Tax exempt bonds, typically state sponsored disaster
bond programs such as Liberty Bonds, or Go Zone, were used in 31% of Florida LIHTC
with only 21% of fields being reported as blank. Future research regarding the efficacy
of subsidies is contingent on accuracy and completeness of fields within the LITHC
database.
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Table 5-5: Analysis of CDBG and HOME Programs in Existing LIHTC

LIHTC Database Analysis - 1987 to 2012
Total LIHTC Developments
Total LIHTC Units/Avg Per Project
Non-Profit

United States
Ratio
17,047
1,098,605
64.45

Developments
Yes
2973
No
10557
Blank
3518

HOME

% of Total
17%
62%
21%
$

Yes
No
Blank

1231
7111
8705

Yes
No
Blank

337
7448
9262

Yes
No
Blank

2136
12576
2335

CDBG

$

Florida
Ratio
459
148,287

323.07

Developments
59
400
0

855,302,105
7%
42%
51%

24
83
352

131,330,414
2%
44%
54%

% of Total
13%
87%
0%
$

18,869,100
5%
18%
77%

$
4
82
373

2,130,691
1%
18%
81%

143
219
97

31%
48%
21%

*Tax Exempt Bonds
13%
74%
14%

* The value of Tax Exempt bonds was unreported in the LIHTC database and is not analyzed.

Source: HUD
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The survey ranked thirteen funding programs used for development during
disaster recovery (Figure 5-5). Respondents were also asked to consider the importance
of incentives given to develop in an impact zone, which is an area directly hit by a
hurricane. Impact zones often withstand the greatest degree of physical damage. The
HWG report grouped counties that were in the impact zone of one or more hurricanes in
the Tier I group.
Supplemental LIHTC was most preferred program for development in an impact
zone. Supplemental LIHTC ranked 6.2 on a scale of 1 to 7 with a standard deviation of
0.88, indicating the program was the most significant for mitigated risk among
respondents. The HOME program is often used in conjunction with LIHTC and has
many of the same restrictions. HOME funds were the second most important funding
source according the respondents. Loan programs of all types were predictably less
attractive. Federal disaster loans outranked traditional financing, likely because of
traditionally lower interest rates for this type of funding. Grants were the next category
of funding preferences with Community Development Block Grants (CDBG)
outweighing Federal Disaster Grants. Mitigation Grants were the least preferred in the
Grant category. Other funding options that were not included in funding options were
contributed by one or more respondents. These included state housing trust funds,
forgivable debt, and Project Based Section 8 Rental Assistance, a voucher program that
allows tenants to locate housing from private owners in the market, including LIHTC.
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Figure 5-5: LIHTC Preferred Funding Preferences

Respondents were also asked to rank programs from 0 to 10 that are critical for
participation in the LIHTC program during disaster recovery with 0 being not critical,
indicating that the program does not mitigate developer risk. A score of ten indicates that
the program is critical for addressing risk when development decisions are made. As in
the previous question, Supplemental LIHTC was the most favored response with a mean
score of 7.63 (Figure 5-6). This was followed by HOME funds and Federal Disaster
Grants. Funding sources that added debt fell below the median indicating a high risk.
State Housing Trust Funds and Project Based Section 8 Rental Assistance were included
in the “other” category.
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Figure 5-6: Identifying LIHTC Subsidy Risks

Location Preferences
Respondents were asked to rank preferences specifically in terms of location.
This section also asked respondents to rank non-financial incentives that influenced
development decision-making. Respondents were given twelve potential location
characteristics or potential hazards related to a site. Responses were ranked on a sliding
scale with 0 being the most preferred, meaning less risk, to 10 being the least preferred,
or the greatest risk (Figure 5-7). The least preferred site, ranking below 3.6, had some
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potential for storm surge damage during a hurricane. The most preferred site with the
least risk was located more than 25 miles from the coast.

Figure 5-7: Location Risks

Respondents were also asked to rank political and social influences on
development decisions. These influences are considered externalities over which LIHTC
producers have no control. Respondents stated a willingness to participate in
development if land costs were lower and if support from advocacy groups were
favorable for a specific community. Higher land costs and more regulations would have
a negative influence on a willingness to participate more than lack of local support. High
insurance costs were as risky to development activity as rising construction costs and
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higher land costs. These three factors could negatively affect profitability. Other than
Supplemental Tax Credits and favorable financing, the most significant factors reducing
risk for LIHTC development during disaster recovery were found in six areas: disaster
relief programs, lower land costs, advocacy in favor, lower insurance costs, more
incentives to build in coastal areas, and flexible regulations (Figure 5-8). Incentives to
build in coastal areas could arguably increase risk without attention to site location during
the pre-development phase. The most significant barriers for development after
unfavorable financing were high costs for insurance, construction, and land as well as
regulations and public sentiment against an affordable housing project.

Figure 5-8: Measuring Risks from Externalities
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Statistical Analysis
Funding preferences and location preferences were further analyzed using
statistical analysis. As stated earlier, an impact zone is an area that withstands the
greatest degree of physical damage, and in the case of coastal hurricanes, is most likely to
be in a coastal county. The statistical analysis conducted for this study did not indicate
causality, but there was correlation between some variables.
Phase I revealed that the public agency, or housing authorities, had a preference
for coastal areas subject to hurricane impact or to areas directly hit by one or more of four
hurricanes in 2004. Descriptive statistical analysis revealed that Supplemental LIHTC
was the most preferred funding program when compared to the mean of all other
programs. The initial phase of statistical analysis looked at the mean between two
groups, the for-profit developer and the non-profit developer. The mean of combined
for-profit and non-profit developers was 6.19 on a scale of 1 to 7. Federal Disaster
Grants, HOME and CDBG programs were the next highest ranking programs with mean
scores of 5.06, 5.06, and 5.10 respectively. On the surface, the results suggest that
Supplemental LIHTC is preferred over all other funding sources used in conjunction with
LIHTC.
Location risk between the combined for-profit and non-profit groups indicated a
preference for site locations greater than 10 miles from the coast. A mean score of 7.6
among respondents show a greater preference for sites more than 25 miles from the coast.
Respondents had a mean score of 7.3 for sites not within a storm surge boundary. A site
not in a coastal county had a mean score of 7.0. In contrast, the least preferred sites, with
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mean score of between 3.3 and 3.6, included sites with some potential for storm surge,
sites within storm surge boundaries, and sites adjacent to previously flooded sites.
Two Independent Samples T-Test
To assess the difference between preferences of for-profit and non-profit LIHTC
developers, an independent two-tailed t-test was conducted using the company structure
(non-profit and for-profit) as the independent variables and the funding programs as
dependent variables. A test for homogeneity of variances between the two groups was
conducted for each funding source. The hypothesis assumes that variances are not
significantly different regardless of business structure (for-profit vs. non-profit). Using
the probability level of .05, if the Sig value for Levene’s test is < .05, the conclusion is
that the variances were significantly different and the t-test is invalid. If Levene’s was >
.05, variances are not significantly different and the t-test is valid. Levene’s test for
equality was not violated for any of the variables with one exception. HOME funding
had a significance of 0.044 (See Table 5-6). The differences between the mean for the
regular (0.287) and adjusted t-test (0.172) was minimal.
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Table 5-6: T-test of Means by Group for Funding Preferences
Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables by Group
Group

Variable

For Profit

Non-Profit

(n = 21)

(n = 10)

M

SD

M

SD

t(29)

CDBG

5.00 2.000

5.30 1.252

HOME

4.81 2.064

5.60 1.075 1.401

< .172

Suppl LIHTC

6.38 0.805

5.60 1.075 -2.041

< .031*

Disaster Bonds

4.67 1.798

3.67 1.581 -1.443

< .160

Mitigation Grants

5.24 1.814

4.50 1.581 -1.101

< .280

Federal Disaster Loans

4.86 1.711

4.80 1.317 -.093

< .927

SBA Loans

3.10 1.921

3.40 1.265

< .653

Traditional Financing

4.62 1.431

4.00 1.155 -1.192

< .243

3.81 1.662

3.22 1.481 -.914

<.368

5.05 1.830

5.10 1.729

.076

<.940

Private Insurance

4.71 1.707

4.50 1.841 -.319

<.752

Road Home Small Rental

2.76 1.947

3.70 1.829 1.278

<.212

New Market Tax Credits

3.52 1.940

4.40 1.713 1.218

<.233

Physical Disaster Business Loan
Federal Disaster Grant

.433

Two-tailed
Adj. (Sig)
< .668

.455

Note. n = sample size within group.

This test was repeated to assess the difference between for-profit and non-profit
LIHTC developers for location preferences. Levene’s test for equality was not violated
for any of the variables indicating no statistical difference in the variances between the
two groups (Table 5-7).
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Table 5-7: T-test of Means by Group for Location Preferences
Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Variables by Group
Group
For Profit
(n = 16)
Variable
In a coastal county
Not in a coastal county
Within a storm surge boundary
Not within a storm surge boundary
Site is subject to flooding
Potential for storm surge damage

Non-Profit
(n = 8)

M

SD

M

SD

t (24)

Two-tailed
Adj. (Sig)

4.93
7.17
3.43
7.53
4.82
3.50

1.87
2.27
2.85
1.87
2.60
2.68

5.14
6.77
3.83
6.87
3.75
3.00

2.67
3.07
3.19
3.23
2.55
2.50

0.214
-0.377
0.281
-0.644
-0.968
-0.439

< .833
< .710
< .781
< .526
< .343
< .665

Correlation Coefficient
Pearson’s Correlation was calculated to determine if there was a linear
relationship between the thirteen funding variables. P-values < .05 indicate some kind of
relationship between programs. Some correlation exists between both loan and grant
programs associated with disaster with significance at the .01 level and the .05 level,
indicating some relationship between funding types. According to Tabachnick and Fidell
(2007), the correlation matrix should be examined for correlation coefficients greater than
0.30. There were 27 pairs of variables with correlations between .30 and .763 indicating
high correlations between variables (Table 5-8).
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Table 5-8: Correlation Coefficient between Funding Subsidies
CDBG

HOME

SUPP LIHTC

FEDERAL
MITIGATION DISASTER
GRANTS
LOANS SBA LOANS

DISASTER
BONDS

PHY
DISASTER
LOAN

TRAD
FINANCE

FED
DISASTER PRIVATE
GRANT INSURANCE

ROAD
HOME
SMALL
RENTAL

NMTC

Pearson Correlation
CDBG
Sig (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
HOME
Sig (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
SUPPL LIHTC
Sig (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
DISASTER BONDS Sig (2-tailed)
N

31
0.193
0.297
31
0.384
0.033
31
-0.351
0.057
30

31
0.262
0.154
31
0.139
0.463
30

31
-0.120
0.529
30

30

Pearson Correlation
Sig (2-tailed)
N

-0.214
247
31

0.323
0.076
31

-0.08
0.671
31

0.645**
0.000
30

31

Pearson Correlation
FEDERAL
Sig (2-tailed)
DISASTER LOANS
N

-0.352
0.052
31

0.387 *
0.031
31

-0.074
0.691
31

0.668**
0.000
30

0.763**
0.000
31

31

Pearson Correlation
Sig (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig (2-tailed)
N

-0.104
0.576
31
0.203
0.273
31

0.198
0.287
31
-0.199
0.283
31

-0.157
0.398
31
0.187
0.313
31

0.392 *
0.032
30
-0.006
0.976
30

0.166
0.372
31
-0.042
0.823
31

0.357 *
0.049
31
-0.170
0.361
31

31
0.249
0.177
31

31

Pearson Correlation
PHYSICAL
Sig (2-tailed)
DISASTER LOAN
N

-0.257
0.17
30

0.240
0.202
30

-0.207
0.272
30

0.545**
0.002
30

0.470**
0.009
30

0.552**
0.002
30

0.718**
0.000
30

0.270
0.148
30

30

Pearson Correlation
FEDERAL
Sig (2-tailed)
DISASTER GRANT
N
Pearson Correlation
PRIVATE
Sig (2-tailed)
INSURANCE
N

-0.076
0.683
31
0.208
0.263
31

0.360
0.047
31
-0.056
0.764
31

-0.005
0.978
31
0.332
0.068
31

0.529**
0.003
30
-0.083
0.663
30

0.581**
0.001
31
-0.166
0.373
31

0.723**
0.000
31
-0.083
0.656
31

.357 *
0.049
31
0.260
0.158
31

-0.136
0.465
31
0.293
0.110
31

0.543**
0.002
30
0.066
0.728
30

31
-0.058
0.757
31

31

Pearson Correlation
Sig (2-tailed)
N

-0.089
0.633
31

0.16
0.391
31

-0.383 *
0.033
31

0.448 *
0.013
30

0.118
0.526
31

0.421 *
0.018
31

0.748**
0.000
31

0.230
0.212
31

0.679**
0.000
30

.389 *
0.031
31

0.207
0.263
31

31

0.246
0.183
31

-0.281
0.126
31

0.321
0.083
30

0.151
0.417
31

0.382 *
0.034
31

0.710**
0.000
31

0.175
0.345
31

0.653**
0.000
30

0.513**
0.003
31

0.081
0.666
31

0.671**
0.000
31

MITIGATION
GRANTS

SBA LOANS

TRAD FINANCE

ROAD HOME

1

Pearson Correlation
0.065
Sig (2-tailed)
0.727
N
31
* Correlation is signficant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
NMTC

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
31

Correlations are significant at the 0.01 level between the various disaster programs. As
preferences for Disaster Bonds increases, preferences for Federal Disaster Grants,
Physical Disaster Loans, and Mitigation Grants increases. Supplemental LIHTC is
significant at the .05 level with Community Development Block Grants (CDBG).
Developers who prefer CDBG also preferred Supplemental LIHTC. CDBG is often used
in conjunction with LIHTC. Developers often use multiple subsidies to fund LIHTC
development. During disaster recovery, developers will combine available disaster
related programs to fund new development or to rehabilitate damaged units.
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Pearson’s Correlation was also calculated to determine if there was a linear
relationship between six location preferences. P-values < .05 indicate some kind of
relationship between programs. The results indicate that correlation exists between
locations with significance at the .01 level.

There were 11 pairs of variables with

correlations between .545 and .714 indicating a high correlation between location
variables (Table 5-9). There was a significant positive correlation (.703) between a site
located in a coastal county and a site located in a non-coastal county. These opposing
variables would be expected to have a negative correlation, meaning when preferences
for coastal counties increases, preferences for non-coastal counties decrease. However
this was not the case. The results suggest that sites in coastal counties positively correlate
with sites in non-coastal counties. One explanation could be that the wording of
statement choices could have resulted in confusion among the respondents. The question
intentionally had elements of contrast that could have created confusion in the
interpretation of results. For instance, a response choice stating a preferred site would be
in a storm surge boundary was followed by a response choice stating a preferred site was
not in a storm surge boundary. Predictably, flooding and damages from storm surge were
not significantly correlated with sites not located within storm surge boundaries.
The findings do suggest that location in coastal counties and inland counties is
highly correlated with the perception of risk associated with storm surge and flooding
hazards as opposed to strictly being in a coastal county or not highlighting an awareness
of risk associated with proximity to flooding and storm surge events, particularly when
adjacent sites have experienced damages from these hazards. High positive correlations
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between sites within a storm surge boundary, flooding or with potential for storm surge
damages reflect the risk of proximity to previous flooding or storm surge events.

Table 5-9: Correlation Coefficient between Location Preferences
Location
Preferences

In a
Coastal
County

Not in a
Coastal
County

Pearson Correlation
1
In a Coastal
Sig. (2-tailed)
County
N
22
Not in a
Pearson Correlation
.703**
1
Coastal
Sig. (2-tailed)
0.000
County
N
22
26
In a Storm Pearson Correlation
.706**
0.42
Surge
Sig. (2-tailed)
0.000
0.052
Boundary N
21
22
Not in a Storm Pearson Correlation
.601**
.639**
Surge
Sig. (2-tailed)
0.004
0.001
Boundary N
21
24
Pearson Correlation
.707**
.668**
Potential for
Sig. (2-tailed)
0.000
0.000
Flooding
N
21
24
Potential for Pearson Correlation
.714**
.545**
Storm Surge Sig. (2-tailed)
0
0.006
damges
N
21
24
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

In a Storm
Surge
Boundary

Not in a
Storm
Surge
Boundary

Potential
for
flooding

Potential for
Storm Surge
damages

1
22
0.098
0.673
21
.611**
0.003
21
.667*
0.001
21

1
25
0.339
0.098
25
0.380
0.067
24

1
25
.583**
0.003
24

1
24

Respondents were also asked to what degree a series of hypothetical situations would
inhibit their willingness to participate in disaster recovery. Pearson’s Correlation was
calculated to determine linear correlations between these statements resulting in a high
correlation of 30 pairs of variables with significance at the .01 level (Table 5-10).
Additional incentives had a high correlation with disaster recovery programs and higher
construction costs associated with redevelopment. Developers facing new or
reconstruction during recovery efforts would likely seek out additional subsidies
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available for participation in an effort to reduce financing costs. The impact of public
sentiment against a LIHTC development is highly correlated unfavorable financing,
stricter regulations, and high insurance costs suggesting these higher costs coupled with
negative public sentiment could impact development decisions. Correlations are not an
indication of causality, but could suggest some of the relationships that have the greatest
impact on development decisions during disaster recovery8.

8

Cross tabulations is another way of analyzing relationships between two or more variables. The pilot
study analyzed a survey among real estate students and LIHTC stakeholders using this method. Crosstabs
developed during the pilot were analyzed at the county level in relation to storm surge and flood zone.
The final survey was more comprehensive and asked respondents as series of questions relating to
preferences for subsidies and development decision-making. Cross tabulations were extracted with data
that included funding and location variables on either a 7-point Likert scale or a 10-point sliding scale. For
each data set the expected cell count was <5 signaling that the statistic was not valid. For instance,
crosstabs on funding preferences and location by company type (for-profit/non-profit) resulted in 18 cells
that had expected counts that are <5 indicating no relationship between non-profit and for-profit groups.
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Table 5-10: Correlation Coefficient for Development Participation
With all else being equal, to what degree would each of the following statements affect your willingess to participate in disaster recovery efforts …
More
Construction
Insurance costs
Public sentiment is
Insurance costs
Financing the
Land costs are
regulations are
costs are rising
are lower in
against low-income
are higher in
project has
higher along
imposed in
in recovery
counties that are
housing
coastal areas unfavorable terms
the coast
coastal counties
zones
along the coast

Financing the
project with
favorable terms

Land costs
are lower in
areas away
from the
coast

Disaster relief
A non-profit
A for-profit
Construction
programs are
organization is organization is
costs are
Supplemental
available for lowwilling to
willing to partner
stable in the
tax credits
income
partner with us
with us in
recovery
are available
multifamily
in development development the
zones
housing
the project
project

A local
neighborhood
group is against
low-income
housing

Additional
incentives are
available to
build in coastal
counties

Public sentiment
is against lowincome housing

Pearson Correlation

1

Sig (2-tailed)
N

26

More regulations
are imposed in
coastal counties

Pearson Correlation

.520**

Sig (2-tailed)
N

0.006
26

26

Insurance costs
are higher in
coastal areas

Pearson Correlation

.532**

.543**

1

Sig (2-tailed)
N

0.006
25

0.005
25

25

Financing the
Pearson Correlation
project has
Sig (2-tailed)
unfavorable terms
N

.510**

.417*

.559**

0.009
25

0.038
25

0.004
25

25

Construction costs Pearson Correlation
are rising in
Sig (2-tailed)
recovery zones
N

0.225

.593**

.466*

0.310

1

0.269
26

0.001
26

0.019
25

0.131
25

26

Land costs are
higher along the
coast

Pearson Correlation

.521**

.435*

.471*

.623**

.607**

Sig (2-tailed)
N

0.008
25

0.03
25

0.018
25

0.001
25

0.001
25

25

Pearson Correlation

0.146

0.256

0.222

0.246

0.337

0.123

1

Sig (2-tailed)
N

0.487
25

0.216
25

0.296
24

0.247
24

0.100
25

0.568
24

25

Pearson Correlation

.432*

0.291

.440*

0.244

0.335

0.388

.643**

1

Sig (2-tailed)
N

0.028
26

0.149
26

0.028
25

0.239
25

0.094
26

0.056
25

0.001
25

26

Pearson Correlation

0.159

0.131

0.315

0.288

0.209

0.129

.876**

.673**

Sig (2-tailed)
N

0.437
26

0.525
26

0.125
25

0.162
25

0.306
26

0.538
25

0.000
25

0.000
26

26

0.151

.482*

0.372

0.15

.500**

0.299

.631**

.503**

.525**

1

0.461
26

0.013
26

0.067
25

0.475
25

0.009
26

0.147
25

0.001
25

0.009
26

0.006
26

26

-0.144

0.374

0.170

-0.181

.560**

0.076

.538**

0.285

0.263

.769**

0.483
26

0.060
26

0.416
25

0.386
25

0.003
26

0.717
25

0.006
25

0.159
26

0.195
26

0.000
26

26

Pearson Correlation

-0.017

0.25

0.197

-0.040

.603**

0.235

0.243

.402*

0.292

.496**

.577**

1

Sig (2-tailed)
N

0.936
25

0.229
25

0.356
24

0.853
24

0.001
25

0.269
24

0.253
24

0.046
25

0.157
25

0.012
25

0.003
25

25

0.114

0.224

0.388

0.154

0.014

0.338

.412*

.427**

0.121

-0.055

0.238

0.58
26

0.281
25

0.056
25

0.453
26

0.946
25

0.098
25

0.036
26

0.03
26

0.555
26

0.789
26

0.253
25

26

.498**

0.339

0.352

0.388

0.052

.426*

0.260

0.223

.522**

.415*

0.161

.498**

1

0.010
26

0.098
25

0.085
25

0.050
26

0.806
25

0.034
25

0.200
26

0.274
26

0.006
26

0.035
26

0.441
25

0.010
26

26

.731**

0.357

0.291

.433*

.497*

0.301

0.286

0.167

.493*

0.333

0.311

-0.136

0.200

0.000
26

0.080
25

0.158
25

0.027
26

0.012
25

0.144
25

0.156
26

0.414
26

0.011
26

0.097
26

0.130
25

0.508
26

0.328
26

26

0.276

0.06

0.133

.625**

0.153

0.16

-0.004

-0.007

.401*

.552**

.456*

0.04

.475*

0.234

1

0.172
26

0.776
25

0.526
25

0.001
26

0.464
25

0.446
25

0.986
26

0.971
26

0.042
26

0.003
26

0.022
25

0.845
26

0.014
26

0.250
26

26

Insurance costs
are lower in
counties that are
along the coast
Financing the
project with
favorable terms
Land costs are
lower in areas
away from the
coast

Construction costs Pearson Correlation
are stable in the
Sig (2-tailed)
recovery zones
N
Disaster relief
Pearson Correlation
programs are
available for low- Sig (2-tailed)
income
N
Supplemental tax
credits are
available

A non-profit
Pearson Correlation
0.160
organization is
willing to partner Sig (2-tailed)
0.435
with us in
N
26
A for-profit
Pearson Correlation
0.060
organization is
willing to partner Sig (2-tailed)
0.769
with us to develop N
26
A local
Pearson Correlation
.577*
neighborhood
group is against
Sig (2-tailed)
0.002
low-income
N
26
Additional
Pearson Correlation
-0.272
incentives are
available to build Sig (2-tailed)
0.180
in coastal counties N
26
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

1

1

1
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1

1

1

1

Views from the Experts
Respondents were given an open-ended question that asked why a lack of
sufficient units of affordable housing remained a problem after disaster recovery. The
question was answered by 23 respondents with responses following eight common
themes (Table 5-6). Major themes included: funding, public sentiment, policy, time,
location, risk, tenant barriers, and costs. Each of these categories are explored in greater
detail to enhance meaning from the results overall.
Funding
The most common theme among respondents underscored the need for additional funding
for affordable multifamily housing production. Specific references were made to low
insurance payouts or difficulty working with insurance companies. Six were for
additional funding. Specific solutions included grants and forgivable loans. One
respondent added:
“most existing LIHTC properties have an equity partner and mortgage,
both of which are very inflexible when it comes to putting additional debt
on their colateral (sic) and the rental income restrictions usually won't
support additional debt anyway.”
Another respondent recognized how market dynamics affect costs during disaster
recovery stating:
“In a disaster recovery, the ability to rebuild affordable housing is solely
related to the subsidies provided. Since construction costs are usually
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escalated during a disaster recovery, there is need for even more subsidy
than required in a "normal" market.”
Policy
Respondents were concerned with the impact of policies on the ability to produce
adequate numbers of affordable housing during disaster recovery. Comments suggested
that policies should not encourage development in coastal areas.
“Encouraging people to live in disaster-prone areas is not good policy.
Encouraging people (all people, not just low income people) to move
elsewhere is probably a positive, not a negative.”
Another respondent faulted policies that encourage mixed income developments saying:
“Primarily due to the new trend where pure public and or affordable
housing is not attractive and can not (sic) be easily financed. The trend is
for mixed income communities which drastically reduce the number of
pure public; and/or low to moderate income housing.”
Others criticized government overreach, the breakdown in the functioning of government,
and a lack of understanding of the LITHC program by government officials.
Public sentiment
Respondents suggested that lack of empathy from government and wealthy citizens, who
are better connected to the leadership, are a factor in the unwillingness to provide
sufficient resources for affordable housing production.
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“Government and wealthy families and corporations do not care about
low income families and are unwilling to provide the support services
needed to help families become self sufficient (sic).”
Others added that public sentiment leans toward personal responsibility and those that
live on the coast are at fault because they choose to live in risky areas. One respondent
commented:
“This is due in part to public sentiment that people who live in areas
prone to damage from natural disasters are partly responsible for their lot
because they "chose" to live in a disaster-prone area. This notion, which
is false when it comes to affordable housing as choice is limited and
families must choose from what is available and typically have to wait
quite a while before a unit - any unit - of affordable housing becomes
available. Nevertheless, the public sentiment impacts legislators' and local
governmental officials' willingness to put the amount of resources needed
to fully address the recovery needs.”
Location
Comments about location were either mentioned directly or in the context of other
themes. One respondent pointed out that those who need affordable housing cannot wait
for restoration and recovery and will follow jobs by necessity, while another suggested
that units that are available for the dislocated are not in areas that have accessibility to
jobs and services.
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“If dislocation leads low income households to quality housing in a safer
location not a large distance from the original location, disaster recovery
can help people move to safer affordable housing.”
Still another respondent suggested that people should move to safer areas. Another
pointed out the desirability of coastal areas to high income earners and the high land costs
associated with coastal development.
Time and Barriers to Occupancy
Developers were concerned with lag time between insurance settlements and the ability
to reconstruct damaged properties. Another said that redevelopment takes time,
reiterating the interconnectedness of many of the other themes. Still another noted that
affordable housing is not available in the market while another said that the poorest could
not wait. Tenant barriers to occupancy include long waiting lists, unaffordable rents, and
not enough units being built.
“The additional resources contributed by federal, state and local
government seldom outweigh the problems created by difficulties with
insurance, both existing and new, changes to building/zoning codes, and
simply the time involved in the redevelopment process - gaining local
government approvals, assembling financing packages, obtaining
community support, relocating residents, etc.”
Development Costs and Risk
Some respondents explicitly identified risk as a problem impacting affordable housing
redevelopment stating:
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“Not enough incentives to attract a development company to be willing to
take the risk of another disaster or not a cap on potential losses.”
Another suggested risk avoidance stating the problem is associated with the
“unwillingness of investors to take greater risks in disaster recovery areas.”
Specific costs perpetuating the problem of insufficient numbers of
affordable housing after disaster included high insurance costs, higher operating
costs, less profitability, and higher labor and construction costs.
The results from Phase II clearly show that LIHTC developers are aware of the
risks associated with coastal locations, particularly in storm surge areas. LIHTC
developers receive subsidies in the form of tax credits and other funding sources such as
CDBG, HOME funds, and tax bonds among others. The opportunity to reduce debt with
these resources and Supplemental LIHTC appealed to the respondents, particularly when
coastal development was factored in. The idea that additional subsidies were essential for
development along the coast is questionable at best because higher land costs and risk
could feasibly be offset by higher rent and property value. It seems counterintuitive that
if risk is associated with coastal areas, as repeatedly stated by respondents answering the
open-ended question, then additional subsidies should be targeted for risk avoidance.
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According to recent studies (Greene, 1992; Comerio et al., 1994; Finch et al., 2010) low-income households face dislocation
because there are not enough low-income housing units constructed during disaster recovery. Why do you think this is a
problem?
Table 5-11: Common Themes
FUNDING

PUBLIC SENTIMENT
POLICY
Personal responsibility-should not Should not encourage people to live
Additional funding needed
live on coast
in disaster prone areas
Additional resources
Trends for mixed income
Personal responsibility
needed
development reduce availability
Additional funding to cover
Should not live on coast
Regulatory difficulties
increased costs

TIME

LOCATION
People should move to safer
areas

RISK

TENANT BARRIERS

COSTS

Risk of loss

Long waiting lists

High insurance costs

Takes time to redevelop

People go to the jobs

Risk of another disaster

Unaffordable rents

Higher operating costs

Poorest cannot wait

Available units not accessible
Risk avoidance
to jobs and services

Not building enough
units

Less profitable

None available in the market

Lag time between settlement
Coastal areas desirable to high
Breakdown of Government function of insurance claims and
income earners
reconstruction
Government does not care about
Higher land costs in coastal
Insurance payouts to low
Government overreach
the poor
areas
Inflexible mortgages reduce
Not enough affordable housing
Wealthy do no care about the poor
ability to add debt
being built
Subsidies needed

Should not live in disaster prone
areas

Additional subsidies needed NIMBY
Grants
Forgivable Loans
Insufficient resources
Working with insurance
companies is difficult
More incentives needed
Land costs
Insurance costs
Insufficient funding
Building codes increase
costs
High insurance costs

Program restrictions on tenant mix
Lack of program understanding by
government
Building code regulations
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High labor
High construction
costs

PHASE III: PREFERENCES REVEALED WITH GIS
Descriptive statistics were used to determine the number of LIHTC located in the
boundaries of storm surge. Storm surge is an abnormal rise of water generated by a
storm with the potential to cause extreme flooding, property damage, and death. Storm
surge from Hurricane Katrina reached 27.8 feet at Pass Christian, exceeding the previous
record set by Hurricane Camille (Fritz et al., 2008). Peak surge often coincides with the
landfall of a hurricane but can also occur before or after. In 2005, a post-runner storm
surge occurred after Hurricane Wilma struck the southwest coast of Florida. Three years
later, the landfall of Hurricane Ike was preceded by a forerunner surge in the 24 hours
before the hurricane stuck the Texas coast (Kennedy et al., 2011).
Others have used GIS technology to analyze the storm surge risk of housing in
Florida. Since 2011, Core-Logic has completed an annual storm surge analysis of singlefamily homes exposed to storm surge risk. Researchers used the Sea, Lake and Overland
Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) model from the National Weather Service (NWS) and
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to analyze single family
homes on the U.S. coast. The SLOSH model was run using the Maximum of the
Maximum of High Water (MOM) data in the storm surge model. According to the most
recent findings, more than 6.5 million single-family homes with a reconstruction value of
nearly $1.5 trillion are at risk of damage from storm surge in coastal communities (Botts
et al., 2014). The study identified Texas and Florida as the states with the greatest risk of
damages due to storm surge. Florida ranks number one for the number of homes at risk
of storm surge with the potential for 2.5 million homes in harm’s way. Botts and
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colleagues estimated reconstruction costs for the state at more than $490 billion. A
Category 5 hurricane, considered an extreme storm and less likely to occur, was
estimated to cause more than $70 billion in damages to single-family homes in the State
of Florida alone. Six of the top 15 metropolitan areas at greatest risk of damages from
storm surge are located in in the state. Miami, Florida has 562,410 single family homes
potentially at storm surge risk for any category of hurricane representing a reconstruction
value of $103 billion.
This study used the SLOSH model to identify the number of LIHTC located in the
bounds of storm surge from two categories of hurricanes, Category 3 at mean tide (C3M)
for an average risk and Category 5 at high tide (C5H) as a worst case scenario. Since
1987, Florida has produced 148,287 LIHTC units in 1,035 developments (Figure 5-9). In
Phase III of this study, geographic information systems (GIS) was used to analyze the
number of LIHTC located in storm surge, and specifically how LIHTC development was
dispersed as a result of the 2004 hurricane season. Identifying LIHTC placed in service
during the study period revealed location preferences of developers given the influence of
public policy. Phase I analyzed QAPs to determine stated preferences for LIHTC
development by the FHFC acting as the public agency. The public agency clearly
preferred development in coastal counties. Phase II analyzed the stated preferences of the
LIHTC development community. The results indicated that 1) low cost funding was
critical for LIHTC development, and 2) developers stated a preference for locations in
areas with less risk from the effects of hurricanes. The LIHTC database provides very
little funding data so determining the significance of funding resources for this phase
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proved impractical. Limited funding data was analyzed and discussed but additional data
sources are needed for analysis of risk and preference. This final phase of the study
allowed comparisons to be made between stated preferences and revealed preferences for
location. Phase III analyzed LIHTC development between 2004 and 2010.

Figure 5-9: LIHTC Developments 1987-2010
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In 2003, LIHTC produced 60 affordable housing developments with 13,088 units
in Florida. Seventy seven percent of them were located in coastal counties. In 2004,
another 60 developments resulted in 11,199 units. In both cases, the majority of units
were constructed in coastal communities. The 2003 and 2004 LIHTC served as the
baseline of comparison for Phase III of this study.
Coastal LIHTC Development 2004-2010
Since 2003, construction of Florida LIHTC has declined. Intervening forces
include the 2004 hurricane season followed by the Great Recession that disrupted the
financial markets between 2007 and 2009. The influence of these two events on LIHTC
development has not been analyzed. This study is more concerned with the percentage of
LIHTC constructed in hazardous areas. Phase III reveals if perceived location risk
influences where LIHTC development actually occurs during recovery. Between 2004
and 2010, a total of 44,658 LIHTC units were produced in Florida (Table 5-7). Seventyfour percent were located in coastal counties. Figure 5-10 shows where LIHTC
developments were produced during the study period. The greatest number of LIHTC
units was placed in service in 2004 and 2005, averaging just over 7,200 units each year.
On average, 3,000 units per year were placed in service in coastal counties between 2006
and 2010.
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Table 5-12: Coastal and Non-Coastal LIHTC 2004-2010
Total LIHTC Developments Placed in Service 2004 - 2010

Baseline

2009
2008
2007
2006
52
59
35
36
Total LIHTC Units Placed in Service 2004 - 2010
5534
5765
4842
5380
8677
2005
47

2003
60

2004
60

13088

11199

TOTAL
2010
25

314

3261

44658

LIHTC Developments Placed in Service 2004 - 2010 in Non-Coastal Counties
15

21

9

16

11

21

5

92

500

11663

20

222

4578

2761

32995

83%

80%

71%

83%

85%

74%

9

LIHTC Units Placed in Service 2004 - 2010 in Non-Coastal Counties
2959

3958

1466

2177

1002

1604

956

LIHTC Developments Placed in Service 2004 - 2010 in Coastal Counties
45

39

38

20

24

38

43

LIHTC Units Placed in Service 2004 - 2010 in Coastal Counties
10129

7241

7211

75%

65%

81%

77%

65%

83%

4161
3840
3203
% Developments in Coastal Counties
64%
69%
56%
% Units in Coastal Counties
72%
79%
60%
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Figure 5-10: LIHTC Developments PIS 2004-2010

In Phase II, developers stated a preference to develop LIHTC away from the coast
and hazards associated with storm surge. Coastal population in the U.S. has outpaced
inland population growth with the expectation that growth will continue for the
foreseeable future (Crowell et al, 2010). The hazards of coastal development are
documented in Chapter 1, and Phase II reiterated an understanding of the potential
hazards to LIHTC. The discussion of Phase III results begins with an analysis of the total
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number of LIHTC in each coastal county compared to the numbers of LIHTC to a C3M
and C5H storm surge on the Florida coast.
Florida UTM Zones
The Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) projection is a two dimensional
division of earth’s surface into sixty zones. The United States is divided into zones ten
through nineteen. Florida is predominantly located in Zone 17 with fifteen of its sixtyseven counties located in Zone 16 (Figure 5-11).

Figure 5-11: Florida UTM Zones
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There were 936 LIHTC developments located in UTM Zone 16 with 132,968 units.
Eight of these developments were located in storm surge boundaries impacting four
counties. Four developments were placed in service between 1987 and 1993, and two
were placed in service in 2004. The remaining two developments were placed in service
in 2007 and 2011. A total of 805 units placed in service between 1987 and 2011 are
located in the boundaries of a C5H storm surge. The minimum storm surge is 12.8 feet to
a maximum of more than 19 feet. These eight developments have been incorporated into
the overall discussion of findings within UTM Zone 17.
C3M - Category 3 Mean Tide
The greatest percentage of potential losses due to a CM3 storm surge includes
four counties recommended for housing production by HWG: Monroe, Charlotte, Collier,
and Lee (Table 5-8). Charlotte was a Tier I county included in the 2005 and 2006 QAPs.
Charlotte County has 1,481 LIHTC units and potentially faces the loss of 94% of LIHTC
housing in the county. Lee County has even more units located in a storm surge area.
While only 74% of Lee County LIHTC is located in storm surge, this equates to 2,586
potentially damaged units. Collier and Monroe counties are Tier IV counties. Monroe
County has the least number of total units but 98% of the total stock could be potentially
damaged from a CM3 storm surge.
The top five counties with the greatest number of LIHTC units in a C3M storm
surge area includes four counties preferred in the HWG report and one or both 2005 and
2006 QAPs. Miami-Dade is most at risk with 8,137 units located in a C3M storm surge
boundary. Collier County followed with 3,532 units at risk. Hillsborough and Lee
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Counties have just over 2,500 LIHTC units in each county subject to damages from a
C3M storm surge. Charlotte County is at risk for fewer units, but the 1,399 units at risk
are 94% of the total LIHTC stock in the county (Figure 5-13).
A 2014 market update for LIHTC properties suggested that the value of a single
LIHTC unit in the Southeast averaged $41,000 per unit (Tax Credit Group, 2014). In
2013, this same reporting agency analyzed the sales of 48 LIHTC properties in the
Southeast with a median sales price of $34,700 per unit. Based on this limited analysis,
the average of the reported per unit values, or $37,850, was used to conservatively
estimate the potential losses from each storm category. A future study could result in a
more reliable per unit value for a better estimate of potential damages. For this study, the
average value of $37,850 is sufficient to demonstrate risk.
The total value of all Florida LIHTC located within a Category 3 storm surge area
is $988 million. Miami-Dade accounts for over 30% of total damages potentially costing
the county and industry more than $307 million (Figure 5-14). Three counties
represented in HWG tiers and the 2005/2006 QAPs have no units at risk in a C3M storm
surge. These counties are Brevard, Escambia, and Santa Rosa. Combined, these three
coastal counties have 4,504 LIHTC units.
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Figure 5-12: Category 3 Storm Surge
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Figure 5-13: LIHTC in Category 3 Storm Surge
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Table 5-13: Estimated Damages to LIHTC in C3M Storm Surge
Storm Surge
County Identifiers

C3M

FIPS

State/County

Min

Max

12
86
21
57
71
15
103
31
11
127
87
115
99
61
101
89
111
81
17
5
53
35
109
37
19
75
9
33
91
113
45
129
TOTAL

Florida
Miami-Dade
Collier
Hillsborough
Lee
Charlotte
Pinellas
Duval
Broward
Volusia
Monroe
Sarasota
Palm Beach
Indian River
Pasco
Nassau
St. Lucie
Manatee
Citrus
Bay
Hernando
Flagler
St. Johns
Franklin
Clay
Levy
Brevard
Escambia
Okalossa
Santa Rosa
Gulf
Wakulla

5.2
5.2
15.8
12.2
17.7
8.9
9.4
7.5
5.2
7
5.4
12.4
6.8
6.7
17.2
11.8
5.2
10.6
18.2
7.9
20.1
13.5
13.8
15.9
5.7
21.7

23.3
12.8
17.4
19.3
20.4
20.4
17.1
12.2
6.3
11.8
9.7
17.9
6.8
12.1
19.5
14.2
5.2
10.6
23.3
7.9
20.1
13.5
13.8
18.2
5.7
21.7

# of LIHTC
Total # of
# of LIHTC
Develop
LIHTC
Units in SS
ments
Units
191
57
19
20
15
7
11
7
7
7
10
7
5
2
2
2
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
2
1
1

191

182

26,111
8137
3532
2591
2586
1399
1373
1298
971
940
612
424
319
303
296
189
182
176
170
160
128
100
88
55
53
32

26,114

143,409
23048
4059
12456
3472
1481
2890
9677
9370
4036
625
1069
8388
2366
1429
537
2264
2332
458
1142
878
314
989
85
877
221
2882
1410
460
212
111
34
99,572

% of
Potential
Loss by
County

Estimated Value of
Potential Damages

C3M

C3M

18%
35%
87%
21%
74%
94%
48%
13%
10%
23%
98%
40%
4%
13%
21%
35%
8%
8%
37%
14%
15%
32%
9%
65%
6%
14%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

988,301,350
307,985,450
133,686,200
98,069,350
97,880,100
52,952,150
51,968,050
49,129,300
36,752,350
35,579,000
23,164,200
16,048,400
12,074,150
11,468,550
11,203,600
7,153,650
6,888,700
6,661,600
6,434,500
6,056,000
4,844,800
3,785,000
3,330,800
2,081,750
2,006,050
1,211,200
988,414,900

Figure 5-14: Value of LIHTC in Category 3 Storm Surge
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C5H - Category 5 High Tide
A worst case scenario was applied to compare with an average Category 3 storm
(Figure 5-15 and Figure 5-16). Fifteen counties have the potential for damage to more
than 50% of LIHTC housing stock in the event of a C5H storm. Six of these counties
were recommended for housing production by HWG. The top five counties for
percentage of losses are at risk of losing more than 94% or more of LIHTC stock.
Charlotte, a Tier I county, and Wakulla counties could potentially see all LIHTC housing
stock damaged or destroyed by a Category 5 storm.
The top five counties with the greatest number of LIHTC units in a C5H storm
surge area includes three counties preferred in the HWG report in one or both 2005 and
2006 QAPs (Table 5-9). Nearly half of LIHTC in Miami-Dade is at risk with 12,833
units located in a C5H storm surge boundary. Broward County could potentially face
damages to 83% of its LIHTC stock with 9,370 units at risk. Hillsborough, Collier and
Duval counties have a combined 10,853 LIHTC units subject to damages from a C5H
storm surge. Collier County is at risk for 87% of LIHTC units located in the county and
could see potential damages to more than 3,500 household units.
Based on the two year average value from the Tax Credit Group sales analysis of
LHTC properties in the southeast, the same estimated value of $37,850 was applied to
potential damages in the C5H analysis. The total value of all Florida LIHTC located
within a Category 5 storm surge area is $1.8 billion. As in the C3M analysis, MiamiDade accounted for the highest potential damage costs exceeding $485 million. Three
counties represented in HWG tiers or the 2005/2006 QAPs have units at risk in a C5H
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storm surge. Miami-Dade and Broward represent two HWG tiers and have the highest
potential damage costs (Figure 5-17). Every coastal county analyzed faces some
potential for damages from a Category 5 storm. Wakulla County is among those with the
least potential dollar value of damages. Wakulla has one LIHTC development with 34
units. Even this small county faces damages to all of its LIHTC units at a potential cost
of more than $1.2 million.
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Figure 5-15: Category 5 Storm Surge

186

Figure 5-16: LIHTC in Category 5 Storm Surge
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Table 5-14: Estimated Damages to LIHTC in C5H Storm Surge
Storm Surge
County Identifiers

C5H

FIPS

State/County

Min

Max

12
86
11
57
21
31
71
127
103
81
15
61
9
115
101
33
87
89
99
53
5
19
111
17
35
109
45
37
91
113
129
75
TOTAL

Florida
Miami-Dade
Broward
Hillsborough
Collier
Duval
Lee
Volusia
Pinellas
Manatee
Charlotte
Indian River
Brevard
Sarasota
Pasco
Escambia
Monroe
Nassau
Palm Beach
Hernando
Bay
Clay
St. Lucie
Citrus
Flagler
St. Johns
Gulf
Franklin
Okalossa
Santa Rosa
Wakulla
Levy

4.2
4.2
5.5
20.8
23.6
14.5
26.3
17
16.7
17.8
14.5
15.5
20.7
14.7
24.1
19.3
9.7
22.4
12.2
30.1
12.8
14.6
8.2
32.7
20.1
24.1
14.9
22.4
17.3*
18.9
31.1
36.8

37.9
19.5
13.1
32.6
28.5
24.5
34.8
25.5
26.4
27.5
32.1
20
24.7
31.9
29
19.7
14.4
23.3
12.2
32.9
13.5
15.6
8.9
37.9
24.4
24.2
15.2
31.5
17.3
18.9
35.2
36.8

# of
# of
Total # of
LIHTC
LIHTC
LIHTC
Develop Units in
Units
ments
SS
343
48,014 143,409
99
12,833
23048
46
7784
9370
25
3875
12456
19
3532
4059
19
3445
9677
18
3270
3472
12
2149
4036
14
1995
2890
13
1789
2332
8
1481
1481
6
1085
2366
6
913
2882
12
880
1069
5
769
1429
2*
667
1410
10
612
625
5
320
537
5
319
8388
2
318
878
3
307
1142
2
211
877
2
182
2264
3
170
458
2
142
314
2
100
989
3
88
111
2
55
85
1
50
460
1
46
212
1
34
34
1
32
221
347
49453
99572
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% of Estimated Value
Potential of Potential
Damages to
Loss by
County LIHTC Housing
Stock
C5H

C5H

33%
56%
83%
31%
87%
36%
94%
53%
69%
77%
100%
46%
32%
82%
54%
47%
98%
60%
4%
36%
27%
24%
8%
37%
45%
10%
79%
65%
11%
22%
100%
14%

$ 1,817,329,900
$ 485,729,050
$ 294,624,400
$ 146,668,750
$ 133,686,200
$ 130,393,250
$ 123,769,500
$ 81,339,650
$ 75,510,750
$ 67,713,650
$ 56,055,850
$ 41,067,250
$ 34,557,050
$ 33,308,000
$ 29,106,650
$ 25,245,950
$ 23,164,200
$ 12,112,000
$ 12,074,150
$ 12,036,300
$ 11,619,950
$
7,986,350
$
6,888,700
$
6,434,500
$
5,374,700
$
3,785,000
$
3,330,800
$
2,081,750
$
1,892,500
$
1,741,100
$
1,286,900
$
1,211,200
$ 1,871,796,050

Figure 5-17: Value of LIHTC in Category 5 Storm Surge
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LIHTC Coastal and Non-Coastal Development Trends 2004-2010
A trend line was applied to LIHTC units developed between 2004 and 2010
(Figure 5-18). Overall LIHTC development declined during the study period. Coastal
LIHTC outpaced units developed in inland counties. Development in inland counties
remained fairly steady while coastal development closely followed the overall
development trend. A significant decrease in LIHTC development occurred before the
onset of the economic downturn in 2007. This observation could have been influenced
by broader economic trends that were not tested for this study, but could be considered in
any future research. The subsequent decline in housing markets affected LIHTC because
tax credits are used to offset income from profits. Investors saw steep declines in income
and the decline in value of tax credits by 2008, having a negative impact on the amount
of capital available for the program (Harig-Blaine, 2011). Non-coastal county LIHTC
development has remained consistent since 2006.
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Figure 5-18: LIHTC Development Trends 2004-2010

A trend line was then applied only to coastal LIHTC development from 2004 to 2010
(Figure 5-19). Since 2004, coastal LIHTC development has declined while the number
of units at risk of a C5H storm surge has increased. Units in a C3M storm surge showed
a marked decrease between 2004 and 2006 remaining steady through 2010. As coastal
LIHTC development has declined, units in the most hazardous areas have increased.
Since 2006, developments in C3M and C5H storm surges have remained relatively stable
with a slight dip in C5H development since 2009. As a percentage, LIHTC development
on the coast appears to be increasing in high hazard areas.
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Figure 5-19: LIHTC Coastal Development

192

A GIS Analysis of LIHTC Funding
An analysis of funding resources was completed using the statistical analysis
features of GIS. The HUD database indicated that LIHTC producers used tax exempt
bonds more often than any other subsidy, over 31% of the time between 1987 and 2012.
HOME funds were reportedly used 5% of the time and CDBG was used only one percent.
These percentages have little to no significance because of underreporting in these
database categories. CDBG was not reported 81% of the time. HOME funds were
unreported 77% of the time. More than $18 million in HOME funds were allocated for
24 projects in 25 years of LIHTC.
Total allocations for both programs were analyzed. In 2003, no allocations were
reported, and only minimal reporting was given from 2004 to 2007. The final three years
of the study period had more extensive reporting of funding data and will be discussed.
The total allocations for CDBG and HOME ranged from a high of nearly $63 million in
2009 to a low of $29 million in 2010. Coastal counties received the greatest share of
these funds. In 2008, 74% of CDBG and HOME funds were applied to coastal
developments. This percentage increased to 90% in 2009 and exceeded even that in 2010
(Table 5-10). These figures are inconclusive and provide nothing more than anecdotal
observations however they do indicate some support for HOME and CDBG based on the
stated preferences of developers from Phase II of the study.
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Table 5-15: LIHTC Allocations 2003-2010
2003 1
2004 2
2005 2
2006 2
Year
Total CC
Developments
45
37
38
20
Total Allocation
0
$ 1,116,080 $ 6,875,524 $ 30,165,146 $
Allocation in CC
0
$ 1,116,080 $ 6,012,471 $ 17,079,080 $
% Difference
100%
87%
57%
Source: Department of Housing and Urban Development LIHTC Database
Notes:

1
2

2007 2

2008

2009

2010

24
29,374,556 $
21,262,413 $
72%

38
53,938,578 $
39,650,149 $
74%

43
62,639,332 $
56,236,336 $
90%

20
29,648,708
27,676,258
93%

Allocations were not reported in 2003
Allocation inputs for 2004-2007 were incomplete

The Human Factor
The results of this study focus primarily on developer risks and decision-making
related to LIHTC development during disaster recovery. One cannot discount the human
factor. Residents in LIHTC subject to storm surge are subject to risk too. According to
the U.S. Census Bureau, household size in Florida averages 2.61 persons per unit. The
number of people displaced in the state from a Category 5 storm during high tide could
affect more than 125,000 people. Charlotte County could face the loss of every LIHTC
unit due to storm surge, impacting 3,873 low- and working-class households in the
county. Large counties like Miami-Dade and Broward face large scale population
displacement. Working class households living in Miami-Dade County would be
devastated with more than 20,000 potential displaced by a Category 3 storm and over
30,000 could be displaced should a Category 5 storm hit the area. A Category 3
hurricane in Broward County should have minimal impact, affecting 2,500 households.
If a Category 5 hurricane hits Broward, that number increases exponentially to over
20,000. Additional studies can identify the extent of human risk associated with select
counties at all hurricane category levels.
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SUMMARY
Miami-Dade had the greatest number of LIHTC located in the boundaries of a
potential storm surge. There are 23,048 LIHTC units within the county and 35% of them
are located within a C3M storm. Over half, 12,833 units, are at risk of storm surge in the
worst case scenario of a C5H storm hitting the Miami coast. The next area most at risk
was Broward County with 7,784 LIHTC units located in storm surge boundary. While
only 10% of Broward’s LIHTC units were at risk from a C3M, in a C5H worst case
scenario, more than 83% of LIHTC in the county are at risk of incurring damages.
The total LIHTC at risk in a C5H storm is more than $1.8 billion. A Category 5
storm could conceivably wipe out LIHTC units in Charlotte, Gulf, and Wiculla counties.
Even a Category 3 storm would place a significant burden on affordable housing in
Charlotte County with as many as 94% of LIHTC located within storm surge boundaries
of between 9 and 20 feet. Miami-Dade poses the greatest risk of loss to the state even
though only 35% of units are at risk in a C3M storm and 56% of units are at risk in a
C5H storm surge. A Category 3 storm could potentially cost more than $307 million for
reconstruction assuming all LIHTC units within the boundaries of the storm surge were
damaged. In a worst case scenario, a conservative estimate of $485 million is at stake for
LIHTC properties for Miami-Dade alone. Monroe County includes the Florida Keys.
Phase I identified Florida Keys was a preferred location in each of the QAPs analyzed.
Ninety eight percent of LIHTC is at risk from either storm category in Monroe County
with potential loses of over $23 million.
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The revealed preferences of LIHTC developers identified using GIS indicates that
developers continue to develop a higher number of units on the coast. Coastal
development is driven by population, which is higher in densely populated coastal areas.
LIHTC developers stated a preference for less risky coastal development, a sentiment that
was diminished by policy preferences for coastal development. Ultimately, coastal
LIHTC development from 2004 to 2010 outweighed the potential risks associated with a
hazardous coast.
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Chapter 6
UNDERSTANDING DIVERGENT RISKS

LIHTC DEVELOPMENT AFTER THE 2004 HURRICANE SEASON
The purpose of this study was to identify LIHTC risk during disaster recovery.
The overriding force guiding this research was to understand how perceived risk from
disaster influenced development decisions. The case study approach was the perfect
platform for conducting a robust investigation of public discourse, profitability, and
affordable housing supply. The practicality of the study offers implications for
affordable housing policy in the context of disaster and the broader impact of climate
change. The study ultimately confirmed a conflict between the human systems we have
created and the natural systems we must adapt to, particularly in the face of sea level rise
and storm surge.
Policies that drive LIHTC housing production also drive thousands of low-income
people into high hazard areas creating additional risk to those individuals, private owners,
and government at the federal, state and local levels. Quantitatively, the numbers speak
for themselves. More than 48,000 LIHTC households in Florida are at risk from storm
surge. Given that Florida averages 2.6 persons per household, this means that
approximately 125,315 people live in LIHTC properties that are susceptible to storm
surge from a Category 5 storm. Owners of LIHTC also face hazards related to hurricane
disaster. Over 340 developments are located in storm surge hazard areas with potential
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flooding in a range from 4.2 to 37.9 feet suggesting that potential damage could be
significant.
This study undertook LIHTC risk from a social constructivist paradigm that
reflects the experience and expertise of multiple stakeholders. Figure 6-1 provides a
comparison of the findings from the three phases of this research. Phases I and III built a
foundation of thought for this study by identifying preferences from the public agency
and verification of development outcomes for LIHTC. Phase II provided the social
context. During this phase, developers said they need more resources, less regulation,
more flexibility, and preferred to avoid location risk associated with storm surge. They
also prefer subsidies that allow them to be profitable. Stated preferences reveal that
developers understand risks associated with coastal development, and given the
appropriate incentives, they would avoid hazardous areas, including areas subject to
storm surge. The fervor of the discussion, however, stems from the qualitative feedback
that shows an awareness of unsustainable policies that ameliorate housing problems but
also create unintended, risky consequences. It is interesting to note, however, that in
spite of the individual stated preferences indicating this awareness, preferences revealed
in the GIS analysis indicate that developers most often developed in hazardous coastal
areas more often than not.

Additional research is needed to differentiate the effects of

policy and market forces that influence LIHTC development decisions.
This study recognizes the risks to people who live in LIHTC units subject to
storm surge hazards by identifying the number of people at risk in Category 3 and
Category 5 hurricanes. Others have identified those groups most at risk within the
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characteristics related to economic, gender, race, and age (Cutter and Emrich, 2006;
Fothergill and Peek, 2004). These are among the households that rely on the affordable
rents available through the LIHTC program. Many of the solutions provided in the
context of this research address the LIHTC industry specifically as well as steps that can
be taken to protect those households living in LIHTC situated in storm surge boundaries.

6-1: Comparison of Phases I, II and III
Total LIHTC Units 2004-2010
Total Non-Coastal
Total Coastal
Total QAP 2005 (Counties)
Total QAP 2006 (Counties)
Total HWG
Tier I
Tier II
Tier III
Tier IV

No of Units % of Total
11663
26%
32995
74%
4818
11%
11253
25%
4874
5052
2256
20052

11%
11%
5%
45%

This purpose of this chapter is to present some concluding thoughts and
recommendations for stakeholders of affordable housing in general, and specifically for
disaster recovery.
A BRIEF REVIEW
In Chapter 2, the concept of risk as a social science was introduced. According to
Bradbury (1989), this is where cooperative decision-making occurs. The affordable
housing literature amplifies the voices of the low and moderate income population. We
know that people who suffer in poverty suffer more during disaster recovery. We know
that housing cost burdens plague owners and renters alike regardless of income. We are
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aware that nearly 35% of households are renters, and many of these spend more than half
their income on rent (JCHS, 2013). Over 12% of the population lives in multifamily
housing. Less than 15% of these developments are funded using the LIHTC. Even
though most LIHTC households have higher incomes relative to those in other subsidized
housing, nearly half the tenants have extremely low incomes and pay more than 30% of
their income on rent. In spite of a developer’s ability to acquire additional incentives for
development, the program does little to offset cost burdens for most households.
Disaster exacerbates affordability, especially when affordable housing shortages
existed prior to a disaster event (Comerio, 1997; Levine et al, 2007; Reece et al, 2011).
Recovery is well understood to perpetuate rental housing shortages as redevelopment
brings an influx of workers. Development costs increase when land, labor and material
are in greater demand. Redevelopment brings the promise of a better community with
better technology. However, limited resources require that choices must be made.
Affordable housing advocates argue that poverty solutions, such as HOPE VI and mixed
income development, fail to provide sufficient quantities of affordable housing (Geotz,
2004; McCarthy and Hanson, 2008; Unity, 2010). Others point to private market
solutions, such as vouchers, to suggest otherwise (Vuk, 2008). LIHTC has faced
criticism for its failure to provide housing for extremely low income households in
general and during disaster recovery (Hooks and Miller, 2006). This study began by
recognizing the inability of multifamily owners to bring affordable properties online and
sought to ask the question ‘why’. The following sections discuss these questions and the
broader implications of the study on the industry, policy, and disaster theory.
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The framework identified multiple stakeholders from four areas: housing
producers (LIHTC for this study), advocacy groups speaking for tenants and low-income
households, public policy identified through QAP analysis, and the merging of housing
policy and disaster recovery in the wake of the 2004 hurricane season in Florida. The
following sets of questions were selected to guide the research:
1) How do LIHTC developers perceive disaster risk? What risk variables have the
greatest influence on development decisions?
2) What are the differences in risk perception between for-profit and non-profit
LIHTC providers? How do these differences impact the location of low-income
multi-family housing within the LIHTC program?
3) Where are LIHTC developments located over the disaster recovery period? Do
LIHTC developers avoid areas that experience the greatest impact from the
disaster event?
Additional research is needed to identify differences in risk perception between for profit
and non-profit LIHTC providers. This study was unable to differentiate development
patterns between non-profit and for profit entities. Developers from both business
models are encouraged to partner for affordable housing production. The study did,
however, provide ample evidence to address how risk perception affects development and
the role of policy for influencing location decisions.
The literature provides examples of how policies implemented during disaster
assist homeowners over renters and economic redevelopment over affordable housing.
Most policies work in favor of business and homeowners, neglecting the needs of
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apartment owners who can scarcely take on more debt to repair and rebuild. During
recovery, policies tend to address areas with the greatest number of housing damages.
Greater attention to storm surge areas could address the unintended consequences of
producing replacement LIHTC housing in vulnerable areas.
This research proposes solutions within public choice theory and a social
constructivist framework based on the individual experience and knowledge of LIHTC
developers. Recommendations have been provided for the industry and government at
federal, state and local levels that incorporate findings from this study. Inputs from
stakeholders inform the social frame from which low risk, mutually beneficial
recommendations are formed. This study relied on the literature for contributions to the
social frame and identified specific areas of concern from the Florida LIHTC community.
IDENTIFYING LIHTC RISK
This research revealed that LIHTC professionals are well aware that the cost of
affordable multifamily housing production is out of balance with project feasibility
without additional incentives for development. Disaster exacerbates this condition. The
LIHTC program is subject to typical development risks as well as risks specific to the
LIHTC industry. Real estate development and LIHTC risks are discussed in more detail
in Chapter 2. This study looked beyond these typical development risks to ask how
LIHTC developers perceive recovery risk after a hurricane disaster.
Categorizing risk using a modified STEEP analysis identified the importance of
technical risks characterized by those factors that affect real estate performance measures.
Internal rates of return, costs, and rent are easily identifiable risks with benchmarks
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established well before construction begins. Risks associated with LIHTC dictate that
management be especially diligent in maintaining the contracted tenant affordability ratio
while staying profitable amidst tight margins (O’Regan and Quigley, 2013; Schwartz,
2010). Experienced management is essential for managing performance risk. The most
significant risk criteria identified in this study were economic, described as funding
sources (or subsidies) emanating from government policy. Policies that increase equity
and reduce debt create the greatest risks when regulations are volatile, either from
changes in government or political opinion. Administering agencies can also increase
risks when frequent policy changes are made. Green and Olhshansky (2011) and Gotham
and Greenberg (2008) described how agency volatility reduced the effectiveness of
programs negatively impacting those who were supposed to benefit. Effective and stable
government boosts developer confidence but overreach and deep regulations increase risk
to profitability. This research does not include measurements of the level of risk that
reduces participation because the LIHTC program often has more applications than
available funding. What the study does expose are the social constructs that guide
LIHTC decision-making. This study demonstrates a framework for the social paradoxes
existing between business, people, and institutions. Policies drive action. Available
subsidies are distributed based on annual policies that encourage or give preference to
coastal development driving LIHTC development in potentially hazardous areas, in spite
of risk. Future research is needed to determine if risk can be mitigated by directing
subsidies to development in less hazardous areas.
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Government regulation can increase pre-construction costs making profit
feasibility challenging. High hazard states, like Florida, use regulatory procedures to
enforce building codes and land use to mitigate damages from natural hazards.
Mitigation techniques include zoning, flood zone regulations, and building codes.
Policies that permit construction in high hazard zones, such as in storm surge boundaries,
can potentially cause catastrophic damages. Environmental hazards are often
disregarded, most likely because increasing populations place demands on policy makers
to secure affordable housing. Developers will continue to build in hazardous areas if
public policy and funding mechanisms subsidize it. County government can mitigate
development in high hazard areas by including public access to site characteristics that
include storm surge vulnerability much in the same way that flood zone mapping is
provided at the county level.
Chapter 5 identified studies of storm surge effects for specific areas (Fritz, 2008)
and applying values to estimate potential losses (CoreLogic, 2011). Policies to reduce
the number of units constructed within storm surge areas have yet to be implemented
through local planning. Funding subsidies are among the top risks that influences LIHTC
development. The funding subsidy is relevant to the production of affordable housing in
general. No evidence was found to suggest a greater reliance on funding subsidies during
disaster recovery than at any other time even though disaster does create additional
burdens on available resources. LIHTC developers require funding subsidies for
housing, so risk can be addressed with mitigation or adaptation measures supported
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through existing funding sources, such as hazard mitigation grants and low cost disaster
loans.
Funding LIHTC
Funding subsidy sources include tax credits, block grants, and special financing
often used in conjunction with some traditional financing. Developers stated a preference
for additional subsidy allocations from existing programs. This could be in part because
of past volatility experiences or reports of program deficiencies by others. LIHTC
developers prefer Supplemental LIHTC over all other funding subsidy sources followed
by HOME funds and CDBG. Data collection fields in the LIHTC database for HOME
and CDBG programs were blank more than two-thirds of the time. A more concerted
effort is needed at the state and federal level to collect and report accurate sources of
public subsidies for LIHTC. Federal and state policymakers also need to address funding
needed to produce adequate numbers of affordable housing units, particularly during
disaster recovery.
Location Preferences
Low Income Housing Tax Credit developments are predominantly located on the
coast in Florida. Even in the immediate aftermath of disaster, coastal development
outpaced LIHTC development in interior counties. Given that Florida is facing hazards
caused by climate change, such as sea level rise and extreme hurricane effects, policies
could be more proactive in mitigating development in coastal areas. LIHTC developers
understand the implications of coastal development. This study established that LIHTC
is dependent on resources established in public policy despite developer understanding of
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potential hazards. Developers from this study were very clear. Locations near the coast
are less desirable, therefore more risky, than locations further from coastal hazards.

Yet

developers construct LIHTC in high risk locations. Intervening causes could include
population, income potential, demand or other factors that have not been developed or
analyzed here. LIHTC developers specifically expressed a preference for development
away from storm surge hazards. LIHTC in storm surge is at greater risk than LIHTC
developed inland; yet LIHTC exists in identifiable storm surge areas. Technology is
available to identify potential storm surge. Similar to regulations that inhibit
development in flood zones, policy can require multifamily housing be developed in
areas with low risk of a storm surge hazard. The high cost of flood insurance also signals
that developers find sites in less vulnerable locations. In spite of the cost of insurance
and associated risks, developers continue to locate the majority of LIHTC in coastal
areas. Insurance costs will be absorbed until profitability is affected. Policy can curtail
cost and location risk by encouraging sustainable safe LIHTC development. Storm surge
risk reduction can be implemented with QAP guidelines and facilitated through local
planning departments and public GIS systems at the county level. Even though LIHTC
developers indicated the high cost of insurance and slow insurance payouts as a deterrent
to sufficient affordable housing production, flood insurance is essential for properties at
high risk of storm surge.
This study does not presume to be a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis, but does
attempt to place an estimate of value on LIHTC at risk. Over $123 million was allocated
for coastal LIHTC from 2008 to 2010 accounting for 85% of total allocations across the
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state. The estimated value of coastal LIHTC within a Category 3 storm surge is more
than $900 million. A Category 5 storm puts nearly $2 billion in LIHTC at risk. Either
one of these events has the potential to wipe out taxpayer supported affordable housing
investment. It would seem that implementing a system to identify storm surge properties
is a cost effective policy that could effectively reduce potential damages during disaster
benefiting property owners, taxpayers, insurance companies, and tenants. Future studies
are needed for a more robust valuation of LIHTC units.
In summary, developers stated a preference for development on non-hazardous
sites but Phase III results revealed the majority of LIHTC continue to be developed on
the coast. Population growth is a major driver for coastal development, so it is inevitable
that more LIHTC or other affordable housing will be needed in coastal counties. Policy
drives development, which means it will be up to policymakers at all levels of
government to control development in hazardous storm surge areas.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The findings of this research suggest that policy drives LIHTC development.
Market forces also influence where LIHTC development is needed due to economic
development and coastal population trends. Coastal population is expected to continue in
an upward growth for the foreseeable future which means that policy and market forces
are likely to support LIHTC growth in hazardous coastal communities. Potential costs
for at risk development suggest that an assessment should be undertaken to identify
solutions to mitigate risks for public and private interests. As more is learned about the
impact of climate change on coastal systems, it has become obvious that a concerted
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effort should be made to identify risks and adopt policies for adaptation and risk
reduction techniques. Studies for adaptation and mitigation come primarily from the
climate change literature. For the most part, the literature is largely conceptual.
However recent studies are beginning to identify specific techniques and policy ideas.
Disaster risk reduction is defined by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk
Reduction (UNISDR) as “the conceptual framework of elements considered with the
possibilities to minimize vulnerabilities and disaster risks throughout a society, to avoid
(prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of hazards,
within the broad context of sustainable development.” Risk reduction identified in this
study includes development in low hazard areas, low cost grants and loans for
production, and additional tax credits to aid in production. Policy measures can be tied to
these programs to implement adaptation and mitigation techniques for existing and new
LIHTC development.
According to the Stockholm Environment Institute, adaptation is an ongoing,
reiterative six stage process that includes “information development, awareness raising,
planning, design, implementation, and monitoring” (Dougherty and Fencl, 2008, p. 38).
Adaptation is “anything that reduces the negative effects of climate change” including
minimizing exposure (Langis, 2013 quoting Warren and Egginton, 2008, p. 6).
Adaptation and risk reduction are methods toward resiliency (Hamin and Gurran, 2009).
Tol et al. (2008) define adaptation as “the planned or unplanned, reactive or
anticipatory, successful or unsuccessful response of a system to a change in its
environment” (p. 432).
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Adaptation has evolved from the initial idea that mitigation would be sufficient to
curtail the impact of climate change. Early literature focused on hard- and soft- structural
techniques such as barricades and seawalls, beach nourishment, and strategic retreat
(London and Volonté, 1991). Klein et al (1999) stressed the importance of coastal
adaptation through an iterative four-step process that includes data collection and raising
awareness, identifying planning and design strategies, implementation, and monitoring
and evaluation. The first decade of 2000 saw increased calls for using technology to
educate multiple stakeholders about the need to reduce coastal vulnerability to the effects
of climate change (Klein et al, 2001; Adger et al, 2005). Since then more attention has
been given to the benefit of regional cooperation and identifying specific techniques for
adaptation and risk reduction. Specific tools to enhance resilience include taking action
at local and regional scales and avoid incentives that increase hazardous conditions
(Adger et al., 2005). Jacob, Gornitz and Rosenzweig (2007) identified structural and
non-structural solutions to reduce risk. Structural solutions such as constructing artificial
barriers and other physical defenses continue to be put forward. Non-structural solutions
involve policy initiatives to curtail growth in hazardous sites. Some of these solutions
address impending sea-level rise, but are also useful for reducing risk associated coastal
hazards in general. The remainder of this chapter will offer recommendations stemming
from this study to address risks for existing and proposed LIHTC development.
ADDRESSING LIHTC FUNDING AND STORM SURGE HAZARDS
This study suggested that policy influences development decisions. Policy will be
the driving force to mitigate hazardous effects with adaptation and risk reduction
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techniques. Technical guidelines presented by the IPCC have been accused of providing
little usable information for policy makers, questioning the capacity to adapt given
available resources and political will (Carter, et al, 1994). Tol et al. (2008) suggest that
vulnerability is determined by the capacity to adapt (p.434). Options for adaptation are of
little consequence if the capacity to employ them is out of reach. Recommendations for
adaptive and risk reduction measures resulting from this study attempt to be cognizant of
the adaptive capacity for implementation specific to industry, and policies at local, state,
and federal levels.
LIHTC Risk Reduction - Industry
The LIHTC industry has a responsibility to identify and promote strategies to
reduce risk for existing building stock and mitigate risk for future development. In the
case of LIHTC, there is also the human factor and responsibility for those being served
under the program. This study identified stated preferences of LIHTC professionals
acknowledging location risk relative to the coast and storm surge. Revealed preferences
identified a significant number of LIHTC units in storm surge areas. Three steps are
recommended at the industry level to address LIHTC risk reduction:
1) Identify LIHTC inventory situated in storm surge boundaries in order to
determine existing risk.
2) Mitigate potential damages by purchasing flood insurance for existing properties
located in storm surge areas.
3) Analyze proposed sites for storm surge hazards during the pre-construction phase
of development.
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These three steps require the industry to take proactive steps to insure LIHTC
developments are located in areas less vulnerable to flooding associated with storm surge.
Identifying risk for existing units provides an opportunity to take steps to reduce future
risks from storm surge.
LIHTC Risk Reduction - Local Government
Local government is a frontline warrior against the impact of climate change and
the threat of coastal hazards. It is this level of government that faces the immediate threat
to its population and existing development. Policy measures and adequate enforcement
from local government are essential for implementing actions that support risk reduction.
Three recommendations for risk reduction from local government include:
1) Provide public access to storm surge models in county geographic information
systems.
2) When considering approval for a local LIHTC development, require that the
extent of storm surge hazard related to the proposed site be identified.
3) Develop inter-agency policies addressing site risk of developments within storm
surge areas.
As stated in Chapter 3, local government is required to approve a specific LIHTC
development before an application is filed with the housing authority. This places some
responsibility for hazard mitigation in the lap of local government. County-level
agencies, including planning and emergency management, should be consulted for policy
development that determine acceptable risk for proposed LIHTC multifamily housing
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within storm surge areas. Absent such policies, public access to potential storm surge
mapping resources will allow LIHTC developers and others to identify and mitigate risks
for internal decision-making.
LIHTC Risk Reduction - State Government
State government works as a conduit for services and funding between federal and
local governments. It is at this level of government that funding is identified and
distributed. Unlike local government, state measures can act with regional and federal
stakeholders to adopt broader measures to produce adequate numbers of LIHTC in safe
locations. Recommendations for state government include:
1) Adopt funding restrictions that discourage development of LIHTC in storm
surge areas.
2) Create disaster bonds targeted for LIHTC as an additional subsidy for LIHTC
development in non-hazardous areas.
LIHTC Risk Reduction - Federal Government
The federal government has relinquished much of its capacity for action to the
state level in recent years. However there are some significant public policy actions that
can support state and local efforts to mitigate coastal hazard risks while still supporting
affordable housing production.
1) Target disaster grants and mitigation grants to LIHTC during disaster
recovery as additional support for new development in areas not subject to
storm surge hazards.
2) Increase access to funding using grants or supplemental tax credits that
will support efforts by the affordable housing industry to improve
resilience for existing developments.
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CONTRIBUTION TO DISCOURSE IN DISASTER THEORY
Disaster theory seeks to understand decision-making and preferences in the
context of disaster. As stated in Chapter 2, political and social pressures require quick
action while integrating lessons learned from past experience. Complexity exists because
limited resources are shared among multiple disciplines competing for attention based on
political will and community needs. Affordable housing is just one of the many
disciplines that contribute to this emerging theory. The findings from this study point to
the significance of policy in decision-making for private production of affordable
multifamily housing. This research builds on other studies that have revealed how
housing recovery takes place in the aftermath of disaster by focusing specifically on the
LIHTC program.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In order to gain a more thorough understanding of the risk associated with LIHTC
during disaster recovery along the coast it is recommended that future research identify
the extent of LIHTC units within all categories of storm surge. Additional research is
needed to determine the per unit value of LIHTC units. Current valuation studies are
formulated from national sales through private companies, only one of which was utilized
in this work (Tax Credit Group, 2014). A more robust study of LIHTC valuations is
needed to understand the scope of potential losses at local, state, regional and national
levels.
The study of LIHTC and disaster could also benefit from an expansion of the
survey used in this study after some modifications. While surveys could be conducted on
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a state by state basis, this practice is impractical because of the number of national
companies participating in the field. The survey used in this study is not designed for
other disaster types. Any future survey should focus on disaster recovery associated with
hurricanes in coastal states.
This study did little to identify similarities and differences between for profit and
non-profit LIHTC producers. Additional research can utilize the methods from this study
to identify how for-profit and non-profit companies are influenced by risk in their
development decisions. In the future, the survey can be revised to allow for cross
tabulations between for-profit and non-profit LIHTC. Statistical analysis using GIS also
has the capability of categorizing risk by for-profit and non-profit entities. These steps
are important to understand how business structure affects risk taking and if partnerships
between the two types of entities results in less risk to LIHTC units and the households
that inhabit them.
CONCLUSION
This study was built from a concern for the failure of disaster recovery to solve
affordable housing problems during disaster recovery. Disaster recovery is a
redevelopment opportunity that incorporates competing needs given available resources.
Unfortunately, just as renters fall behind homeowners in disaster assistance, affordable
multifamily housing owners also find it difficult to obtain sufficient funding to participate
fully in recovery. This study focused specifically on the LIHTC industry which faces
fewer barriers to recovery, but is influenced by policy. Policy drives the LIHTC industry
by driving competition through limiting tax credits available at the federal level. State
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and local level preferences impact funding and location. LIHTC producers are well
informed of coastal risks and have indicated a preference to avoid hazardous conditions.
LIHTC placed in service between 2004 and 2010 are predominantly in coastal areas in
Florida, and some developments are located within hazardous storm surge boundaries.
The financial risks associated with these properties are significant and warrant
consideration of efforts to adapt and improve resiliency. This study specifically
identified risks for LIHTC in Florida and does not pretend to be significant to any other
coastal state. More in depth studies are needed to identify specific risks to each county
within the state. Case studies for other coastal states can begin the process of identifying
storm surge hazards affecting affordable housing of all types at local, state, and regional
levels so that adaptive management can effectively respond in case of disaster. This
study provides a foundation for policy makers, affordable housing advocates and
producers to identify and support measures that will provide sufficient numbers of
affordable housing in safer areas on the coast not only during disaster recovery, but in the
general sphere of affordable housing and coastal development.
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Appendix A
Research Survey Instrument
1 Information about Being in a Research Study
Clemson University
LIHTC Development, Disaster Recovery, and Perceptions of Risk

Introduction
This study attempts to collect information about the perception of risk during disaster
recovery for Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) developers.
Procedures
You will be asked a series of questions that will help determine how your company
makes development decisions during disaster recovery. The questionnaire consists of
approximately 18 questions and will take about 15 minutes or less. Questions are
designed to determine how you would expect to respond to development opportunities
that are typical for developers of LIHTC projects during disaster recovery. This
questionnaire is conducted with an online Qualtrics-created survey.
Risks/Discomforts
Risks are minimal for involvement in this study. However, you may feel uneasy when
asked to make judgments based on company experience.
Benefits
As a participant in this survey, you have the option to receive a summary of the
aggregated results as long as you provide your contact data. Your contact information
will be completely confidential and will only be available to the principal investigator. It
is hoped that through your participation, researchers and policy makers will learn more
about how low-income housing programs can better assist developers during disaster
recovery.
Confidentiality
All data obtained from participants will be kept confidential and will only be reported in
an aggregate format (by reporting only combined results and never reporting individual
ones). All questionnaires will be concealed, and no one other than then principal
investigator listed below will have access to them. The data collected will be stored in the
HIPPA-compliant, Qualtrics-secure database until it has been deleted by the primary
investigator.
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Compensation
There is no direct compensation for participation in this research study.
Participation
Participation in this research study is completely voluntary. You have the right to
withdraw at anytime or refuse to participate entirely without jeopardy. If you desire to
withdraw, please close your internet browser and notify the principal investigator at this
email: vhammet@clemson.edu. Or, if you prefer, inform the principal investigator by
telephone at 864-247-0600.
Questions about the Research
If you have questions or concerns about this study or if any problems arise, please contact
Dr Stephen Verderber at Clemson University at 864-656-3896, sverder@clemson.edu.
Questions about your Rights as Research Participants
If you have any questions or concerns about your rights in this research study, please
contact the Clemson University Office of Research Compliance (ORC) at 864-656-6460
or irb@clemson.edu. If you are outside of the Upstate South Carolina area, please use the
ORC's toll-free number, 866-297-3071.
Q2 I have read, understood, and printed a copy of, the above consent form. I agree to
participate in this study.
 Yes (1)
 No (2)
If No Is Selected, Then Skip To End of Survey
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Q3 When was the first time you worked on a project that utilized the LIHTC program?
(Enter the approximate year as yyyy.)

Q4 Please provide details about the ownership structure of your company. (Select one)
 Private, for-profit (1)
 Non-Profit, 501(c)3 (2)
 Non-Profit, not tax exempt (3)
 I'm not sure. (4)
If Private, for-profit Is Selected, Then Skip To What is the geographic scope of the c...

Q5 Does your company operate as a Community Development Corporation (a not-forprofit organization that is specifically incorporated to offer services, provide programs,
and engage in activities that promote and support community development)?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)
 I am not sure. (3)

Q6 What is the geographic scope of the company's LIHTC activities? (This question will
help us understand the geographical reach of the company's LIHTC development
activities. PLEASE SELECT ONE.)
 Within one county (parish or borough) (1)
 Multiple counties (parishes or boroughs) within one state (2)
 Multiple states (3)

Q7 Does your company engage in development projects that do not participate in the
LIHTC program?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)
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Q8 Does your company own LIHTC multi-family developments in a coastal county? (A
county can also include a parish or borough)
 Yes (1)
 No (2)

Q9 Has your company sustained damages to a LIHTC unit as a result of hurricane
damages? (A LIHTC unit is a single housing unit, such as a single apartment unit.)
 Yes (1)
 No (2)

Answer If Has your company sustained damages to a LIHTC unit as a r... Yes Is Selected

Q10 How many LIHTC units have been damaged as a result of a hurricane? A LIHTC
unit is a single housing unit, such as a single apartment unit. (Select one)
 1 (1)
 2 - 5 (2)
 6 - 10 (3)
 11-20 (4)
 More than 20 (5)

Q11 Development in coastal counties involves additional risk because of the natural
hazards from hurricanes. Hurricane Hugo caused extensive damage along the Atlantic
coast in 1989. More than 18,000 multi-family housing units were damaged or destroyed.
Hurricane Andrew struck the south and caused extensive housing damage in Florida and
Louisiana. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita caused damages on the Gulf
Coast displacing many low-income households. Galveston, Texas lost nearly all multifamily housing units when Hurricane Ike hit the Gulf Coast in 2008. More recently,
Hurricane Sandy hit the northeast damaging single-family and multi-family housing units
in New Jersey and New York. Each of these hurricane events became presidentially
declared disaster areas which opened access to disaster relief and funding for
reconstruction and redevelopment. The following questions are intended to evaluate the
influences your company considers when making development decisions during disaster
recovery.
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Q12 To what degree would the following general categories derail a LIHTC project
during disaster recovery? Move the slider to rank the categories by level of importance
from 0 (will definitely not derail) to 10 (would derail).
______ SOCIAL: (i.e., public sentiment, advocacy group activities) (1)
______ TECHNICAL: (i.e., Cap Rates, IRR, Income/Expenses) (2)
______ ECONOMIC: (i.e., government funding, land acquisition) (3)
______ ENVIRONMENTAL: (i.e., proximity to the coast, proximity impact areas) (4)
______ GOVERNMENT: (i.e., government priorities, program changes) (5)
Q13 During disaster recovery, LIHTC is often combined with other programs to increase
funding and encourage recovery participation. The following questions are intended to
help us understand the programs that would influence your company participation in the
recovery phase of disaster.
Q14 Given the following incentives, how likely would your company be willing to build
a LIHTC multi-family development in an impact zone that has sustained severe damage
from a hurricane disaster? An impact zone is often the area that was directly hit by the
hurricane and sustains the most physical damage from the storm.
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Q15 Please rank additional funding programs that may be combined with LIHTC that are
critical to your company's participation in the development of LIHTC multi-family
housing during disaster recovery. Move the slider to rank the program by level of
importance from 0 (not critical) to 10 (extremely critical).
______ Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) (1)
______ Supplemental LIHTC (2)
______ New Market Tax Credits (NMTC) (3)
______ HOME FUNDS (4)
______ Small Business Administration (SBA) Loans (5)
______ Physical Disaster Business Loans (6)
______ Disaster Bonds (7)
______ Federal Disaster Loans (8)
______ Federal Disaster Grants (9)
______ Road Home Small Rental Property Funding (10)
______ Mitigation Grants (11)
______ Private Insurance (12)
______ Traditional financing (13)
______ Other (14)
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Q16 When thinking about disasters, please rate the location preference for each of the
following for a potential LIHTC development. Provide a rating using the following scale
with 0 being Least Preferred to 10 being Most Preferred.
______ The available site is NEXT to a parcel that flooded in a previous storm (1)
______ An upcoming election may change disaster recovery priorities (2)
______ Site location IS in a coastal county (3)
______ Site location IS NOT in a coastal county (4)
______ A development site is within 1 to 5 miles of the coast (5)
______ A development site is between 5 and 10 miles from the coast (6)
______ A development site is more than 10 miles from the coast (7)
______ A development site is more than 25 miles from the coast (8)
______ A site location is within a storm surge boundary (9)
______ A site is not within a storm surge boundary (10)
______ There could be some flooding during a hurricane. (11)
______ There is some potential for storm surge damage during a hurricane (12)
______ Other (13)
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Q17 With all else being equal, to what degree would each of the following statements
affect your willingness to participate in a LIHTC development project during disaster
recovery? (Please rank each of the following statements along the scale of 0 to 10 using
the sliders, with 0 indicating an unwillingness to participate and 10 indicating willingness
to participate.)
______ Public sentiment is against low-income housing (1)
______ More regulations are imposed in coastal counties (2)
______ Insurance costs are higher in a coastal area (3)
______ Financing the project has unfavorable terms (4)
______ More flexible regulations in a non-coastal county (5)
______ Construction costs are rising in the recovery zones (6)
______ Land costs are higher along the coast (7)
______ Insurance costs are lower in counties that are not along the coast (8)
______ Financing the project with favorable terms (9)
______ Land costs are lower in areas away from the coast (10)
______ Construction costs are stable in the recovery zones (11)
______ Disaster relief programs are available for low-income multifamily housing (12)
______ An advocacy group supports low-income housing in a specific community (13)
______ Supplemental tax credits are available (14)
______ A non-profit organization is willing to partner with us in developing the project
(15)
______ A for-profit organization is willing to partner with us in developing the project
(16)
______ A local neighborhood group is against low-income housing (17)
______ Additional incentives are available to build in coastal counties (18)
______ Other (19)
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Q18 Thank you so much for your patience. There are only 3 questions left. These
questions are asking for your expert opinion as a stakeholder in the field of low-income
housing.
Q19 According to recent studies (Greene, 1992; Comerio et al., 1994; Finch et al., 2010)
low-income households face dislocation because there are not enough low-income
housing units constructed during disaster recovery. Why do you think this is a problem?
Q20 What suggestions would you offer to advocacy groups and community leaders to
address low-income housing needs for low-income households?
Q21 How can housing and recovery programs be improved to encourage low-income
housing development during disaster recovery?
Q22 The compiled data is strictly confidential and will be published in aggregated form.
As a participant in the survey, your company has the option of receiving a summary of
the results. Would you like to receive a summary of the results?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)

Answer If The compiled data is strictly confidential and will be pu... Yes Is Selected

Q23 You have indicated that your company would like to receive a summary of the
survey results. In order to have results forwarded to you, please complete the form below.
Your contact information is completely confidential and will only be used to deliver the
summarized results. To maintain confidentiality, your contact information will not be
matched with your survey answers.
Company Name (1)
Respondent's Name (2)
Email (3)
Date (4)

Q24 This is the end of the survey. We appreciate the information you have shared
with us. Thank you for your time.

225

Appendix B
IRB Protocol # 2013-356 Exempt Category B-2

226

REFERENCES
Adamowicz, W., Louviere, J., and Williams, M. 1994. Combining revealed and stated
preference methods for valuing environmental amenities. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 26(3), 271-292.
Alsech, D. J. 2005. Complex urban systems and extreme events: Toward a theory of
disaster recovery. Paper presented at the 1st International Conference of Urban
Disaster Reduction, Kobe, Japan, January 8.
Anderson, Z. 2015. Cost of flood insurance to go up 20 percent. Herald-Tribune, March
31, 2015. Retrieved on March 30, 2015 from
http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20150331/ARTICLE/150339934
Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 78 Fed. Reg. 5182 (January 24, 2013) pp.
5181-5183
Archer, W.R., P.J. Elmer, D.M. Harrison, and D.C. Ling. 1998. Determinants of
Multifamily Mortgage Default. FDIC Working Paper No. 99-2, Washington, DC.
Babbie, E. 2011. The Basics of Social Research. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth.
Baum-Snow, N., Marion, J., 2009. The Effects of Low Income Housing Tex Credit
Developments on Neighborhoods. Journal of Public Economics, 93(5-6), 654666.
Bea, K. 2010. Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations,
Eligible Activities, and Funding. Library of Congress, Washington DC:
Congressional Research Service.
Beatley, T. 2009. Planning for coastal resilience: best practices for calamitous times.
Island Press.
Berke, P.R. and Beatley, T. 1997. After the hurricane: Linking recovery to sustainable
development in the Caribbean. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Berke, P.R., Kartez, J., and Wenger, D. 1993. Recovery after disaster: Achieving
sustainable development, mitigation, and equity. Disasters, 17, 93-109.
Beven, J. L. 2014. Tropical Cycle Report: Hurricane Frances. National Hurricane
Center, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL062004_Frances.pdf retrieved on
December 30, 2014.

227

Beven, J. L. II, Avila, L. A., Blake, E. S., Brown, D. P., Franklin, J. L., Knabb, R. D.,
Pasch, R. J., Rhome, J. R., and Stewart, S. R. 2008. Annual Summary: Atlantic
Hurricane Season of 2005. Monthly Weather Review, Volume 136, pp. 11091173.
Bin, O., and Kruse, J. B. 2006. Real estate market response to coastal flood hazards.
Natural Hazards Review.
Blake, E. S., Landsea, C. W. Landsea, and Gibney, E. J. Gibney. 2011. The Deadliest,
Costliest, and Most Intense United States Tropical Cyclones from 1851 to 2000.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NOAA Technical
Memorandum NWS NHC-6.
Bodie, Z, Kane, A., and Markus, A. 1993. Investments. Boston: Irwin.
Bockstael, N.E. and K.E. McConnell. 2007. Environmental Valuation with Revealed
Preferences: A Theoretical Guide to Empirical Models. Kluwer Publishing.
Botts, H., Du, W., Jeffery, T., Suhr, L. 2014. 2014 CoreLogic Storm Surge Report. July
2014.
Bradbury, J. A. 1989. The policy implications of differing concepts of risk. Science,
Technology and Human Values. Volume 4, No. 4 (Autumn), pp. 380-399.
Buchanan, J. M., and Tullock, G. 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations
of Constitutional Democracy. University of Michigan Press.
Buckle, P. 2005. “Disaster: mandated definitions, local knowledge and complexity”, in
Perry, R.W. and Quarantelli, E.L. (Eds), What is a Disaster? New Answers to Old
Questions, Xlibris, Philadelphia, PA, pp. 173-200.
Byrne, P. 1996. Risk, Uncertainty and Decision-making in Property Development. E & F
N Spon: London.
Cadman, D. and Topping, D. 1995. Property Development. E & F N Spon: London.
Cameron, S. 1990. Managing interest rate risk in real estate development. Journal of
Applied Corporate Finance, 3 : 72-79.
Campanella, T. J. 2006. Urban resilience and the recovery of New Orleans.Journal of the
American Planning Association, 72(2), 141-146.
Car, L. J. 1932. Disaster and the Sequence Pattern of Social Change. American Journal
of Sociology, 38: 207-218.

228

Carson, R. T., Mitchell, R. C., Hanemann, M., Kopp, R. J., Presser, S., & Ruud, P. A.
2003). Contingent valuation and lost passive use: damages from the Exxon
Valdez oil spill. Environmental and resource economics, 25(3), 257-286.
Chaplin, R., & Freeman, A. 1999. Towards an accurate description of
affordability. Urban Studies, 36(11), 1949-1957.
Cheng, P., Lin, Z. and Liu, Y. 2008. A Model of Time-on-Market and Real Estate Price
Under Sequential Search with Recall. Real Estate Economics, 36: 813–843.
Clancy, P. E. 1990. Tax incentives and federal housing programs: Proposed principles for
the 1990s. In D. DiPasquale & L. C. Keyes (Eds.), Building foundations: Housing
and federal policy (Chapter 11). Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press.
Cohen, R. 2011. The Impacts of Affordable Housing on Health: A Research Summary.
Insights from Housing Policy Research. Center for Housing Policy, retrieved from
http://www.nhc.org/media/files/Insights_HousingAndHealthBrief.pdf on
December 15, 2014.
Coles, E. and Buckle, P. 2004. Developing Community Resilience as a Foundation for
Effective Disaster Recovery. Australian Journal of Emergency Management,
Volume 19, Number 4, pp. 6–15.
Comerio, M. C. 1997. Housing issues after disasters. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis
Management, 5(3), 166-178.
Comerio, M. C. 1998. Disaster Hits Home: New Policy for Urban Housing Recovery.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Comerio, M. C., Landis, J. D., and Rofe, Y. 1994. Post-Disaster Residential Rebuilding,
Working Paper 608, Institute of Urban and Regional Development, University of
California, Berkeley, CA.
CoreLogic, 2011. Annual Storm Surge Report, 2011: Residential Storm Surge Exposure
Estimates for 10 U.S. Cities, CoreLogic
Cresswell, J. 2007. Research Design: Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design.
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Crossett K., Culliton T., Wiely P., and Goodspeed T. 2004. Population trends along the
coastal United States: 1980–2008. Silver Spring, MD: National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration. Coastal Trends Report Series.

229

Crowell, M., Coulton, K., Johnson, C., Westcott, J., Bellomo, D., Edelman, S., Hirsch, E.
2010. An Estimate of the U.S. Population Living in 100-Year Coastal Flood
Hazard Areas. Journal Coastal Research. Vol. 26, (2) pp. 201-211.
Cutter, S., 1995. Forgotten Casualties: Women, Children and Environmental Change.
Global Environmental Change, 5 (3), 181-194.
Cutter, S.L. 2005, “Are we asking the right questions?”, in Perry, R.W. and Quarantelli,
E.L. (Eds), What is a Disaster? New Answers to Old Questions, Xlibris,
Philadelphia, PA, pp. 39-48.
Cutter, S. L. and C.T. Emrich. 2006. Moral Hazard, Social Catastrophe: The Changing
Face of Vulnerability along the Hurricane Coasts. Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 604 (1): 102-112.
Davidson, R. A. and Lambert, K. B. 2001. Comparing the Hurricane Disaster Risk of
U.S. Coastal Counties. Natural Hazards Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 132-142.
DeNavas-Walt, C. and Proctor, B. E. 2014. Income and Poverty in the United States:
2013. Current Population Reports. Issued September 2014. U.S. Department of
Commerce Economic and Statistics Administration, U.S. Census Bureau.
Dillman, D. A., Smyth, J. D. & Christian, L. M. 2011. Internet, mail and Mixed-Mode
Surveys: The Tailored Design Method, 3rd edition. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc.
Dombrowsky, W. 1981. Another Step Toward a Social Theory of Disaster. Preliminary
Paper #70, Newark, DE: Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware.
Dullisear, R. 2001. Checklist helps tick off how to avoid pitfalls during development.
Australian Property Journal 36: 509-514.
Dynes, R. 1998. Coming to Terms with Community Disaster. In E.L. Quarantelli (ed.)
What Is a Disaster: Perspectives on the Question. Routledge, London.
Edson, C. L. 2011. Affordable Housing—An Intimate History. Journal of Affordable
Housing & Community Development Law, 193-213.
Emanuel, K. 2005. Increasing Destructiveness of Tropical Cyclones Over the Past 30
Years. Nature. 436, pp. 686–688.
Enarson, E. 1998. Through Women’s Eyes: A Gendered Research Agenda for Disaster
Social Science. Disasters. 22(2): 157-173.

230

Enarson, E., Fothergill, A., and Peek, L. 2006. Gender and Disaster: Foundations and
Directions, in H. Rodriguez, E. L. Quarantelli and R. R. Dynes (eds.) Handbook
of Disaster Research, pp. 130-146, New York: Springer.
Eriksen, M. D. and Rosenthal, S. S. 2010. Crowd out effects of place-based subsidized
rental housing: New evidence from the LIHTC program. Journal of Public
Economics 94(1112):953 – 966.
ESRI 2013. ArcGIS Desktop: Release 10.1. Redlands, CA: Environmental Systems
Research Institute.
Field, C. G. 1997. Building Consensus for Affordable Housing. Housing Policy
Debate, 8(4), 801-832.
Finch, C., Emrich, C. T., and Cutter, S. L. 2010. Disaster disparities and differential
recovery in New Orleans. Population and Environment. 31:179-202.
Fishcoff, B., Slovic, P., and Lichtenstein, S. 1983. The public vs. ‘the experts’ in The
analysis of actual vs. perceived risks, V.T. Covello, W. G. Flamm, J. V.
Rodricks, and R. G. Tardiff, 235-249, New York: Plenum.
Fischer, H. W. 1998. Response to disaster: Fact versus fiction & its perpetuation: The
sociology of disaster. University Press of America.
Fischer, H.W. 2003. The Sociology of Disaster: Definitions, Research Questions, &
Measurements. Continuation of the Discussion in a Post-September 11.
Environment. International Journal of Mass Emergency and Disasters, 1:91–107
Fischer H.W. III. 2008. Response to Disaster: Fact versus Fiction and its Perpetuation,
3rd ed. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Fischer, W. and Sard, B. 2006. Housing Needs of Many Low-Income Hurricane
Evacuees are Not Being Addressed. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
Washington, D.C.
Florida Department of Health. 2012. Florida Population Atlas. Retrieved on 2/5/2015 at
http://www.floridacharts.com/Charts/atlas/population/PopAtlas2012/narrative.pdf
Fothergill, A. and Peek, L. A. 2004. Poverty and Disasters in the United States: A
Review of Sociological Findings. Natural Hazards 32:89-110.
Freeman, A., Chaplin, R., and Whitehead, C. M. E. 1997. Rental Affordability: A Review
of International Literature. Discussion Paper No. 88. Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University, Department of Land Economy.

231

Fritz, C.E. 1961. “Disaster.” Pp. 651-94 in Contemporary Social Problems, in R. K.
Merton and R.A. Nisbet (eds). New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
Fritz HM, Blount C, Sokoloski R, Singleton J, Fuggle A, McAdoo BG, Moore A, Grass
C, Tate B (2008) Hurricane Katrina storm surge reconnaissance. J Geotech
Geoenviron Eng, ASCE 134(5):644–656. doi:10.1061/(ASCE)10900241(2008)134:5(644)
Furman Center. 2013. Sandy’s Effects on Housing in New York City. March 2013.
Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy and Moelis Institute for
Affordable Housing, New York City University.
Galster G, Walker C, Hayes C, Boxall P, Johnson J. 2004. Measuring the impact of
Community Development Block Grant spending on urban neighborhoods.
Housing Policy Debate. 15(4): 903-34.
GAO – See U.S. Governmental Accounting Office [GAO]
Glaeser, E. L. and Gyourko, J. 2008. Rethinking Federal Housing Policy, Washington:
American Enterprise Institute.
Glahn, B., Taylor, A., Kurkowski, N., & Shaffer, W. A. 2009. The role of the SLOSH
model in National Weather Service storm surge forecasting. National Weather
Digest, 33(1), 3-14.
Godschalk, D. R., Brower, D. J., and Beatley, T. 1989. Catastrophic Coastal Storms:
Hazard Mitigation and Development Management. Duke University Press.
Goetz, E. G. 2004. The Reality of Deconcentration. Shelterforce Online, Issue #138,
November/December 2004. Retrieved on March 12, 2015 at
http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/138/deconcentration.html
Goetz, E. G. 2013. New Deal Ruins: Race, Economic Justice, & Public Housing Policy.
Cornell University Press.
Gotham K. F. and Greenberg, M. 2008. From 9/11 to 8/29: Post-Disaster Recovery and
Rebuilding in New York and New Orleans. Social Forces , Vol. 87, No. 2, pp.
1039-1062, Oxford University Press, Article Stable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20430902
Graham, L. 2012. Advancing the human right to housing in post-Katrina New Orleans:
discursive opportunity structures in housing and community development.
Housing Policy Debate, 22:1, 5-27.

232

Green, T. F., & Olshansky, R. B. (2012). Rebuilding housing in New Orleans: the Road
Home Program after the Hurricane Katrina disaster. Housing Policy
Debate, 22(1), 75-99.
Gustafson, J. and Walker, J. C. 2002. Analysis of State Qualified Action Plans for the
Low Income Housing Tax Credit Program. Submitted to the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development. The Urban Institute, Metropolitan Housing and
Communities Policy Institute, Washington, D.C.
Haas, J. E., Kates, R., and Bowden, M. 1977. Reconstruction following disaster.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hamin, E. M., & Gurran, N. (2009). Urban form and climate change: Balancing
adaptation and mitigation in the US and Australia. Habitat international, 33(3),
238-245.
Hargitay, S.E. and Yu, S. 1993. Property Investment Decisions: A Quantitative
Approach, E.&F.N. Spon, London.
Harrington, S. E.. 2006. Has Rethinking Disaster Policy After Hurricane Katrina. In R. J.
Daniels, D. F. Kettl, and H. Kunreuther (Eds.) On Risk and Disaster: Lessons
from Hurricane Katrina, Philadephia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Heinz Center. 2000. The Hidden Costs of Coastal Hazards: Implications for Risk
Assessment and Mitigation. Island Press: Washington, D.C.
Henry, M., Cortes, A., & Morris, S. 2013. The 2013 Annual Homeless Assessment
Report to Congress: Part 1, Point-In-Time Estimates of Homelessness, The U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Community Planning
and Development.
[HHS] U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2013. 2013 Annual Poverty
Guidelines retrieved from http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/13poverty.cfm on
December 15, 2014.
Hickey, R., Lubell, J., Haas, P., & Morse, S. 2012. Losing Ground: The Struggle of
Moderate-Income Households to Afford the Rising Costs of Housing and
Transportation. Retrieved on December 30, 2014 from
http://www.nhc.org/media/files/LosingGround_10_2012.pdf
Hollar, M. K. 2014. Understanding Whom the LIHTC Program Serves: Tenants in
LIHTC Units as of December 31, 2012, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Office of Policy and Research.

233

Hooks, J. P., and Miller, T. B. 2006. Continuing Storm: How Disaster Recovery
Excludes Those Most in Need, The. Cal. WL Rev., 43, 21.
Hoover, Herbert: "Statement Announcing the White House Conference on Home
Building and Home Ownership," September 15, 1931.Online by Gerhard Peters
and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=22804
Hurricane Housing Working Group [HWG], 2005. Recommendations to Assist in
Florida’s Long Term Housing Recovery Efforts. Report and Recommendations
of the Hurricane Housing Working Group created by Executive Order 04-240,
February 2015.
Igan, D., & Pinheiro, M. 2010. Exposure to real estate in bank portfolios. Journal of Real
Estate Research, 32(1), 47-74.
IPCC, 2012. Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate
Change Adaptation. A Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, Cambridge University Press.
IPCC, 2014: Summary for policymakers. In: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation,
and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working
Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D.
Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B.
Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L.White
(eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York,
NY, USA, pp. 1-32.
Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University. 2013. State of the Nation’s
Housing 2013. Cambridge, MA: Author. Retrieved on December 12, 2014 at
www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2012/son2012.pdf.
Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University. 2012. State of the Nation’s
Housing 2012. Cambridge, MA: Author. Retrieved on September 9, 2013 at
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/son2013.pdf
Kates, R. W., Colten, C. E., Laska, S., & Leatherman, S. P. 2006. Reconstruction of New
Orleans after Hurricane Katrina: a research perspective. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 103(40), 14653-14660.
Katz, B. J., Turner, M. A., Brown, K. D., Cunningham, M., and Sawyer, N. 2003.
Rethinking Local Affordable Housing Strategies: Lessons from 70 years of policy

234

and practice. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Program on Metropolitan
Policy and the Urban Institute.
Keim, M. E. 2011. Preventing Disasters: Public Health Vulnerability Reduction as a
Sustainable Adaptation to Climate Change. Disaster Medicine and Public Health
Preparedness, 5(02), 140-148.
Khadduri, J. 2013. Creating balance in the locations of LIHTC developments: The role of
qualified allocation plans. Washington, DC: Poverty and Race Research Action
Council.
Khadduri, J., Climaco, C., Burnett, K., Gould, L., & Elving, L. 2012. What Happens to
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Properties at Year 15 and Beyond? US
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy and
Development Research.
Klein, R.J.T., Nicholls, R.J., and Mimura, N., 1999. Coastal adaptation to climate change:
can the IPCC technical guidelines by applied? Mitigation and Adaptation
Strategies for Global Change, 4, 51–64.
Klein, R.J.T., Nicholls, R.J.; Ragoonaden, S., Capobianco, M.; Aston, J., and Buckley,
E.N., 2001. Technological options for adaptation to climate change in coastal
zones. Journal of Coastal Research, 17(3), 531–543.
Knight, F. H., 1921. Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. New York: Hart, Schaffner, and Marx.
Khumpaisal, S., & Ross, A. 2009. Analytic Approach to Risk Assessment in Real Estate
Development. In 4th Annual Conference Liverpool BEAN, p. 60.
Knutson, T. R., and R. E. Tuleya, 2004: Impact of CO2-induced warming on simulated
hurricane 498 intensity and precipitation: Sensitivity to the choice of climate
model and convective 499 parameterization. J. Climate, 17, 3477–3495.
Knutson TR, McBride JL, Chan J, Emanuel K, Holland GJ, Landsea CW, Held CI,
Kossin JP, Srivastava AK, Sugi M (2010) Tropical cyclones and climate change.
Nature Geoscience, 3:157–163
Kunreuther, H. 2006. Has the Time Come for Comprehensive Natural Disaster
Insurance? In R. J. Daniels, D. F. Kettl, and H. Kunreuther (Eds.) On Risk and
Disaster: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina, Philadephia, PA: University of
Pennsylvania Press.
Landsea, C. W., Pielke Jr, R. A., Mestas-Nunez, A. M., & Knaff, J. A. 1999. Atlantic
basin hurricanes: Indices of climatic changes. Climatic change, 42(1), 89-129.

235

Langis, J. 2013. Adaptation measures for floods, storm surges, and sea level rise.
Groupe Littoral et vie Université de Moncton, February 2013.
Lawrence, M. B. and Cobb, H. D. 2014. Tropical Cycle Report: Hurricane Frances.
National Hurricane Center,
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL112004_Jeanne.pdf retrieved on December
30, 2014.
Levine, J. N., Esnard, A. M., & Sapat, A. 2007. Population Displacement and Housing
Dilemmas Due to Catastrophic Disasters. Journal of Planning Literature, 22(1),
3-15.
Liu, Y. C., Liu, W. B., Sun, M. X. 2011. Analysis of Risk of Commercial Real Estate
Based on Multiple Attribute Group Decision-Making. Advanced Materials
Research, Vol. 368-373, 1920.
Lofstedt, R.E. and Frewer, L. (eds). 1998. The Earthscan Reader in Risk and Modern
Society. London: Earthscan.
Maclennan, D., & Williams, R. 1990. Affordable housing in Britain and the United
States. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
Malpezzi, S., Vandell, K., 2002. Does the low-income housing tax credit increase the
supply of housing? Journal of Housing Economics, 11 (4), 360-380.
Markham, J. 2001. Development finance: Analysing structures here and internationally.
Australian Property Journal, 36 : 695-703.
Marlowe, H. 1999. Assessing the economic benefits of America’s coastal regions. Trends
and future challenges for US National Ocean and Coastal Policy, 77.
Maxwell, J. 2005. Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach (2nd ed).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
McCarthy, K. F. and Hanson, M. 2008. Post-Katrina Recovery of the Housing Market
along the Mississippi Gulf Coast. A Technical Report, Rand Gulf States Policy
Institute.
Meléndez, E., Schwartz, A., and de Montrichard, A. 2008. Year 15 and preservation of
tax-credit housing for low-income households: An assessment of risk. Housing
Studies 23(1):67–87.
Miles, M.E., Berens, G. and Weiss, M.A. 2000. Real Estate Development: Principles
and Process. Washington, DC: Urban Land Institute.

236

Mileti, D. 1999. Disasters by Design: A Reassessment of Natural Hazards in the United
States. Washington, D.C.: Joseph Henry Press.
Morrison, L., J. 2007 “The STEEP Sectors”, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
Learning Resources Website, USA (30 Jan. 08)
Mueller, E. J., Bell, H., Chang, B. B., and Henneberger, J. 2011. Looking for Home after
Katrina: Postdisaster Housing Policy and Low-Income Survivors. Journal of
Planning Education and Research, 31(3): 291-307
Nakagawa, Y. and Shaw, R. 2004. Social capital: A missing link to disaster recovery.
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, 22(1), 5-34.
National Marine Fisheries Service. 2014. Fisheries Economics of the United States, 2012.
U.S. Dept. Commerce, NOAA Tech. Memo. NMFS-F/SPO-137, 175 p.
Nelson, A. C. 2014. Survey of Public-Private Partnership Tools and the Role of Public
Patient Equity to Leverage Private Real Estate Development. In Foundations of
Real Estate Development Financing (pp. 99-135). Island Press/Center for
Resource Economics.
Newell, G. and Steglick, M. 2006. Assessing the Importance of Property Development
Risk Factors. Pacific Rim Property Research Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 22-37.
Nguyen, M. T. 2005. Does affordable housing detrimentally affect property values? A
review of the literature. Journal of Planning Literature, 20(1), 15-26.
Nigg, J. M. 1995. Disaster recovery as a social process. Wellington after the quake: The
challenge of rebuilding (pp. 81-92). Wellington, New Zealand: The Earthquake
Commission.
NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration]. 2013a. National coastal
population report: population trends from 1970–2020 [Internet]. Washington, DC:
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [accessed April 3, 2015].
Available from: http://stateofthecoast.noaa.gov/features/coastal-populationreport.pdf
NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration]. 2013b. National coastal
population report: population trends from 1970–2020 [Internet]. Washington, DC:
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [accessed April 3, 2015].
http://stateofthecoast.noaa.gov/coastal_economy/welcome.html
Oliver-Smith, A. 1996. Anthropological research on hazards and disasters. Annual
review of anthropology, 303-328.

237

O’Looney, J. 2000. Beyond Maps: GIS and Decision Making in Local Government.
ESRI Press: Redlands, CA.
O’Regan, K. M., and Ouigley, J. M. 2013. Federal Policy and the Rise of Nonprofit
Housing Providers (Tighe, J. R. and Mueller, E. J., editors), Affordable Housing
Reader, p. 257.
Pasch, R. J., Brown, D. P. and Blake, E. S. 2011. Tropical Cycle Report: Hurricane
Charley. National Hurricane Center,
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL032004_Charley.pdf retrieved on December
30, 2014.
Peacock, W. G., Dash, N., & Zhang, Y. 2007. Sheltering and Housing Recovery
Following Disaster*. In Handbook of disaster research (pp. 258-274). Springer
New York.
Perry, R. W. 2007. What is a Disaster?. (H. Rodriquez, E. L. Quarantelli, and R. Dynes,
eds.), Handbook of Disaster Research, (pp. 1-15). Springer New York.
Pidgeon, N.F., Hood, C., Jones, D., Turner, B.A. and Gibson, R. 1992. Risk perception,
in: Risk - Analysis, Perception and Management pp. 89-134, London: Royal
Society.
Pielke Jr, R. A., Gratz, J., Landsea, C. W., Collins, D., Saunders, M. A., & Musulin, R.
2008. Normalized hurricane damage in the United States: 1900–2005. Natural
Hazards Review, 9(1), 29-42.
Plough, A., and Krimsky, S. 1987. The emergence of risk communication studies: social
and political context. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 12(3/4), 4-10.
Plyler, A. 2013. Facts for Features: Hurricane Katrina Recovery. Greater New Orleans
Community Data Center, Press Release dated February 2, 2013.
Popkin, S. J., Turner, M., and Burt, M. 2006. Rebuilding Affordable Housing in New
Orleans: The Challenge of Creating Inclusive Communities. Rebuilding
Opportunity and Equity into the New New Orleans. The Urban Institute.
Washington, D.C.
Postyn, S. H. 1994. The low income housing tax credit: A study of its impact at the
project level. Master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,
MA.
Quigley, J. M. 2000. A decent home: Housing policy in perspective. Brookings-Wharton
Papers on Urban Affairs, 53-99.

238

Reece, J., Rogers, C., Martin, M., Lawson, S., Lee, J., and Singh, A. 2011. Galveston
after Ike: Moving Together Towards a Full Recovery. Kirwin Institute for the
Study of Race and Ethnicity: Ohio State University.
Rehfeld, A. 2005. The Concept of Constituency. New York: Cambridge
Revi, A., D.E. Satterthwaite, F. Aragón-Durand, J. Corfee-Morlot, R.B.R. Kiunsi, M.
Pelling, D.C. Roberts, and W. Solecki, 2014: Urban areas. In: Climate Change
2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral
Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J.
Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O.
Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R.
Mastrandrea, and L.L.White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp. 535-612.
Reznick Group. 2011. The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program at Year 25: A
Current Look at Its Performance. Retrieved on December 15, 2014 from
http://www.
reznickgroup.com/sites/reznickgroup.com/files/papers/reznickgroup_lihtc_
survey_2011.pdf
Richardson, T. M. and Renner, R. N., Geographic Information Systems Supporting
Disaster Response and Recovery. Cityscape, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2007. Available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1089502
Roberts, B. 2009. Strengthening the Low Income Housing Tax Credit Investment Market.
Community Investments, Volume 21, Issue 3. Winter 2009/2010.
Rubin, C. B. 1985. The community recovery process in the United States after a major
natural disaster. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters. 3(2),
9-28.
Rubin, C. B. and Barbee, D. 1985. Disaster recovery and hazard mitigation: Bridging the
intergovernmental gap. In Emergency Management: A challenge for public
administration, pp. 57-63. Public Administration Review. January, 45.
Rubin, C. B., & Popkin, R. 1990. Disaster recovery after hurricane Hugo in South
Carolina. Natural Hazards Working Paper Series, Working Paper #69, Center for
International Science, Technology and Public Policy, The George Washington
University.
Rusk, David. 2001. Inside Game Outside Game. Brookings Institution Press.

239

Salama, A. M., & Alshuwaikhat, H. M. (2006). A trans-disciplinary approach for a
comprehensive understanding of sustainable affordable housing. Global Built
Environment Review, 5(3), 35-50.
Samuelson, P. A. 1948. Consumption theory in terms of revealed preference. Economica,
243-253.
Samuelson, P. A. 1950. The problem of integrability in utility theory. Economica, 355385.
Savas, E. S. 1987. Privatization: The Key to Better Government. Chatham, NJ: Chatham
House Publishers.
Savas, E. S. 2000. Privatization and the New Public Management. 28 Fordham Urb. L.J.
1731 (2000-2001).
Schensul, S. L., Schensul, J. J., & LeCompte, M. D. 1999. Essential ethnographic
methods: Observations, interviews, and questionnaires (Vol. 2). Altamira Press.
Schwab, J., Topping, K.C., Eadie, C., Deyle, R., and Smith, R. 1998. Planning for
Postdisaster Recovery and Reconstruction. PAS Report 483/484. Chicago, IL:
American Planning Association.
Schwartz, A. F. 2010. Housing Policy in the United States, 2nd Edition. Routledge. New
York.
Schwartz, A. F. 2014. Housing policy in the United States, 3rd Edition. Routledge, New
York.
Simunovich, David V. 2008. The Quiet of Dissolution: Post-Disaster Redevelopment and
Status-Preserving Compensation, Seton Hall Law Review: Vol. 38: Iss. 1, Article
7. Available at: http://scholarship.shu.edu/shlr/vol38/iss1/7
Singleton, R.A. and Straits, B.C. 2005. Approaches to Social Research. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Slovic, P. E. 2000. The Perception of Risk. Earthscan Publications, London: UK.
Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., & Lichtenstein, S. 1979. Rating the risks. Environment: Science
and Policy for Sustainable Development, 21(3), 14-39.
Smith, D. 2005. Through the glass darkly. In Perry, R.W. and Quarantelli, E.L. (Eds),
What is a Disaster? New Answers to Old Questions, Xlibris, Philadelphia, PA, pp.
292-307.

240

Smith, K. 2013. Environmental hazards: assessing risk and reducing disaster.
Routledge.
Smith, G., & Wenger, D. 2007. Sustainable disaster recovery: Operationalizing an
existing agenda. In H. Rodriguez, E. Quarantelli, & R. Dynes (Eds.), Handbook of
disaster research (pp. 234–257). New York: Springer.
Somerville, C. T., & Mayer, C. J. 2003. Government regulation and changes in the
affordable housing stock. Economic Policy Review, 9(2).
Spangle, William & Associates, Inc. 1991. Rebuilding After Earthquakes: Lessons from
Planners. Portola Valley, California: William Spangle & Associates, Inc.
Stallings, R. A. 1998. Disaster and the theory of social order. In E. L. Quarantelli, (Ed.),
What is a Disaster? Perspectives on the Question, pp. 127-145, New York:
Routledge.
Stallings, R.A. 2005. Disaster, crisis, collective stress and mass deprivation. In Perry,
R.W. and Quarantelli, E.L. (Eds), What is a Disaster? New Answers to Old
Questions, Xlibris, Philadelphia, PA, pp. 237-274.
Stake, R. E. 2000. Case studies. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of
qualitative research, pp.435-453, Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Stegman, Michael A. 1991. The Excessive Costs of Creative Finance: Growing
Inefficiencies in the Production of Low-Income Housing. Housing Policy Debate,
2(2):357–73.
Stegman, Michael A. 1992. Comment on Kathryn P. Nelson and Jill Khadduri’s “To
Whom Should Limited Housing Resources Be Directed?” Housing Policy Debate,
3(1):57–66.
Stewart, S. R. 2011. Tropical Cycle Report: Hurricane Charley. National Hurricane
Center, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL092004_Ivan.pdf retrieved on
December 30, 2014.
Stone, M. E. 1993. Shelter Poverty: New Ideas on Housing Affordability. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press.
Stone, M. E. 2006. What Is Housing Affordability? The Case for The Residual Income
Approach. Housing Policy Debate, 17(1), 151-184.

241

Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. 2007. Profile analysis: the multivariate approach to
repeated measures. Using multivariate statistics. Boston (MA): Pearson
Education, Inc, 311-74.
Teaford, J. C. 2000. Urban renewal and its aftermath. Housing Policy Debate,11(2), 443465.
Teddlie, C., & Yu, F. 2007. Mixed methods sampling: A typology with examples. Journal
of Mixed Methods Research, 1, 77-100
Thomas, J. M. 1997. Redevelopment and Race. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Tierney, K. 2006. Social Inequality, Hazards, and Disasters. In R. Daniels, D. Kettl, and
H. Kunreuther (Eds.), On Risk and Disasters: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina,
pp. 109-128, Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press.
Tol, R. S., Klein, R. J., & Nicholls, R. J. 2008. Towards Successful Adaptation to SeaLevel Rise Along Europe's Coasts. Journal of Coastal Research, 432-442
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk [UNISDR], 2005. Note on
Terminology from the WCDR Conference Secretariat to the Drafting Committee
(18/11/2004) retrieved http://www.unisdr.org/2005/wcdr/intergover/draftingcommitte/terminology.pdf on March 23, 2015
Unity of Greater New Orleans. 2010. Search and Rescue Five Years Later: Saving People
Still Trapped in Katrina’s Ruin. A report of the Abandoned Buildings Outreach
Team, August 2010.
US Commission on Ocean Policy. 2004. An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century: Final
Report of the US Commission on Ocean Policy. Washington (DC), US
Commission on Ocean Policy.
U.S. Government Accountability Office [GAO]. 2010. Disaster Assistance: Federal
Assistance for Permanent Housing Primarily Benefited Homeowners;
Opportunities Exist to Better Target Rental Housing Needs. (Publication Number
GAO-10-17)
Virmani, J. I., & Weisberg, R. H. 2006. The 2005 hurricane season: An echo of the past
or a harbinger of the future?. Geophysical research letters, 33(5).
Viveiros, J. and Sturtevant, L. 2014. Housing Landscape 2014. Center for Housing
Policy Report.

242

Vuk, V. 2008. Taking advantage of disaster: misrepresentation of housing shortage for
political gain. International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 35 Iss: 8, pp.603 –
614
Webster P.J., Holland G.J., Curry J.A., Chang H-R. 2005. Changes in tropical cyclone
number, duration and intensity in a warming environment. Science, 309:1844–
1846.
White, G. F. 1945. Human Adjustment to Floods. Chicago: The University of Chicago.
Williamson, A. R. 2011. Can they afford the rent? Resident cost burden in low income
housing tax credit developments. Urban Affairs Review, 47(6), 775-799.
Wu, J. and Lindell, M. K. 2003. Housing Reconstruction after Two Major Earthquakes:
The 1994 Northridge Earthquake in the United States and the 1999 Chi-Chi
Earthquake in Taiwan. Hazard Reduction & Recovery Center, Texas A&M
University.
Yin, R. K. 2009. Case Study Research: Design and Methods (4th ed). Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage Publications.

243

